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ABSTRACT 
How Experts Judge Creativity: A Field Study of the Assessment of Creative Output 
by 
Michael Robert Seyle  
August 2018 
Chair: Pam Scholder Ellen 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
Creativity is a fundamental component of innovation and critical for long-term business 
success.  Identifying the products and ideas that are most creative, and therefore worthy of 
further development and investment, is an essential part of the creative process.  However, 
experimental research into creativity over the past 20 years has yielded inconsistent and 
contradictory results.  Moreover, this same research has shown that organizations struggle to 
identify their most creative products and ideas for further development.  Critics suggest 
organizational creativity research may suffer from measurement misspecification due to a 
misalignment between existing construct definitions of creativity as a response that is both 
“novel and useful” and experimental studies that use only a single item, creativity, to measure 
creative output.  This research investigates whether the theorized misalignment may be due, in 
part, to the research use of judges with little or no experience in the creative domain and their 
failure to understand the criteria, approaches, and techniques that expert judges actually use to 
assess creative output.  To better understand how these issues may affect research results, this 
research utilized Naturalistic Decision Making field-study methods to investigate how expert 
judges assess the creative output of experienced professionals in the setting of a creativity awards 
contest.  Through a series of interviews, observations, think-aloud protocols, and simulations 
 xii 
with expert judges of creativity award contests, this research identifies six factors experts use to 
assess professional level creative output, and uncovers the processes, approach, and challenges 
involved in the real-world assessment of creative products and ideas.  Recommendations for how 
assessing creativity can be improved in research and practice are discussed as well as suggestions 
for future research. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Creativity, Intuition, Analysis, Experts, Creative Output, Measurement, Field 
Study, Contests, Judgment, Decision Making 
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I INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Background 
 The importance of creativity to business success and the global economy continues to 
garner attention in both business press and academia.  Expanding on Drucker’s concept of the 
“knowledge-based” organization, Florida argues human creativity has become “the decisive 
source of competitive advantage” for businesses and “the ultimate economic resource” for 
organizations (Florida, 2002).  In 2008, the Conference Board reported that corporate executives 
view creativity as a key capability organizations need to succeed:  
U.S. employers rate creativity and innovation among the top five skills that will increase 
in importance over the next five years and rank it among the top challenges facing CEOs 
(Conf. Board, 2008).   
A 2010 survey of 1,500 U.S. corporate CEOs extended the significance of creativity to the C-
suite, stating, “Creativity is now the most important leadership quality for success in business, 
outweighing even integrity and global thinking” (IBM, 2010).   
Creativity is viewed as an essential element and precursor to innovation that drives 
organizational success and economic prosperity (Amabile & Khaire, 2008).  The importance of 
creativity to both business and global economies is reflected in the impact creative industries 
have on domestic production.  Creative industries, such as the arts and cultural goods and 
services, are estimated to contribute more than $500 billion to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product, 
or more than 3.2% of current-dollar GDP, compared to other industries, like travel and tourism, 
that generate only 2.6% of GDP (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013).  Advertising 
creativity alone is estimated to generate almost $200 billion in U.S. gross domestic output, or 
20% of all arts and cultural goods and services (US BEA 2013).  Likewise, in the United 
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Kingdom, creative industries supply more than 1.5 million jobs, which amounted to more than 
5% of the U.K.’s total employment in 2010 (UK Dept. Culture Media and Sport, 2011).  
I.2 Problem Statement 
Given creativity’s importance to business success and global economic output, it is 
unsurprising that individual and organizational creativity has been the subject of increasingly 
intensive research in the fields of management, psychology, education, and the arts over the past 
60 years (Runco, 2004).  Despite this intense academic interest across disciplines, however, 
understanding of creativity remains fragmented into specialized subfields, often resulting in 
inconsistent, and conflicting, research findings (Amabile, 2012).  Recently, scholars have raised 
concerns that these inconsistent and contradictory creativity research results may be due to 
construct measurement misspecification, incomplete methodological approaches, or poor 
construct validity (Sullivan & Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012).   Many of these concerns relate 
to how creativity is defined, both as a construct and operationally, as well as the processes 
utilized in assessing creative output in research studies (Montag et al., 2012).   
Most extant creativity research has utilized consensual judgment methods to assess the 
“overall creativity” of products or ideas as a unitary construct or single item.  This approach 
contradicts the numerous existing construct definitions of creativity as either a two-item or a 
multi-faceted construct (Sullivan & Ford, 2010).  The majority of published research to date also 
has relied upon experimental studies that employ children, students, and individuals with little or 
no experience or training in creativity as study participants (Montag et al., 2012).  These 
inexperienced experimental subjects raise concerns about the quality of the items assessed and 
the validity of their results (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012).  Moreover, the majority of studies have 
utilized educators, students, and other individuals with little or no established creativity expertise 
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as judges to measure the creative output of study subjects.  In short, it appears existing creativity 
research may suffer from the triple-threat combination of low construct validity, measurement 
misspecification, and incomplete assessment methods.  To investigate the nature and extent of 
these potential shortcomings, and gain insight into the processes, criteria, and approaches used to 
assess creative products and ideas in practice, this research examined how established domain 
experts make judgments of the creative output of professionals in a real world setting. 
I.3 Statement of Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria expert judges 
use in assessing the output creativity of those who regularly create products and ideas in creative 
industries that are subsequently submitted to award contests.  Understanding how domain experts 
make judgments about the level of professionals’ creativity in situations where judges face 
significant time, uncertainty, and ambiguity constraints provides useful insights into how 
creativity is assessed in real-world situations.  Such insights may also: (1) increase the field’s 
understanding of the challenges creativity researchers face in assessing creative output in 
experimental studies, (2) identify the key criteria real world judges use in assessing creativity; 
(3) suggest more effective assessment methods to improve the overall reliability and validity of 
creativity research, and (4) provide ideas that organizations can use to better discern the most 
promising creative product and ideas for development and investment.     
To explore these issues, this research examines how domain experts judge the creativity of 
entries in a professional award program by investigating the following research questions: 
1.  What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the 
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of 
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?  
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2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the 
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’ 
professional workplace settings?  
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products 
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else 
when judging creativity contests? 
4.  What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make 
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity? 
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging 
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them? 
I.4 Research Approach 
After receiving approval for the study from the university’s institutional review board, this 
research began investigating the steps, processes, and experiences of experts judging entries in a 
creativity awards contest.  Identified expert participants were all professionals in various creative 
industries with significant experience in assessing creative output in organizational settings as 
well as having acted as judges in numerous regional, national, and international creativity award 
programs.   
The main method of data collection involved in-depth interviews of these experts.  
Following an engaged scholarship research approach, the investigation originated with a pilot 
study that conducted open-ended interviews of managers in different creative industries.  This 
approach revealed the nature of creativity assessment in organizational settings and identified 
key challenges facing organizations that seek to exploit their most creative products and ideas.  
To gain further understanding into the processes involved in judging creative products and ideas, 
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the researcher subsequently spent three days immersed in a creativity awards event, observing 
expert judges during the judging process, collecting information about the awards program, and 
interviewing contest judges and the organizers of the awards program.  In-person interviews of 
participants were conducted using Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques in an effort to 
uncover non-conscious routines and steps in the judging process.  Several participant judges also 
took part in simulated judging exercises and think-aloud protocols during judging of contest 
entries to provide a better explanation of their cognitive effort.  After the awards event, 
additional phone interviews were conducted with domain experts who had served as judges for 
the same awards program in prior years.  A total of 12 in-depth interviews of expert judges were 
administered during and after the three-day judging event, and five judges also participated in 
simulation and think-aloud exercises during the judging event.  In addition to the interviews, 
simulations and observations, archival data on the judges’ numerical scores across ten creativity 
award contests over five years were obtained from the contest organizers.  This data was 
obtained in non-attributable format for use in testing the judges’ inter-rater reliability and 
comparing rater agreement within and across awards contests.   
 The combination of interviews, many involving Applied Cognitive Task Analysis with 
simulations and think-aloud exercises, along with direct observation of the judging event, and a 
longitudinal analysis of contest scores, did not allow for complete triangulation of data, but did 
help provide a deep analysis of creativity assessment in a field setting.  A comprehensive review 
of the literature on the assessment of creativity and expert judgment, the pilot study, and direct 
observations helped shape the collection of additional data from past judges.  Preliminary coding 
classifications were developed in advance of interviews, simulations and think-aloud exercises, 
and coding was refined as the research progressed, taking into account data previously collected 
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and the frameworks underlying the data analysis.  To help insure reliability of the coding 
process, two independent researchers check-coded several interview transcripts and 
disagreements were discussed until consensus was reached on a coding scheme that was used by 
the researcher for the remaining transcripts.   
I.5 Researcher Background and Assumptions 
The researcher who conducted this study is employed as an executive at a global 
architecture and design organization and has more than a decade of direct experience working 
with professionals engaged in generating creative products and ideas on a regular basis.  This 
background and practical experience provides a unique understanding about creativity in the 
workplace and the challenges organizations face in the development of creative and innovative 
output.  This background, however, also tends to color and potentially limit the researcher’s 
perceptions and beliefs about creative work and how creativity is judged.  As a result, the 
researcher took additional steps to identify and address potential preconceptions and biases that 
might affect the neutrality of the research, including peer reviews of the research design and 
process, consultation with academics and consultants not connected to the research, journaling 
about the decisions and choices made in the study’s design and analysis, and informing each of 
the research participants of the researcher’s position, such that they could raise any concerns they 
might have during the research process.  To help strengthen the validity of the research and 
address the subjectivity of the researcher, interview candidates were not prescreened as to their 
viewpoints and were selected by the contest organizers based solely on their qualifications as 
domain expert judges of numerous creativity contests.  Multiple data sources were sought to help 
identify diverse perspectives and possible alternative explanations for the findings and 
information discovered.  Information that potentially contradicted any researcher assumptions or 
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existing theoretical concepts was preserved and considered separately, to prevent forcing the data 
to fit any preconceptions. 
Based on past experience and understanding of the challenges businesses face in assessing 
creativity, as well as concerns raised in the literature about judgments of creative output, the 
following three assumptions grounded this research.  First, creativity is a social construct that is 
dependent upon the experiences, values, and utility ascribed to it by individuals who hold a 
position of authority, respect, or recognition within a particular domain or industry.  As such, 
creativity cannot be measured objectively through scientific analysis or accurately described as a 
physical property—whether something is considered creative is an intersubjective assessment or 
shared meaning developed through interaction with others and by means of comparison, 
expectation and personal aesthetic judgment.  Second, although all individuals can be creative in 
some way and at some period, those who are employed in creative industries to generate creative 
output have special skills, training, talent, motivation, supports, and experience that are 
necessary to inform creative products and ideas for business.  This second assumption leads to a 
third, wherein those who have been employed as creative professionals for many years and who 
have been identified by their peers as masters of their craft, such that they are selected to judge 
the creativity of other professionals, have achieved a level of experience to be considered 
“experts” in their domain. 
I.6 Rationale and Significance 
The rationale for this study arises from the challenges business leaders and managers of 
creative industries face in identifying the most creative products and ideas for further 
development and investment.  In addition, academic research into creativity has struggled to 
produce consistent and reliable findings about the nature of creativity, its antecedents and 
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consequences, and methods to motivate individuals and increase creative output.  One possible 
reason for inconsistent, and often contradictory, results may stem from how the dependent 
variable of “creative outcomes” is measured and assessed.  A deeper understanding of how 
experts judge creativity in field settings should lead to improved processes for assessing creative 
output and lend new insights into how to measure, increase, and expand creativity. 
I.7 Summary of Remaining Chapters 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation cover the following areas:  
• Chapter 2 - Literature Review: This section provides a general review of the literature 
on creativity and the assessment of creative outcomes.  It examines previous research on 
the definitions and processes of creativity, measurement of creative output in 
experimental studies, and the decision-making aspects of creative evaluation and 
assessment. This chapter highlights concerns about possible measurement 
misspecification and the validity and reliability of existing quantitative research. The 
review also generally explores the research on expert decision-making processes, 
particularly expert intuition and the heuristics and biases that accompany its use. The 
review establishes that a lack of research has explored how creativity is evaluated in real-
world settings and the processes domain experts use in judging creativity; in doing, it 
identifies the gap in literature this study is designed to address.  This section also 
describes the two main theories of information processing relating to judgment and 
decision making, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum 
Theory (CCT), explores how each theory applies to previous research, and the constructs 
and predictions of each theory about how decisions are made and outcomes are evaluated. 
This section illustrates how CEST and CCT differentially view the role and impact of 
intuition and analysis in decision-making, the nature and impact of heuristics and human 
cognitive biases, and the reliability of judgments under different conditions.  This chapter 
also provides an overview of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) as a framework for 
investigating and understanding judgment and decision making of experts in field 
settings. 
• Chapter 3 - Research Methodology: This chapter justifies the use of a qualitative, 
process focused case study approach, as it seeks to answer how experts judge creativity 
where the researcher has no control over activities, behaviors, and events of interest. This 
chapter also discusses the engaged scholarship approach to research as a means of 
increasing the relevance of the study by including information and perspectives from key 
stakeholders. The process used to select domain experts with significant experience in 
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judging and evaluating creativity in professional settings is also discussed.  This chapter 
also provides an outline of the data collection, reduction, and triangulation strategies 
utilized to both increase understanding of the context and improve validity by 
incorporating: (1) multiple sources of evidence, (2) a case study database, and (3) a chain 
of evidence.  It subsequently explains the methods used to analyze the various types of 
data obtained. 
• Chapter 4 – Findings 
Chapter 4 presents the key findings of the in-depth interviews, simulations and think-
aloud exercises, field observations of an actual creativity awards judging event, and the 
results of inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ numerical contest scores.  Extensive 
illustrative quotes from participant interviews are provided to allow the reader an 
opportunity to explore participants’ views in their own words. 
• Chapter 5 – Discussion 
This section provides an analysis of the findings and a synthesis of the data in an effort to 
make sense of the meaning of the data.  It additionally explores how the data relates to 
the theoretical frameworks applied in this research study.  Possible linkages and logical 
inferences suggested by the data are explored, and the main contributions of the study to 
theory and practice are discussed.   
• Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
This final chapter provides the researcher’s conclusions based on study findings and 
analysis, as well as recommendations for changes to research methods and practice based 
on the results of the study.  Recommendations for future research are also discussed. 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria expert judges 
use in assessing the creativity of output by individuals who regularly create products in creative 
industries.  Specifically, the research sought to understand how domain experts make judgments 
about the level of creativity of products and ideas, in situations where judges face extreme time 
pressure, uncertainty, and ambiguity.  Before conducting the study, critical reviews of the 
literature on creativity research, construct measurement, decision making and expert cognition 
were conducted.  The literature review informed the research design, data collection, and 
analysis phases of this study. 
This review of creativity literature traces the approaches, methods, results, and challenges 
of research into the nature and elements of creativity; in particular, the ways in which creative 
outcomes are measured and assessed.  Moreover, as discernment of creative outcomes involves 
many aspects of judgment and decision making, this review explores the constructs and theories 
relating to decision making, particularly as it concerns experts, rational choice, and intuition.  
Lastly, literature relating to how individuals make decisions in field settings is reviewed. 
II.2 Review of Literature 
Academic study of creativity began to flourish after J. P. Guilford’s 1950 presidential 
address to the American Psychological Association (Mumford, 2003; Amabile, 2012).  However, 
for the first 30 years of inquiry, creativity was considered solely a psychological “trait” or 
quality, consisting of unique attributes and “divergent” thinking abilities only possessed by 
gifted individuals (Amabile, 2012).  As a result, almost all creativity research until the mid-
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1990s focused on the inherent differences and abilities of exceptionally creative individuals 
(Mumford, 2003). 
Over the past 20 years, creativity research has undergone a number of significant shifts in 
both the development of theory and the use of various research methodologies (Mumford, 2003). 
This research has also expanded from psychology to sociology, education, economics, and 
management (Runco, 2004).  As a result of its multi-disciplinary focus, the scope of 
understanding creativity’s processes, antecedents, and consequences has grown exponentially, 
but not without having paid a price (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).  The lack of inter-disciplinary 
research has resulted in fragmented, often conflicting and confusing, findings and the 
development of numerous competing theories of creativity, how it functions, how to measure it, 
and how to improve creative thinking and outcomes (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). 
II.2.1 Definitions of Creativity 
What creativity is, and what it is not, hangs as the mythical albatross around the neck of 
scientific research on creativity (Prentky, 2000: 97). 
One of the most significant challenges to creativity research the lack of a consistent 
definition.  More than 50 years ago, Rhodes reported having identified 40 different definitions of 
creativity (Rhodes, 1961).  Twenty-seven years later, a review of published psychological 
research uncovered more than 60 different definitions for the concept (Taylor, 1988).  These 
various definitions reflect the growing, but fragmented, academic interest in the study of 
creativity from different domains and research perspectives.   
When used as an adjective, the word “creative” is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as, 
“relating to or involving the use of the imagination or original ideas to create something” or 
“having good imagination or original ideas.”  As a noun, creative is defined as, “a person whose 
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job involves creative work.”  As a verb, to “create” is defined as meaning to “bring (something) 
into existence,” or “cause (something) to happen as a result of one’s actions.”  Creativity also has 
been defined as “inventiveness; the use of imagination or original ideas to create something.”1  
Synonyms of creativity include cleverness, imagination, ingenuity, inventiveness, originality, 
resourcefulness, inspiration, and vision (Roget, 2013). 
In creativity research, the term “creative” has developed numerous inherent meanings 
over the past 65 years that can refer to a person, group or organization, or to the process, 
products, and environment in which people work (Batey, 2012).  For example, when creativity is 
viewed as an aspect of a person, the definition might arise from the traits and abilities inherent in 
creative genius (Runco, 2004; Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  If the focus is on process, a definition 
might relate the mental activities and procedural steps involved in a divergent thinking exercise 
(Mumford, 2003).  
The lack of a shared definition is certainly not due to a shortage of effort or attention.  In 
1996, Amabile attempted to define creativity from a social-psychological approach stating, “a 
product or response will be judged as creative to the extent that (1) it is both a novel and an 
appropriate, useful, correct, or valuable response to the task at hand, and (2) the task is heuristic 
rather than algorithmic” (Amabile, 1996: 35).  Sternberg and Lubart (1999) defined creativity 
more objectively as “the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) 
and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)” (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999: 
                                                 
1 The origin of the word “create” is believed to be of late Middle English in the sense of “form out of nothing” and 
relating to “a divine or supernatural being” originally from the Latin creat- “produced,” from the verb creare.  
“However, the verb form derives from a Proto-Indo-European root kerh2, which is believed originally to have 
meant, ‘grow’ and in Latin its original meaning was ‘to make (something) grow.’”  The past participle of creare is 
“to make, bring forth, produce, beget” which is related to crescere, or “arise, grow.” 
(http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=create, accessed February 9, 2015). 
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3).  This seeming confluence of conceptual understanding lead Mumford to conclude: “Over the 
course of the last decade, however, we seem to have reached a general agreement that creativity 
involves the production of novel, useful products” (Mumford, 2003: 110). However, despite 
these various attempts to capture the essence of creativity, many authors still believe a widely 
accepted or inter-disciplinary definition of creativity remains elusive and  that the lack of a 
workable definition hampers efforts to formally identify and measure the construct (Sullivan & 
Ford, 2010; Batey, 2012; Montag et al., 2012; Simonton, 2012).  
This study investigated the assessment of creative individuals’ output (Montag, et al., 
2012), as opposed to creative processes, individual traits, or the environments surrounding 
creative activity,; accordingly,the research necessarily focused only on creative products and 
ideas. Thus, for the purposes of the present research, and for the reasons outlined in the next 
section, this study adopts as a starting point Amabile’s proffered definition of creative output as a 
product or response that is both novel and appropriate to the task, where the task is heuristic 
rather than algorithmic (Amabile, 1996; 2012). 
II.2.2 Creativity Research 
To understand the divergent views of creativity and why a standard definition of 
creativity is necessary, it is important to trace the development of creativity research over the 
past 30 years.  According to the componential theory of creativity, developed by Amabile in 
1983 and refined in the years since, creativity occurs in the combination of three “within-
individual” components and one external component.  The three internal components are: (1) 
domain-relevant skills, i.e., expertise or knowledge in the relevant domain or domains; (2) 
creativity-relevant process abilities, i.e., cognitive abilities and personality attributes that enable 
novel thinking; and (3) task motivation, specifically intrinsic motivation to engage in the task.  
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The single external component of the theory is the surrounding social or workplace environment 
the individual acts within (Amabile, 1983; 2012).   
Amabile’s componential theory therefore predicts, “creativity should be at its highest 
when an intrinsically motivated person with high domain expertise and high skill in creative 
thinking works in an environment high in supports for creativity” (Amabile, 2012: 3). Domain-
relevant skills relate to the knowledge, experience, skills, and abilities of the particular technical 
or professional arena where an individual has gained expertise.  This domain-relevant expertise 
provides the background the individual will likely draw upon to develop new combinations and 
to evaluate the viability of the various options created (Amabile, 1983).  Creativity-relevant 
process abilities include “a cognitive style and personality characteristics that are conducive to 
independence, risk-taking, and taking new perspectives on problems, as well as a disciplined 
work style and skills in generating ideas” (Amabile, 2012: 3). 
Task, or intrinsic, motivation has received the most scholarly attention in recent years, 
and the inconsistent, and often contradictory, research findings in this area frame many of the 
current definitional dilemmas.  The intrinsic principle of motivation posits “people are most 
creative when they feel motivated primarily by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and 
challenge of the work itself” (Amabile 2012: 4). However, the external factors that explicitly 
motivate the organization or the individual—so-called extrinsic motivators—as well as other 
workplace, mood, and compensation factors, can have either a positive or negative effect on an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation and creativity (Oldham & Cummings, 1996; George & Zhou, 
2007). 
One of the most widely used frameworks for understanding the concept of creativity is 
the “Four P’s” model, a schematic representation that divides creativity into four categories of 
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person, process, place, and product (Runco, 2004).  Initially developed by Rhodes (1961), the 
Four P’s identify each aspect of creativity as an attribute of: (1) the Person—i.e., some 
individuals tend to be more creative than others; (2) the Process—i.e., particular types of 
thinking, perception and behaviors are likely to produce creativity more readily than others; (3) 
Place—i.e., physical and social environmental factors can have the effect of increasing or 
decreasing creativity in individuals; and, (4) Product—i.e., some ideas, solutions and designs can 
be judged as more creative than others (Rhodes, 1961; Runco, 2004). 
One of the most comprehensive models of the Process aspect of creativity is that 
developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1996), and consists of five stages: (i) preparation, (ii) 
incubation, (iii) insight, (iv) evaluation, and (v) elaboration.  Preparation involves the 
preparatory work that focuses an individual's mind on the problem and explores the problem’s 
dimensions.  Incubation is the stage where the problem is internalized into the unconscious mind 
and nothing appears externally to be happening.  Insight arises when the creative person begins 
to make connections between previously unassociated concepts and a creative idea arises from 
non-conscious processing into conscious awareness.  Evaluation occurs when the newly 
developed idea is mentally challenged and tested for its appropriateness to the problem or goal.  
Finally, elaboration is the stage where the idea is further refined and then applied. 
The Product category of the Four P’s creativity model and the evaluation stage in 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) five-stage model provide the focal points for this research study. The 
Product dimension focuses on the creative outcomes and results of the creative process, 
specifically whether they are judged as more or less creative.   The evaluation stage is crucial in 
creativity assessment as it provides the first opportunity to objectively assess the fitness of 
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generated ideas during the creative process.  For organizations, the evaluation stage serves as a 
critical juncture where products and ideas are assessed for  
potential value and further development.  An error in assessment at this stage can prevent 
creative ideas and products from being realized or result in unnecessary development effort and 
excessive cost.  Businesses must also be able to assess the creativity of fully developed ideas and 
products before incorporating them into to strategic plans or introducing them to the 
marketplace.  In research, the assessment of creative products or outcomes at either the 
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evaluation stage or conclusion of the creative process has been called “the bedrock of all studies 
of creativity” (Cropley & Cropley, 2008; MacKinnon 1978: 187). 
 
Figure 1 Schematic Model of Creativity Concepts 
II.2.3 Creative Outcomes 
Similar to the challenges of defining creativity overall, the definitions of creative 
products and outcomes also have varied considerably over the past 50 years.  Brogden and 
Sprecher (1964) defined a product simply as a physical object, a theoretical system, an equation, 
or a technique.  Research studies using this definition attempt to explain the differences between 
creative and ordinary products (Santanen, Briggs, & Vreede, 2004).  Jackson and Messick (1965) 
defined a creative product as being “unusual” when compared to other products: it is appropriate 
to the context of the situation; it shifts the constraints and boundaries of the situation; and it 
condenses both simplicity and complexity in such a way that the product may at first appear 
simple but is in reality quite complex.  Condensing these definitions, Amabile et al. (1986) 
operationally defined a product as creative if it was both novel and appropriate in response to a 
non-algorithmic task (Santanen et al., 2004). 
However, the past 30 years of research using these definitions of creativity and creative 
products has resulted in conflicting, and often contradictory, experimental outcomes across 
numerous disciplines (Batey, 2012; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).  For example, in the social-
psychological study of creativity, particularly with regard to its motivational dimension, 
researchers have struggled to find common ground in methods to increase creativity (Hennessey 
& Amabile, 2010).  A significant body of research shows extrinsic motivators, such as financial 
rewards or recognition, have a detrimental effect on creative output by increasing a sense of 
being controlled and reducing intrinsic motivation, a fundamental aspect of creativity according 
 18 
to the componential theory (Amabile, 1996; Hennessey, 2003).  Researchers following a 
behavioral perspective, however, have developed substantial empirical evidence showing how 
extrinsic rewards and recognition can increase creativity, particularly in the workplace, by 
focusing individuals on the need for creative ideas, without any resulting detrimental impact on 
intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger & Shanock, 2003; Eisenberger & 
Aselage, 2009).  
Similarly, research into the effects one’s work environment has on creativity has failed to 
reach consensus.  For example, the effect of time pressure on creativity has been shown to have a 
detrimental impact on creativity in some studies (Amabile et al., 1996), while other studies have 
found that individuals respond positively to time pressures and produce greater levels of 
creativity (Madjar & Oldham, 2002).  Studies also have shown a complicated relationship 
between time pressure, the person, and the situation, resulting in an inverted U-shape relationship 
that is mediated by personality (Baer & Oldham, 2006).  Likewise, summaries of research into 
the related concepts of feedback, monitoring by supervisors, and evaluation of work product 
have shown these environmental factors to have quite different effects on creative output 
depending on how information is presented and processed by the individual (Zhou, 2003).  In 
organizational research, some studies have shown the use of clear overall goals can increase 
motivation and creative output (Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1996), while many others 
suggest such external expectations have a direct negative impact on creativity (Shalley & Perry 
Smith, 2001; West, 2002).   
A number of meta-analyses and reviews of extant research also have failed to coalesce 
the disparate findings surrounding various approaches to creativity research, stating that “few 
solid conclusions regarding creativity can be drawn” (see Byron & Khazanchi, 2012; Oldham & 
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Baer, 2006; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Montag, et al., 2012).  For example, Byron & 
Khazanchi (2012) reviewed more than 60 experimental and field studies applying either Learned 
Industriousness Theory (LIT) or Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and concluded that neither 
theory completely accounted for the inconsistent and contradictory results of the various studies 
reviewed (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012).  The authors also identified a number of study limitations 
that may have contributed to a lack of validity and reliability, including that the majority of the 
research subjects were children, students, or individuals who were not required or expected to 
perform creatively on a routine basis.  Additionally, most of the studies did not occur in creative 
or professional settings, and the few studies situated in workplace settings did not focus 
specifically on creative employees (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012).  As a result, the conclusions 
reached by LIT and SDT research cannot extend to questions of workplace creativity among 
professionals or employees in creative occupations.  The authors also point out most of the tasks 
involved in the 60 studies reviewed offered little opportunity for high levels of creativity, 
explaining, “the studies in this analysis were more likely to employ tasks that were relatively low 
in complexity” and concluding the “proposed models may better explain incremental creativity 
than radical creativity” (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012: 825).  In conclusion, the authors urge further 
research into the nature of creativity in the workplace using experienced creative employees as 
participants.   
Another recent review of the creativity literature offered a different perspective to explain 
the inconsistent results of existing research.  Montag, et al. (2012) criticized most creativity 
research approaches as unnecessarily focused and organized according to the antecedents of 
creativity, which may have resulted in incorrect conclusions and inconsistencies among prior 
studies and the inability to develop generalizations from those results (Montag et al, 2012). 
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Montag and colleagues instead propose a new framework for organizing and understanding 
workplace creativity constructs based on workplace performance literature.  Instead of thinking 
of creativity as a unitary construct, they contend creativity should be considered a research 
domain with multiple constructs.  The authors hypothesize at least two separate sets of constructs 
may exist within the creativity domain, i.e., Creative Performance Behaviors (CPB) and Creative 
Outcome Effectiveness (COE), with differential definitions and causal directions between them.   
The competing perspectives, inconsistent results, and contradictory findings of creativity studies 
over the past few decades have caused some commentators to question the appropriateness of the 
various frameworks, theories, and methodologies used in studies of creativity, as well as whether 
the definitions utilized are appropriate and complete, and whether the construct of creativity 
itself needs to be reconsidered (Sullivan & Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012).   
II.3 Measurement of Creative Output 
As outlined above, how creativity is measured depends in large part on the construct and 
operational definitions used as well as the research perspective employed.  Separating creative 
behaviors from creative output as proposed by Montag et al. (2012) requires an understanding of 
the methods that have been used to measure creative output.  Batey (2012) developed a heuristic, 
multi-level framework to account for different levels of analysis, facets, and approaches to 
measuring creativity.  Within this taxonomic framework, shown in the diagram from Batey’s 
article reproduced below, creativity can be analyzed from an individual, team, organization, or 
culture level by considering the four facets of creativity—i.e., traits, process, press, or product.  
Measures of creativity under this heuristic model can employ: (1) objective measures, (2) 
subjective assessments through self-reports, or (3) external appraisals or ratings by subject matter 
experts (Batey, 2012).   
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Figure 2 Measures of Creativity (Batey, 2012) 
From a practice perspective, the assessment of creative ideas and output is especially 
important for organizations during the idea evaluation or “validation stage” (Montag et al., 2012; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).  However, organizational creativity research has shown managers do 
not differentiate between creativity, innovation, or problem solving, incorrectly viewing the three 
distinctly separate constructs as inextricably connected (Banks, Calvey, Owen, & Russell, 2002).  
Evaluating the most promising ideas and creative output during the iterative stages of the 
creative process requires accurate forecasting of which ideas and products are most creative, as 
well as which have the best chance for ultimate success (Daily & Mumford, 2006; Lonergan, 
Scott, and Mumford, 2004).  Thus, evaluation of creative ideas and products is one of the most 
critical steps in the creative process, yet organizations struggle to make appropriate decisions 
about the creative ideas and products they develop (Harvey & Kou, 2013).  For example, groups 
have been shown to prefer relatively average ideas produced by their members over more novel 
ideas created by other individuals (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006).  Unlike idea 
generation, which is considered a divergent creative thinking behavior, idea evaluation is a 
 22 
convergent decision-making activity that occurs in later stages of the creative process and seeks 
to filter out poor ideas (Paletz & Schunn, 2010; Singh & Fleming, 2010).  This convergent 
process of product or idea evaluation in group settings involves social, political, and critical 
assessment functions, as members “choose consciously or subconsciously to ignore ideas, 
advocate for their own ideas, show enthusiasm for others’ ideas, and provide interpersonal 
rewards for good ideas” and “reflects the iterative and integrated nature of idea evaluation at the 
individual and organizational levels” (Rietzschel et al., 2006: 347).  Organizations and 
individuals that are best able to discern which ideas and products are highly creative will not 
only produce the candidates that are most likely to be successful, but will also reduce the overall 
cost and timeframe of development. 
From a research perspective, measurement of creative output is critical to the validity of 
experimental results.  As noted above, various concerns have been raised about the evaluation of 
creative output in research; in particular the possibility of measurement misspecification as a 
result of differences between construct definitions and empirical measurement approaches 
(Sullivan & Ford, 2010).  After a review of published creativity research in top journals over a 
10-year period, Sullivan & Ford (2010) noted that, despite the growing use of definitions 
including both “novelty” and “usefulness” components, most creativity research studies continue 
to measure creativity as a unitary construct that relies on a single dimension.  Other authors have 
suggested novelty and usefulness are associated with different organizational processes (Ford & 
Gioia, 2000), may have different causes and consequences (Reiter-Palmon, Illies, Cross, 
Buboltz, & Nimps, 2009), and may have distinct goals that can be represented as orthogonal 
constructs (Litchfield, 2008).  As a result, some researchers hypothesize the differences between 
construct definitions and operational definitions in use may potentially create a misalignment 
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that threatens statistical conclusion validity and could result in errors of inference (Sullivan & 
Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012).   
To test their hypotheses about possible measurement misspecification of prior creativity 
research, Sullivan & Ford (2010) conducted two experiments to examine alternative 
measurement models of creativity, comparing a one-factor measurement model with reflective 
measures, against two-factor and three-factor composite latent models using novelty and 
usefulness and  novelty, usefulness, and ‘stylistic appeal', respectively, as formative indicators.  
The results from both experiments suggest the two-factor composite latent construct model with 
distinct formative indicators for novelty and usefulness provided the best fit of the participants’ 
assessments (Sullivan & Ford, 2010).  However, the authors point out the measurement model 
required by a specific study may depend on the nature of research and its theoretical approach, 
and that in some circumstances a unidimensional or multiple-facet reflective indicator approach 
may be more appropriate.  The authors conclude by noting a significant limitation of their 
research involved the use of students and professors to create and judge creative output, 
suggesting future research should investigate “the relative weight of novelty and usefulness 
assessments,” as well as “how other appropriate judges evaluate the creativity of stimulus items 
in their domain” and “whether the depth or breadth of the judges’ domain expertise affects 
creativity assessments” (Sullivan & Ford, 2010: 518).  This research attempts to respond to the 
authors’ three suggestions. 
Other attempts to address the perceived insufficiency of the “novel and useful” construct 
and operational definitions have generally involved the addition of a new facet or criterion.  As 
noted above, Sullivan & Ford (2010) included the criterion of “stylistic appeal” in their analysis 
in light of research suggesting “style” as another aspect of creativity, but did not find sufficient 
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support to unequivocally recommend adding that factor.  Boden (2004) advocated three facets, 
requiring a creative idea to be novel, valuable, and surprising, following Bruner’s (1962) 
definition of creativity as involving an element of “effective surprise.”  Simonton (2012) and 
others have advocated that researchers adopt a definition similar to the three-part test utilized by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for patent applications, under which a 
product or idea will only be awarded a patent if it is shown to be: 1) novel; 2) “non-obvious;” 
and, 3) useful.  Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code governs the Patentability of a 
product or idea, which asserts: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
Section 102 of Title 35 U.S.C. expands on the newness requirement of Section 101 by stating the 
invention must exhibit “novelty,” which is defined as not having already been patented, 
described in a publication, or otherwise in public use, for sale or available to the public.  This 
requirement is also described as the “prior art” exclusion and is designed to preclude obtaining a 
patent by appropriating someone else’s previously published idea or publicly available product.  
Section 103 adds the second criterion of “non-obvious subject matter”: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained…if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would 
have been obvious … to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains. 
The “non-obviousness” criterion, or “surprise” in Simonton’s (2012) formulation, 
similarly requires that a product or idea be sufficiently “above or beyond the current state of the 
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art” such that is not simply an obvious extension of an existing idea or concept (Barton, 2003: 
476). European patent regulations contain very similar requirements of novelty and usefulness, 
but term the non-obviousness requirement as “inventiveness,” requiring that the product or idea 
represent an “inventive step” or significant iteration in development either through the 
combination of disparate ideas or departure from a normal development cycle (Barton, 2003).  
Although some researchers have used a three-part criterion in the past, Simonton points out that 
“few have followed their example” (Simonton, 2012: 98, fn, 1).   
II.3.1 Consensual Assessment Technique  
Most studies of creativity that involve the assessment of creative products or output rely 
on external appraisals (Batey, 2012).  The assessment of creative products by others initially 
began as “aesthetic judgment” of the arts more than 100 years ago (Kaufman, Baer, Cropley, 
Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013).  Amabile (1982) built on that historical approach in developing 
the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), which provides specific guidelines for measuring 
the results and output of creative effort.  Amabile’s consensual assessment technique is expressly 
premised on a “product-based” operational definition of creativity:   
A product or response is creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently 
agree it is creative.  Appropriate observers are those familiar with the domain in which 
the product was created or the response articulated. (Amabile, 1982: 1001.) 
Amabile’s CAT is unabashed in its reliance on knowledgeable individuals’ subjective and 
intersubjective judgment of creative products, acknowledging the difficulty, if not near 
impossibility (and perhaps the irrelevance), of attempting to assess creativity objectively 
(Amabile, 1982, 1996).  Moreover, CAT rests on two important assumptions: first, that given an 
appropriate group of judges, it is possible to obtain reliable judgments of creativity; and second, 
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that creativity exists on a continuum, i.e., some products and outcomes are more creative than 
others are.  This first assumption takes into account the fact that, while it is difficult to identify 
specific features of a product that make it creative, people can recognize creativity when they see 
it.  Second, as a consensual technique, CAT assumes there are degrees of creativity and that 
experts and individuals familiar with the domain can generally agree on the level of creativity of 
a particular product (Amabile, 1982, 1996).  The consensual assessment technique follows the 
manner in which creativity is judged in many real-world situations in that it requires a group of 
judges, usually domain experts, working independently and without specific instructions, to 
make intersubjective assessments of creativity (Kaufman & Baer, 2012).  As a result, CAT has 
been called the “gold standard” of creative output measurement for research (Kaufman & Baer, 
2012).   
Recent research highlights the importance of expertise in judging creative output using 
consensual assessment techniques and the stark differences between expert and novice ratings of 
creativity. For example, Kaufman, Baer, Cole, and Sexton (2008) assessed the level of interrater 
agreement among domain experts and college students who were asked to judge the creativity of 
poems and short stories.  Novices were found incomparable with experts in both cases.  For 
poetry, the correlation between experts and novices was only r = .22, and for short stories the 
correlation was r = .71 (Kaufman et al., 2008; Kaufman, Baer & Cole, 2009).  The expert judges 
had very high levels of interrater reliability for both the poetry and short stories, with a 
coefficient α of .83 and .92, respectively.  For novices, interrater reliability was surprisingly also 
very high, with a coefficient α of .94 for the poems and .93 for short stories.  However, the very 
high interrater reliabilities of the novices required using scores from 106 novice judges. When 
any randomly selected group of 10 novice judge scores were analyzed, interrater reliability fell 
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dramatically to just .58 for poetry and .53 for short stories.  Even the moderate level of 
agreement of r = .71 between novices and experts for short stories necessitated reliance on more 
than 100 novices.  As a result, the authors concluded novices could not be relied upon to produce 
valid creativity judgments, and that the validity of CAT as a measurement tool in research 
requires the use of domain experts as judges (Kaufman et al., 2013).  
Contrary to the evidence showing that domain expert judges are necessary for the 
consensual assessment technique to be considered reliable and valid, and that experts perform at 
a much higher level as judges than novices, a review of published research suggests the vast 
majority of creativity studies over the past 30 years utilizing CAT or similar consensual 
techniques to assess creative outcomes have not used recognized domain experts as judges (see 
Appendix 7.2, Summary of Published Creativity Research).  The review reveals that a high 
preponderance of studies (37 of 41) used college students, research assistants, university 
professors, or study researchers to judge the creative outcomes produced by study participants.  
The use of non-expert judges to assess creative outcomes—where CAT necessitates expert 
judges for reliability and validity—raises questions about the soundness of those research results, 
as well as the appropriateness of the criteria and processes used to evaluate creativity in those 
studies (Sullivan & Ford, 2010).  However, how experts actually judge creativity in practice is 
not well understood. 
II.4 Experts and Expertise-Based Intuition 
Psychologists have studied expertise for over a century in an attempt to understand how 
experts acquire and use knowledge, particularly studying the differences in mental functioning 
between experts and novices (Andre & Gobet, 2008).  Current research on expertise suggests that 
two major phenomena constitute the foundation of cognitive expertise—visual perception and 
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knowledge organization.  Visual perception plays a major role in evoking knowledge (Henderson 
& Hollingworth, 1999) and, because expert knowledge is fundamentally different from that of 
novices, the study of cognitive expertise cannot be separated from the study of perception—
experts literally “see” their domain differently than novices (Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, & 
Stampe, 2001). Experts are also fundamentally different from novices in the way they acquire, 
manage, and organize domain knowledge (Andre & Gobet, 2008).  While experts have not been 
shown to possess greater memory or computational capacity than others with similar intelligence 
(Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Ericsson, 2014; but see Grabner, 2014), the manner in which they 
develop and reorganize information sets them apart from novices of similar general abilities 
(Chase & Simon, 1973).   
Expert knowledge is thought to be organized in two ways, as “chunks” or “scripts” at a 
low level of abstraction, and in more schematic and abstract elements or “templates” which can 
be adapted readily to a larger range of situations in higher levels (Andre & Gobet, 2008).  
Experts use these chunks and templates to situate problems or challenges within groups of past 
experiences from long-term memory, allowing the expert to extrapolate or anticipate next steps, 
the way an expert chess player can both “see” the entire chess board and simultaneously imagine 
most if not all of the next possible moves available (Gobet & Simon, 1996).  Obtaining the 
requisite knowledge and schemas to become an expert requires a considerable number of years 
of direct experience and “deliberate practice” (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993).   
Interest in the effectiveness of intuition in judgment and decision-making has also grown 
in recent years as scholars have begun to accept the concept, particularly with regard to expert 
use of intuition.  Several researchers have suggested that expert intuition might be an effective 
way to manage the difficult trade-off between decision accuracy and speed (Dane & Pratt, 2007). 
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In psychology, intuition is generally accepted to arise from one of two information-processing 
systems that operate within the brain (Epstein, 2003).  Under this dual-process model, decision 
making is hypothesized as either the product of primal, automatic, associative and experiential 
“System 1” processing, or the result of rational, intentional, deliberate, and extensional “System 
2” processing (Epstein, 2003; Kahneman, 2003, 2011).  Intuition is thought to arise from the 
faster, associative, and “nonconscious” information processing of System 1 (Epstein 2003; 
Kahneman 2003, 2011).    
In management literature drawing upon dual-process models, the construct of intuition 
consists of four characteristics:  “Intuition is a (1) nonconscious process (2) involving holistic 
associations (3) that are produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged judgments” 
(Dane & Pratt 2007: 36).  The process of “intuiting” is rapid (often instantaneous), spontaneous 
(without effort and unable to be controlled) and alogical (not necessarily contradicting the rules 
of logic but may not follow them either) (Dorfler & Ackermann, 2012).  
Intuiting has been theorized to involve matching environmental stimuli or a non-
algorithmic task with nonconscious patterns, schemas, or cues (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 1998) 
or linking or associating disparate elements of information (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 
1996).  However, a significant body of research shows intuition is ineffective in decision-making 
involving algorithmic tasks that can be decomposed and solved logically, sequentially, or 
mathematically (Dane, Rockmann & Pratt, 2012).  In fact, research has repeatedly shown that 
reliance on intuition in decision-making that involves decomposable tasks, mathematical 
calculations, or following a sequence of rules is likely to produce gross misjudgments (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2003).  In their research on “heuristics and biases,” Kahneman 
and Tversky define intuition as “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without 
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much reflection” (Kahneman 2003: 449).  The results of heuristics and biases research 
highlighted the insufficiency and errors that arise from the use of any of three “intuitive” 
heuristics in decisions made in algorithmic tasks such as estimating the population of a city or 
choosing between limited alternatives presented: (1) the representativeness heuristic (i.e. “what 
is typical”); (2) the availability heuristic (i.e. “what comes easily to mind”); (3) adjustment and 
anchoring (i.e. “what happens to come first”) (Kahneman 2003, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).   
However, other research suggests intuition may be much more effective and significantly 
less error-prone than analysis in cases of non-algorithmic and non-decomposable tasks 
(Hammond et al., 1987).  Examples of non-decomposable tasks theorized to be more amenable 
to intuitive decision-making include judgments about artwork, the taste of food, and the morality 
of behavior (Dane et al., 2012; Haidt, 2001).  Research into expertise-based intuition has focused 
on how experts recognize and retrieve large “chunks” of information, and use patterns or 
schemas stored in long-term memory without conscious effort when dealing with non-
algorithmic situations (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  Studies of the effective use of expert intuition 
indicate greater time pressure will cause an individual to rely more on intuition than analysis, and 
that experts possess highly sophisticated, nonconscious cognitive structures that afford rapid and 
accurate retrieval of information and creation of appropriate responses in time-critical situations 
(Klein, 1998; Simon & Chase, 1973; Dane & Pratt, 2007).  However, research has also shown 
that not all expertise is the same, and expertise in one domain does not easily transfer to another 
(Kahneman, 2011).   
As a result of these studies, intuitive judgments and decisions by domain experts at a very 
high level of expertise, variously called “intuition-as-expertise” (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004), 
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“intuitive expertise” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), and “expertise-based intuition” (Salas, Rosen, 
and Diaz-Granados, 2010), are theorized to be highly trustworthy, fast, and effective (Dane & 
Pratt, 2007).  
The distinctive earmarks of intuition are rapid response (a matter of seconds) and 
inability of the respondent to report a sequence of steps leading to the result—even denial 
of awareness of such steps . . . what impresses observers about intuition is that responses, 
especially those of experts, are frequently correct even though they seem to have required 
almost no processing time or effort” (March & Simon, 1993: 11).   
Researchers have also concluded the most effective intuitive judgments are those of domain 
experts who have had the opportunity to acquire domain specific information and who have 
received critical feedback and cues from a high validity environment (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009), and where the effectiveness of intuition relative to analysis is amplified by higher levels 
of domain expertise (Dane et al., 2012; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Salas, et al., 2010).   
II.5 Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) 
For this research, understanding how experts use intuitive expertise to judge creative 
outcomes suggested application of two competing theories of judgment and decision-making.  
The two theories, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum Theory 
(CCT), were applied in this study using Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) models and 
techniques.  An in-depth review of the literature on CEST and CCT helped shape the research 
conducted using NDM, and a summary of the literature is provided below. 
II.5.1 Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is a dual-process theory of human 
information processing integrating theories of learning, cognition, personality, and the self 
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(Epstein, 2003; Norris & Epstein, 2011).  CEST assumes the human brain consists of two 
complimentary but independent systems of information processing: an “experiential (i.e., 
intuitive) system” and a “rational (i.e., analytical) system” (Epstein et al., 1996).  The 
experiential or intuitive system, sometimes referred to as System 1, is preconscious, fast, 
nonverbal and holistic, and is considered a product of human evolution operating automatically 
under principles of associative learning that solves problems through adaptation by reacting 
according to its experience and reinforcement history (Norris & Epstein, 2011).  In contrast, the 
rational or analytical system, System 2, is a conscious, slow, affect-free, verbal reasoning system 
that is engaged deliberately to process information logically and solve problems through 
evaluation of evidence and alternatives (Norris & Epstein, 2011). 
CEST posits the two processing systems often work in parallel and interact as necessary 
to contribute to a person’s behavior and conscious thought (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012).  
Because the experiential system is fast, requires little in cognitive resources, and is guided by 
prior experiences, it is particularly adept at handling the vast majority of information processing 
that occurs outside of conscious awareness on a daily basis (Epstein, 2003).  This default to 
System 1 processing is thought to preserve cognitive resources and conscious deliberation for 
more abstract, logical, and challenging cognitive processing.  The two systems are also presumed 
to respond differently to stimuli and use different cognitive resources.  For example, when faced 
with an emotionally significant event, CEST predicts the experiential system will automatically 
search long-term memory stores for related “experiences” and emotional accompaniments that 
create an intuitive response (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2013). The rational system, on the other 
hand, is inferential, and operates through reason, abstract thought, and the use of language.  
Because of these criteria, the rational system requires more cognitive resources and has limited 
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processing capacity.  Unlike the experiential system, the rational system is self-aware and has 
capacity to understand and decide whether to accept or reject influence from the experiential 
system.  The rational system theoretically operates without emotion and can be changed through 
appeals to logic and reason (Epstein, 2003).  As a result, even when operating under guidance 
from the experiential system, individuals are capable of discounting System 1 influence by 
consciously deciding to do so (Epstein et al., 1996).  The theorized characteristics of System 1 
and System 2 are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Characteristics of Experiential-System 1 and Rational-System 2 (from Epstein, et 
al. 1996) 
System 1 (experiential / intuitive) System 2 (analytical / reflective) 
Holistic Analytic 
Automatic Intentional 
Emotional Logical 
Mediates behavior by “feel” Mediates behavior by conscious 
appraisal 
Fast for immediate action Slow for delayed action 
Resistant to change Easily changed through reason 
Preconscious Conscious 
 
According to CEST, the experiential and rational systems tend to work independently but 
in tandem, “toggling” sequentially as needed, and affect one another depending on the nature of 
the stimulus (Epstein, 2003).  Each system has its own unique adaptations, advantages, and 
disadvantages that tend to direct the order of operation of the two systems and the ultimate 
behavioral response.  The experiential system adapts through implicit learning by experience, 
whereas the rational system adjusts through logical inference and explicit learning (Epstein 
2003).   
In operation, CEST predicts that when confronted with an event, the experiential system 
responds quickly and non-consciously by making automatic associations to similar past events or 
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experiences, eliciting a holistic emotional response or “vibe,” which then directs further 
processing (Epstein, 2003).  The slower, more analytic rational system subsequently attempts to 
understand or “rationalize” the initial emotional response and logically analyzes behavior before 
selecting the most emotionally satisfying and intellectually appropriate explanation for that 
behavior.  “Such rationalization is a routine process that occurs far more often than is generally 
recognized,” and the influences of the experiential system on the rational system are attributed 
by CEST “as major sources of human irrationality” (Epstein, 2003: 162).  This may be because 
the experiential system is fast and its automatic emotional response is able to bias subsequent 
processing in the rational system outside of an individual’s conscious awareness (Norris & 
Epstein, 2011).  Likewise, the rational system has the ability, through conscious thought and 
deliberation, to correct the experiential system and teach it through repetition of thoughts and 
behaviors to adapt to new situations (Epstein 2003).  However, the experiential system is thought 
to be much more efficient, able to manage greater amounts of information, and for that reason, 
tends to be the default processing system in daily life.  “The rational system is capable of high 
levels of abstract reasoning and is therefore the source of humankind’s unique accomplishments, 
but it is too effortful to efficiently direct most behavior in everyday life” (Norris & Epstein, 
2011: 1044). 
While dual-process theories, such as CEST, posit \ the two modes of cognition are often in 
direct conflict, each operating independently at different times, dual-process theories provide 
few, if any, specifics about how the two systems or modes interact or the nature of their 
relationship (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).  This “either-or” approach to cognition as being either 
purely analytic or purely intuitive potentially creates a false dichotomy that has been challenged 
by competing views seeking to integrate analysis and intuition into a single theoretical 
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framework (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).  However, recent studies of human brain functioning 
and mental processing using fMRI suggest cognition may actually operate in the manner 
predicted by dual-process theories.  Researchers conducted fMRI studies of individuals during 
tasks designed to engage the two different brain networks: the task-negative or default mode 
network that operates outside of conscious attention (System 1), and the task-positive network 
that manages attention-demanding cognitive tasks (System 2) (Jack, et al, 2014).  Results of 
analyzing brain scans of the subjects while engaged in the two types of tasks revealed that social 
tasks deactivated regions associated with mechanical reasoning, while mechanical tasks 
deactivated regions of the brain associated with social reasoning.  The researchers concluded a 
physiological constraint on human processing might prevent both networks from acting 
simultaneously (Jack, et al, 2014).   
II.5.2 Cognitive Continuum Theory 
In contrast to CEST and other dual process models, Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) 
views different modes of cognition in decision making along a continuum, with intuition at one 
end and analysis at the other, and explains the interaction between different cognitive modes 
during a decision-making task (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).  CCT, founded on social judgment 
theory and Brunswickian principles of functionalism, argues that cognitive processes and 
performance should be described and measured relative to the environment in which they 
function (Dhami, Hertwig and Hoffrage, 2004).  Recognizing the benefits of both analysis and 
intuition, as well as the limitations of each to high-fidelity decision making, Brunswick 
introduced the concept of “quasirationality” as cognition that occurs when intuition and analysis 
are simulataneously present to some degree (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). 
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According to CCT, most decision making involves a combination of intuition and 
analysis, with cognitive tasks arranged along a continuum in terms of the task’s tendency to 
induce intuition, quasirationality, or analysis.  When performing a task, individuals move along 
the continuum in response to the properties of the task (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).  CCT 
predicts initial task success will inhibit movement along the continuum, or preclude a change in 
cognitive mode, while initial task failure will stimulate movement and search along the 
continuum, potentially causing oscillation between the two modes until a decision is reached 
(Dhami & Thompson, 2012).  CCT also predicts decision performance is contingent on 
correspondence between task properties and individual cognitive mode or abilities (Dhami & 
Thompson, 2012; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia & Pearson, 1987).   
The different modes of cognition along the continuum are identified by unique sets of 
properties defining either intuition or analysis (Doherty & Kurz, 1996).  Some of these defining 
properties and resulting impacts on processing are outlined in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 Defining properties of intuition and analysis (from Dhami & Thompson, 2012) 
Property Intuition Analysis 
Consistency / reliability of 
judgments or cognitive control 
Low High 
Awareness of cognitive activity Low High 
Speed of cognitive activity High Low 
Memory Little encoding Complex encoding 
Metaphors used Pictorial, qualitative Verbal, quantitative 
Information use Flexible Consistent 
Confidence in judgments Low High 
Errors in judgment Many, but small and 
normally distributed 
Few, but large and non-
normally distributed 
 
Quasirationality is defined as when any combination of these properties of intuition and analysis 
are used in judgment and exists along the continuum between the two polar extremes (Dhami & 
Thompson, 2012).  In practice, quasirationality is thought to be the most prevalent mode of 
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cognition, such that “it is rare for any task to involve pure intuition or pure analysis” (Dhami & 
Thompson, 2012: 320). 
Cognitive tasks along the continuum that are expected to induce either intuition or 
analysis can also be differentiated by their respective task properties, as shown in Table 3 below.  
The number, nature, and degree of task properties present dictate the cognitive mode that will be 
induced.  Depending on the nature of the task, intermediate levels or a combination of properties 
that separately induce intuition and analysis will likely result in quasirationality (Dhami & 
Thompson, 2012). 
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Table 3 Properties of tasks that induce intuition and analysis (from Dhami & Thompson, 
2012) 
Task Properties Intuition Analysis 
Familiarity with task Familiar Unfamiliar 
Prior training / knowledge of 
task 
None Some 
Amount of information > 5 pieces of 
information 
< 5 pieces of information 
Information presentation order Simultaneous Sequential 
Information presentation format Pictorial Quantitative 
Inter-relation of information Redundancy Independent 
Interpretation of information Subjectively Objectively 
Number of response options Many Few 
Time pressure High Low 
Feedback available Little / none Cognitive feedback 
Outcome knowledge Available Unavailable 
 
Many of the defining properties of intuition and analysis, and the properties of the tasks likely to 
induce intuition, analysis, or quasirationality, have been supported by studies testing cognitive 
control (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000), linearity of organizing 
principles (Hammond et al., 1987), and distribution of errors (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond, 
et al., 1987).  Confidence in the decision-making process has been shown to be higher than 
confidence in the actual judgment with analytic cognition, whereas confidence in method is 
lower than in the ultimate outcome with intuition (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al., 
1987).    
There is also some evidence supporting CCT’s prediction that different task properties 
induce different modes of cognition, particularly with regard to the number of cues, redundancy 
among cues, cue weights, availability of organizing principles and degree of non-linearity of 
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organization (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hamm, 1988; Hammond et al., 1987).  Cognitive mode has 
been shown to shift during a task depending on the perceived difficulty of the task and is 
dependent upon the tendency of the task to induce intuition (Hamm, 1988).  Lastly, Hammond, 
et al. (1987) found empirical evidence to support CCT’s prediction that achievement is 
dependent upon correspondence between task properties and the cognitive mode employed 
(Hammond et al., 1987; see also Dunwoody et al., 2000).  Research also lends indirect support to 
many other assumptions of CCT about how task properties alter the mode of cognition listed in 
Table 2, including the ways experts use intuitive processing, the amount of information these 
individuals are able to cognitively process, and how high time pressure leads to use of more 
intuitive strategies (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). 
Cognitive Continuum Theory has been used in several different research contexts to 
examine expert judgment, including management (Mahan, 1994), nursing (Cader, Campbell & 
Watson, 2005; Standing, 2008), engineering (Hammond et al., 1987), clinical decision making 
(Hamm, 1988), and retail products (Mathwicka, Malthotrab, & Rigdon, 2002).  For example, 
Mahan (1994) applied CCT in a management context to examine the effects of task duration and 
task uncertainty on decision performance.  Mahan found that stressors, such as short task 
duration and task uncertainty, induced a shift toward intuition but also resulted in a decrease in 
decision performance (Mahan, 1994).  
II.5.3 Application of CEST and CCT using Naturalistic Decision Making 
Most of the research applying CEST and CCT has involved experimental studies in 
laboratory conditions.  The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) framework provides a method 
for applying CEST and CCT to understand how experts make decisions in cognitively 
challenging field settings.  NDM arose from a need to take decision making out of the laboratory 
 40 
and understand how decisions are made in the real world (Klein, 1997).  The NDM framework is 
a descriptive model that focuses on cognitive functions of decision making in the field, 
particularly emphasizing situational awareness, recognition primed decisions, and sensemaking 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001). 
One of the hallmarks of NDM is the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model.  RPD 
describes how people use past experiences and knowledge to develop and recognize cues, 
patterns, and relationships to make decisions quickly and effectively.  The RPD model was 
developed using cognitive task analysis to understand how experienced fireground commanders 
make appropriate and effective decisions under conditions of extreme time pressure, high stakes, 
and uncertainty (Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989; Lipshitz et al., 2001).  Klein and 
colleagues hypothesized that fireground commanders, faced with extreme time pressure, would 
not be able to generate and select from a large number of decision options as predicted by 
models of rational decision making.  Instead, it was anticipated that fireground commanders 
would be restricted to choosing between just two options, a favored decision and a comparison 
(Klein et al., 1989).  However, after conducting in-depth interviews of experienced firefighters 
about their experiences with 156 highly challenging fireground incidents, researchers discovered 
the firefighters were not comparing any options; instead, they were generally following the very 
first course of action identified.  This finding raised two questions: (1) how could the fire 
commanders effectively rely on the first option identified, and (2) how could they evaluate a 
single option without comparing it to any others? (Lipshitz et al. 2001).   
In seeking answers to these questions, the fireground commander interviews lead 
researchers to identify three variations of the Recognition-Primed Decision model.  In the first 
variation, a skilled decision maker sizes up the situation and develops a feasible course of action 
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using prototypes based on experience (Lipshitz et al., 2001).  This variant works best in 
relatively straightforward situations under short time constraints.  In the second variation, most 
often used when a situation is unclear or ambiguous, the skilled decision maker relies on a story-
building strategy to mentally simulate the events leading up to the observed features of the 
situation, gauging the status of the situation to develop a feasible course of action based on the 
mental simulation (Pennington & Hastie, 1995).  The third variation describes how fireground 
commanders are able to evaluate a course of action without comparing it to other options.  Here, 
commanders develop and evaluate the first feasible course of action through mental simulations 
to determine whether the strategy might work and look for potential unintended consequences.  
The course of action then can be modified and re-simulated if it lacks “progressive deepening” 
until an acceptable choice is identified (Lipshitz et al., 2001).   
All three variations of RPD rely heavily on the domain expertise and experience of the 
decision maker, and domain expertise greatly enhances the speed and quality of judgments.  In 
the first variant of RPD, expertise provides the prototypes the decision maker uses to quickly 
categorize the situation and recognize a possible course of action.  In the second and third 
variants, expertise is used to develop the stories, mental models, and simulations required to 
imagine the events leading up to the situation, develop a feasible course of action, and simulate 
and test the possible outcomes if that course of action is taken (Lipshitz et al., 2001).  Expertise 
in the RPD model also allows decision makers to respond quickly to changing conditions and ill-
defined goals because RPD focuses on working forward from existing conditions:  “Therefore, 
the RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The pattern matching is the intuitive part, and 
the mental simulation is the conscious, deliberate, and analytical part.”  (Klein, 2008: 458). 
Research has also shown that experts are more likely to use “forward-chain reasoning,” 
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whereas novices and non-experts tend to rely on “backward-chain reasoning” (Patel & Groen, 
1986).  Forward-chain reasoning involves taking the known or assumed aspects of an event or 
series of events and imagining next steps and ultimate conclusions.  Forward chaining requires 
significant experience and understanding of the possible consequences of action or non-action 
and the ability to discover missing elements.  Forward chaining involves “If-Then” reasoning 
where “If” is the known and “Then” relates to the inferred effects.  Backward-chain reasoning, 
on the other hand, involves starting from a known result or consequence and developing 
hypotheses about causation and linkages to see if necessary conditions are met to achieve the 
desired outcome (Mess, 1995; Darden 2002).   
The three variations of RPD show how expert decision makers can be effective in the 
face of uncertainty, time pressure, shifting conditions, and ill-defined goals without developing 
and comparing multiple choices or following a rational choice approach (Lipshitz et al., 2001).  
These findings have been replicated by research of experts in various military, design 
engineering, offshore oil industry, commercial aviation, and medical settings (see Klein, 1998 for 
a review).  However, this additional research also suggests several boundary conditions:  RPD 
tends to apply in situations where the decision maker has sufficient relevant domain experience 
and expertise, is under significant time pressure, and where ill-defined goals produce uncertainty.  
RPD is less effective in situations presenting highly combinatorial or algorithmic problems, 
where justifications are required, or in cases where differing views of multiple stakeholders must 
be considered (Klein, 1998).   
As a descriptive model, NDM uses a variety of field observation techniques to understand 
real-world decision making within the context of the task environment to gain insight into 
sources of difficulty, error, non-optimal performance, and how larger systems support or inhibit 
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decision makers in practice (Lipshitz et al., 2001).  NDM methods used for eliciting decision-
making strategies and expert knowledge include: structured and unstructured interviews, critical 
incident analysis, domain and concept maps, think-aloud protocols, simulations, and real-time 
observation or review of recorded decision-making behaviors (Klein et al., 1989; Lipshitz et al., 
2001).  One of the key techniques of NDM is cognitive task analysis (CTA), a broad term that 
encompasses multiple methods for capturing experts’ and practitioners’ knowledge and 
processes in performing their jobs (Klein et al., 1989; Lipshitz et al., 2001).  CTA and related 
techniques have been shown to provide reliable and valid results in a number of different studies 
(see Hoffman et al., 1998, for review). 
For the purposes of this research, NDM was used as the framework for investigating how 
creativity domain experts make judgments of creative output “in the wild” (Lipshitz et al., 2001: 
346).  Expert judgment (assessment and evaluation) of creativity occurs in numerous real-world 
settings including education (e.g., art, design, creative writing), the workplace (e.g., graphic 
design, advertising, marketing, architecture, engineering), and society (e.g., museums, film, 
music, photography).  CEST and CCT suggest experts may use many different approaches, 
techniques, and strategies in decision making, depending on the nature of the task and the 
surrounding environment.  NDM lends a methodology to help uncover and understand the 
processes, cues, cognitive schemas and approaches that creative experts use when deciding if a 
product or idea is indeed creative. 
Accordingly, this study utilized Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA), a streamlined 
version of cognitive task analysis developed for researchers untrained in cognitive psychology 
(Militello & Hutton, 1998; Crandell, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  ACTA provides a refined set of 
cognitive task analysis techniques specifically designed to identify the key cognitive elements 
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required to perform mentally challenging or complex tasks (McAndrew & Gore, 2013).  Because 
ACTA focuses on the key cognitive elements underlying difficult judgments and decisions, 
critical cues and patterns and problem-solving strategies, it is particularly well suited to studying 
expert decision making (McAndrew & Gore, 2013).  A more complete description of how ACTA 
was used in this study is provided at Appendix 7.1 
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III METHODOLOGY 
III.1 Introduction and Overview 
The purpose of this multi-case field study was to investigate the processes and measures 
that expert judges use in assessing the output creativity of individuals who regularly generate 
products and ideas for industry. Understanding how individual domain experts make judgments 
about the creativity of products and ideas under extreme time pressure, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity is expected to provide useful insights into the criteria, weightings, key elements, and 
biases involved in judging creative output.  These insights are also anticipated to advance 
understanding of the challenges creativity researchers face in assessing creative output, and to 
suggest methods and practices that will improve the measurement, reliability, and validity of this 
area of research. 
To better understand this phenomenon, this study investigates how domain experts judge 
the creativity of entries in professional awards programs through the following specific research 
questions:   
1.  What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the 
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of 
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?  
2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the 
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’ 
professional workplace settings?  
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products 
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else 
when judging creativity contests? 
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4.  What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make 
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity? 
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging 
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them? 
This chapter describes the study’s methodological approach and explains: (1) the rationale for 
the research approach; (2) a description of the research participants; (3) a summary of the 
information required for the research; (4) an overview of the research design; (5) the methods 
used for data collection; (6) the methods used to analyze and synthesize the data; (7) ethical 
concerns; (8) issues of trustworthiness; and (9) limitations and delimitations of the study.   
III.2 Rationale for the Research Approach 
III.2.1 Rationale for a qualitative field study approach 
This research investigated how domain experts make real-world judgments about the 
creativity of products and ideas.  As such, it involved a process study of the steps, procedures, 
and actions judges take in evaluating creative output, and a cognitive behavioral study of the 
criteria, cues, and mental processing that expert judges use to form judgments.  The focus of the 
research was on “how” particular individuals understood, experienced, and applied certain social 
constructs, and “what” information and approaches those individuals relied upon to make 
decisions in a social environment.  Accordingly, a qualitative research approach was determined 
to be most appropriate for this field study.   
Qualitative research is concerned with the social complexities of the real world in a 
particular context, over a specific period of time, and the ways in which participants make sense 
of the world around them (Merriam, 2009).  As such, it derives from a constructivist 
epistemology that contends knowledge is a human and social construction based on 
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interpretations of available information (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  Qualitative research involves 
researcher participation to investigate social situations and interactions in an effort to achieve a 
more holistic understanding of the events, participants, and environments (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2011).  In contrast to quantitative analysis, which is more concerned with the relationships 
between variables, measurement of objectively verifiable data, and testing of hypotheses, 
qualitative research is a naturalist approach that seeks to extract and interpret the meaning of 
events as they are experienced and understood by individuals (Merriam, 2009).   While 
quantitative research assumes a post-positivist view that an approximation of reality can be 
observed and described using evidence-based probabilities, qualitative research is based on an 
interpretivist perspective, wherein there are multiple versions of reality, requiring deeper inquiry 
of shared meaning from various sources (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).  In this respect, “model-
dependent realism” argues there is no observer-independent concept of the world and reality: 
Model-dependent realism is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from 
our sensory organs by making a model of the world.  When such a model is successful 
at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that 
constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth…According to model-dependent 
realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with 
observation.  If there are two models that both agree with observation…then one 
cannot say that one is more real than another. (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010: 7 & 46). 
III.2.2 Rationale for a case study approach 
This field study was designed to understand “how” judgment and decision making occurs 
in a particular context, and as such, it was necessary to examine contemporary events that the 
researcher could not manipulate or modify by intervention.  The information sought in this 
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research related to the actions, mental processes, choices and biases of individuals engaged in 
one particular complex activity.  Thus, a case study approach was chosen as the most likely to 
yield the desired level of detail and understanding (Yin, 2009).  Case studies maximize face 
validity by incorporating a contemporary problem that other researchers or organizations identify 
with, which allows the researcher to explore challenging questions in the context of complex and 
uncertain situations.  However, case studies are also susceptible to potential disadvantages, 
including difficulty accessing participants and data, lack of control over the context, and 
significant time investments (Myers, 2009). 
The study sought to investigate judgment and decision making at an individual unit of 
analysis by observing, interviewing, and learning from individual domain experts.  As Myers 
(2009) explains, qualitative research aims to understand decisions and action in context by seeing 
and talking with people who are or who have engaged in the actions and events of interest.  To 
increase the relevance of this study to practice, a pluralistic methodology of engaged scholarship 
was used (Van de Ven, 2007), which involved the participation of business stakeholders to 
uncover the complex, real-world problems they routinely face (Van de Ven, 2007).  The study 
included perspectives and feedback from key stakeholders and participants in creative industries, 
such as domain experts, experienced judges, creativity awards program operators, managers of 
creative employees, and experienced creative employees throughout the research process. 
Following an engaged scholarship approach, this research study adopted the seven principles 
recommended by Klein and Myers (1999) for conducting interpretive field studies: (1) the 
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle (“understanding is achieved by iterating between 
the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole they form”); (2) contextualization (“critical 
reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting”); (3) interaction 
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between researcher and subjects (critical reflection of how the data obtained were socially 
constructed); (4) abstraction and generalization (relating the data and observation to theory); (5) 
dialogical reasoning (awareness of possible contradictions between theoretical preconceptions 
and actual findings); (6) multiple interpretations (possibility of differences in participants’ 
interpretations); and, (7) suspicion (awareness of participants’ possible of biases and “distortion 
of events”) (Klein & Myers, 1999).  These principles are not all mandatory or required to be used 
in a particular order—researchers are expected to use their judgment and discretion in deciding 
how and when various principles should be applied while keeping in mind the principles are 
somewhat interdependent (Klein & Myers, 1999).  
III.3 Research Setting and Context 
This study is situated in a field setting to understand how individuals make judgments of 
creative products and ideas in the real world.  In an effort to explain how judgments are made at 
a very high level, the inquiry focused on individuals with substantial domain experience in 
creative industries that were recognized as experts by their peers.  In addition, it was important 
that study participants possess a significant level of past experience in making judgments about 
creative products and ideas, both in workplace settings and in situations involving time pressure, 
high stakes, and uncertainty. 
Creativity award program judges are selected because their peers have recognized them as 
creative industry experts, and because they have received awards for their creative work in the 
past.  These judges are also usually managers or directors in highly creative marketing, 
advertising, graphic design, photography, product design and packaging, architecture, and 
research and development industries.  As such, they have experience evaluating creative products 
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and ideas at each step of the creative process in their capacities at work and in contests under 
stress, ambiguity, and time constraints. 
After investigating of a number of creativity award programs, one program on the U.S. 
East Coast was selected as most appropriate for this study.  All of the judges involved in the 
selected awards program were previous winners of multiple creativity awards, had more than 15 
years professional experience in a creative industry, and were nominated as judges by other 
professionals.  The awards program’s primary purpose was recognizing and awarding 
“creativity” in a large number of professional fields, in contrast to many other programs where 
creativity comes second to other content areas, such as “advertising.”  The judges chosen for this 
program came from diverse backgrounds, industries, and major metropolitan cities in the United 
States, Mexico, Italy, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, China, Singapore, and 
Spain.  The awards program was also chosen because it is one of few that requires judges to be 
physically present to score items simultaneously in a large venue over several days, instead of 
viewing entries either via webpages or on a computer file.  These conditions provided the judges 
the advantage of handling each item personally, interacting with other judges, and evaluating at 
their own pace, but also created a field condition of significant stress, compressed time 
constraints, uncertainty, and high stakes that are key elements for understanding how experts 
assess creativity.  The setting also allowed the researcher to examine judges during actual contest 
conditions, and conduct simulations and think-aloud exercises with contest entries. 
III.3.1 Overview of information needed 
Obtaining information from diverse sources was considered important to investigate how 
expert judges assess creativity in field settings.  To understand the tasks and cognitive challenges 
judges might face, it was critical to interview judges with a very high level of experience in a 
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creative domain, but also to observe them in actual field conditions.  Furthermore, while semi-
structured interviews provided valuable insight into participants’ subconscious awareness of their 
actions, it was necessary to use a form of cognitive task analysis that involved simulation 
exercises and think-aloud protocols.  Collateral written materials from the awards program, as 
well as interviews of the operators of the contest, were obtained to provide context about the 
judging event.  Lastly, data from the judges’ entry scores from this contest and from previous 
award contests over a five-year period were obtained in order to evaluate the inter-rater 
agreement among these expert judges. 
III.4 Research Participants and Data Sources 
III.4.1 Pilot Study 
This study was inspired by challenges the researcher encountered in his professional 
experience as an executive at an architecture and design organization, as well feedback of other 
business executives about the difficulty of identifying highly creative work.   These challenges 
also inspired the researcher and two colleagues to conduct an unpublished student research study 
examining the impact of rewards and task description on employee motivation and creative 
outcomes.  As part of that initial study, the research team interviewed managers of several 
different organizations, each with more than 10 years of experience supervising creative 
employees and producing creative ideas and products themselves.   
Using the information obtained through the interviews, a pilot study that featured a logo 
design contest for a charity organization was developed.  Freelance graphic designers were asked 
to design a logo for a specified charity, and 36 different logo designs were submitted.  Three 
independent graphics professionals scored the submissions separately based on the criteria of 
“novelty” and “usefulness,” each on a scale of 1 to 5.  During the scoring process, two of the 
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professionals residing in the U.S. scored one particular entry as highly novel and also very 
useful.  However, the third professional, based in the U.K., scored the same entry as a 1 on both 
novelty and usefulness.  When the third professional was asked why he scored the entry so low, 
he indicated the logo design appeared to be a very close replica of a finalist logo for the 2012 
London Olympics.  When the other two judges were asked about their scores on the same item, 
they revealed they had not seen the finalists for the London Olympics logo.  To the U.S. judges, 
the entry appeared to be unique and to be a good fit with the charity’s mission.  This raised the 
issue of whether the criteria of “novelty” and “usefulness” are good measures of creativity where 
the full domain of existing art cannot be known by any one evaluator, and how (and in fact 
whether) these two criteria are assessed in real world settings. 
The pilot study uncovered numerous other practical and theoretical challenges 
surrounding the discernment of creative outcomes in professional settings and academic 
research.  Of particular note was the lack of understanding about how the creativity of 
professional work product is identified and measured, how those who assess creativity go about 
the critical task of selecting the most creative ideas and products, and the factors and criteria 
judges actually use to identify highly creative outcomes.  These practical and theoretical 
questions contributed to development of the research questions for this study. 
III.4.2 Criteria for Research Participants  
To better understand the processes and cognition experts use when evaluating creativity, 
this study sought to identify research participants who were recognized by their peers as domain 
experts in various creative endeavors and industries.  Of particular interest were individuals with 
more than a decade of substantial experience in creative industries who also had significant 
experience assessing creativity in professional settings and in judging creativity awards 
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programs.  Numerous studies have shown that superior expertise is developed through repeated 
effort and diligent practice over a significant number of years in a specific domain environment 
that offers regular feedback and opportunity for learning (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 
1993).  In professional settings, experts are recognized by others in the industry through their 
years of experience, professional commitment, and dedicated practice, and as a result are often 
selected by their peers to acts as mentors, judges, managers, leaders, and educators.  
Awards programs that recognize highly creative work in fields such as graphic design, 
advertising, and product development utilize such peer-recognized industry experts as contest 
judges to choose winners and increase the overall credibility of award selection.  Judges for these 
types of awards programs are considered among the very best in their field and have often 
received numerous awards for their own work in previous contests.  Thus, recognized industry 
experts who have judged award programs specifically focused on creativity and creative 
professions are anticipated to have established the level and type of experience this study seeks 
to understand. 
III.4.3 Participant Selection 
For this study, criterion-based and purposive selection methodologies were used to 
identify and select research participants with the requisite professional experience, skill, and 
expertise (Patton, 1990; Merriam, 2009).  Purposive sampling allows for a selection of 
information-rich cases at the heart of the research investigation.  Criterion-based methods require 
that all participants meet one or more criteria predetermined by the researcher, and that they have 
extensive experience in the identified phenomena to be investigated, in an effort to reduce 
variation (Patton, 1990).   Internet research revealed more than a dozen different national and 
international award programs in various creative industries operating within the United States 
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between 2010 and 2015.  This list was narrowed to four whose primary missions were to 
recognize and award highly creative work of professionals across a broad range of categories that 
also utilized recognized industry experts as contest judges.  Specialty and niche award programs 
were excluded from further consideration if they focused on only one or a few categories within 
a defined creative industry.  Also excluded from the list were those that did not identify 
creativity as a specific award criteria, those focused on technical innovations, and those that were 
aimed mainly at recognizing other aspects of professional work, such as overall financial 
performance or advertising effectiveness (e.g., the “Effie Awards”, see www.effie.org).  Award 
programs also were excluded if all of the judges or the jury for the program did not appear to be 
industry experts or otherwise have significant direct professional experience in the domain that 
was evaluated (e.g., general interest publication awards that utilized writers and editors from the 
publication as judges for technical product and other non-writing awards).   
Program directors or lead judges of the four remaining creative industry award programs 
were contacted by email using information listed on the websites for each contest.  All four 
identified program posted the identities of the judges from the most recent contest as well as the 
identity and contact information for the program director or judge in charge.  An introductory 
email was sent to each of the four programs identifying the nature of the proposed research and 
inquiring about interviewing their program’s judges.  Follow-up emails were sent if a response 
had not been received within a week of initial contact.  After two weeks, program directors from 
two of the four contests had responded to the inquiry, and both offered to discuss the research.  
After discussing the proposed research by phone, one of the two programs was selected as the 
most appropriate and willing to participate in the research effort. The selected program and the 
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program director have requested that their identity not be revealed in publication of the research 
study.   
The awards program that served as the context for this study has held contests for more 
than 30 years, with entries received from around the globe, and more than 60 categories of 
creativity were assessed each year.  In 2014, the awards program received more than 800 
separate entries and gave awards in 64 distinct categories, including awards in print categories 
such as graphic design, product packaging, magazine and periodical design, newspaper and print 
advertising, annual reports, and book covers, as well as for digital and broadcast media design 
including website, web and smartphone applications, animation, film, training videos, and 
television and radio advertising.  
III.4.4 Backgrounds of the Participating Expert Judges 
All of the judges who agreed to participate in this research study had broad and diverse 
backgrounds in various creative industries, as well as having significant experience working in 
and managing creative organizations.  All participants were working professionals with 15 or 
more years of direct experience in creative professions such as advertising, branding, product 
design, photography, copywriting, packaging design, digital media (web and application design), 
graphic design, and broadcast media.  Several of the participants had experience in multiple 
fields, and some had a total of more than 30 years of experience in creative industry.  Nine of the 
participants were male and three were female.  Seven of the participants owned and operated 
their own design, branding, or advertising companies or agencies at the time of the study, and the 
remainder held positions of senior creative director, senior vice president, or managing director 
in their respective organizations.   
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Each of the study participants had been awarded numerous individual creativity awards for 
own their design work from national and international competitions including Best of Show, Best 
in Category, and Gold awards from various contests including the Cannes Lions International 
Festival of Creativity, the International Academy of Digital Arts and Sciences (“Webby’s”), the 
American Advertising Federation (“ADDY’s”), Communication Arts (“CA”), the American 
Graphic Design and Advertising Awards (“AGDA”), Creativity International Awards, and the 
Summit Creativity Awards.  As past award winners, all of the participants had been invited and 
had acted as judges in multiple international, national, and regional awards programs, and many 
had served as a judge for more than 20 contests.  Many are also recognized public speakers on 
creativity and design, and some had published best-selling critically acclaimed books on 
advertising, photography, and branding.  The participant group for this study also included a past 
winner of the U.S. Presidential Design Award, a National Press Photographer of the Year, and a 
Pulitzer-prize winning photographer.   
III.5 Data Collection 
This research follows Yin’s (2009) recommendations for data collection:  (1) use of 
multiple sources of evidence; (2) development of a case study database; and (3) a documented 
chain of evidence (Yin, 2009: 114-124).  The research included formal, semi-structured and 
probe question-based interviews using Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques to question 
domain expert judges.  Appendix 7.1 provides a summary of the Applied Cognitive Task 
Analysis approach used in this study.  Advice, feedback, and contextual information were also 
obtained from several creativity award programs through informal discussions with program 
directors, operators, and participants.  Archival documents, including information from various 
creativity award program websites, presentations, contest rules and criteria, were also reviewed.   
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III.5.1 Observation of Creativity Contest Judging Event, Simulations, Think-Aloud 
Exercises and In-Person Interviews of Experts and Contest Administrators 
In an effort to further understand the context, background, and activities of judging 
creativity in an awards show, the researcher obtained permission to attend and observe an awards 
contest-judging event in a major city in the eastern U.S.  The judging event is held annually and 
takes place over a three-day period in a large hotel ballroom.  Judges for each annual contest are 
selected by contest administrators based on recommendations from past judges, industry leaders, 
prior judging experience for this and other contests, industry experience and recognition as 
industry experts.  An awards program director and administrative assistant administered the 
judging event. 
Before the judging process began, the program director for the awards program introduced 
the researcher to the eight judges in a group setting, and allowed the researcher to give an 
overview of the research and offered judges the opportunity to participate in the study.  The 
program director and administrative assistant also agreed to be interviewed for the study, and the 
researcher was allowed to observe the judging process over the full three-day event.  During the 
course of the judging event, five judges agreed to be formally interviewed during breaks in the 
judging process.  All eight judges and the awards program director and administrator also 
participated in general roundtable discussions about the awards program and overall judging 
process with the researcher after all the judging had concluded.  In addition to the interviews and 
roundtable discussions, the five judges who consented to be interviewed also agreed to 
participate in think-aloud exercises as they scored a sample of actual entries or participated in 
simulated judging exercises using entries from the contest that had been previously scored. 
The researcher observed all eight judges as they viewed, evaluated, and scored the contest 
entries over a three-day period.  The formal scoring process began with a short introduction by 
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the contest administrator, an overview of the entry categories and explanation of how the entries 
were displayed in the ballroom, followed by instructions on how to use the electronic scoring 
devices and a review of the schedule of the three-day event.  Each judge was assigned an 
electronic tablet with a program that allowed him or her to record a numerical score for each 
entry by category and to record nominations for the “Best in Show” award, which recognizes the 
top entries regardless of category.   
Judges were told that many entries were entered in multiple categories; for example, a 
photograph in a magazine advertisement might be entered in both the advertising photography 
category and the magazine photography category.  Each judge was also given a one-page 
explanation of the instructions on how to the use the tablet.  Included on this sheet was a list of 
criteria for the judge to use in scoring entries and an explanation of how awards would be 
selected: 
 Judging Criteria 
o 9-10 being excellent! Top of its category (“I wish I had done that!”). 
o 7-8 being above average work for the category. 
o 5-6 being average work for the category. 
o 3-4 being below average work for the category. 
o 1-2 should not be considered for an award. 
Scores from all judges will be averaged to give the final score.  Best in Show 
candidate selections will be pulled by staff at the end of the judging and all 
nominations will be discussed by the Jury on Saturday. 
The judges received no other instructions or directions on how to judge the entries, how to 
go about reviewing the categories, or what was expected of them.   
Judges were observed over the three days as they moved around the room from table to 
table where entries were displayed, and the researcher kept notes of the judges’ actions and 
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behaviors.  In some instances, the researcher surreptitiously timed (with permission) the 
participant judges as they reviewed individual categories and entries, in an attempt to capture 
how long participants spent forming assessments.  The researcher also took notes as to whether 
and when participants worked alone or in concert with other judges, whether judges spoke to 
each other about individual entries, and what judges said aloud about the entries and process.  
During breaks in the scoring, judges and the contest administrators were observed interacting 
and, on several occasions, the researcher engaged in conversation with the group about the 
contest, the overall quality of the entries, the research study, and the scoring process.  At 
different points during lunch and other long breaks, each of the participants was interviewed in a 
location away from the other judges.  Think-aloud scoring was conducted during judging 
sessions, and simulation exercises were held during breaks in the scoring process. 
Interviews with the participants during the judging event focused on how each individual 
approached the task of judging creative products and ideas, their judging experiences, the criteria 
used to assess contest entries, the challenges of judging creativity in a contest setting, the 
differences between assessing creativity for an award and in professional practice, the types of 
heuristics and techniques participants used to assess creativity, and the potential biases 
participants encountered and considered during the assessment of creativity.  Participants 
explained that the awards program paid for the judges’ accommodations and provided meals 
during the event; however, none of the judges were compensated for their participation and each 
had to pay for their own travel.  During a round-table discussion after the event, many of the 
judges said they participated in judging events out of a sense of obligation to the industry, as a 
way of staying connected to the very best work in their profession, and to strengthen their 
professional credentials. 
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After participants had explained as much as they could recall about the assessment process, 
the interviewer followed the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis protocol described in Appendix 
7.1 to delve into the cognitive aspects of the judging task.  Participants were first told to “think 
about what you do when you score contest entries” and asked to break down the task of assessing 
creative products or ideas into three-to-six steps, and then identify which of the steps required the 
most cognitive effort.  The interviewer then used the elicited steps to create a “task diagram” that 
provided a broad overview of the judging task and was reviewed with the participants for 
accuracy and completeness.  Generic and specific probe questions were then asked as part of the 
“knowledge audit” step to elicit greater detail about each of the identified subtasks and the 
cognitive effort necessary to complete them effectively, including critical cues and strategies for 
judging creativity broadly and scoring each entry specifically.  Concrete examples and specific 
information about past experiences and comparisons between how experts and novices might 
perform the task were captured during this stage of the interview to create an inventory of task-
specific expertise.  Participants identified specific cues and strategies that were explored further 
to identify how they were used to make decisions, and to help explain why the task poses 
challenges to inexperienced or novice judges.  During the simulation interview, five participants 
were provided with actual contest entries from a selected category and asked to score each entry 
while describing aloud the processes and cognitive steps they undertook.  In three cases, the 
participant had not judged the entries beforehand, such that their descriptions and scoring were 
observed in real-time.  In the other two cases, participants had scored the entries previously, and 
they repeated their assessments during the interview, describing their thinking and process aloud 
as each entry was viewed again.   
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The simulation interview was used to build on the information obtained in the first two 
steps to contextualize the task, allowing the interviewer to better understand expert judges’ 
cognitive processes.  After the interviews were complete, a “cognitive demands table” of the 
information elicited in all the interviews was created to merge and synthesize the data.  The 
cognitive demands table provided a format for the researcher to identify those areas that required 
complex cognitive skills and pertinent problem-solving and decision-making activities involved 
in the task of assessing creativity. 
III.5.2 Interviews of Judges from Prior Year Contests 
After the awards contest judging event, additional participants for this study were solicited 
by email from a list of past judges provided by the awards program director.  The list contained 
names and contact information for 18 judges who had participated in at least one of three 
creativity awards contests preceding the 2014 program.  The solicitation email described the 
research in general terms and requested a response if individuals were interested in participating 
in the research.  Three past judges responded and agreed to participate within the first week of 
the initial email.  A second email was sent to the remaining judges on the list the following week, 
and two more subsequently agreed to be interviewed.  A third and final email was sent two 
weeks later, at which point, two more judges agreed to participate.  Two judges declined due to 
busy schedules.  The remaining nine judges on the award program’s list did not respond to any of 
the three emails sent.   
Interviews of the seven judges who agreed to participate were conducted by telephone 
following a semi-structured approach.  Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.  
Interview questions were drawn from those posed to judges during in-person interviews at the 
contest event.  The questioning focused on how the participants generally approached the task of 
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judging creative products and ideas, their judging experiences, the criteria used to assess contest 
entries, the challenges of judging creativity in a contest setting, the differences between assessing 
creativity for an awards program and in professional practice, the types of heuristics participants 
used to assess creativity quickly, and the potential biases participants were aware of during the 
assessment of creativity.  Following the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis protocol, participants 
interviewed by phone were also asked to break down the judging task into steps to identify those 
that required the most cognitive effort, which helped develop a task diagram. Probe questions 
were then asked during the knowledge audit as to subtasks and cognitive effort, critical cues and 
strategies employed.  Past experiences and comparisons between experts and novices were 
explored to create a task-specific inventory with examples.   For the simulation portion of the 
telephone interviews, participants were presented with a challenging brief scenario drawn from 
the in-person judging think-aloud exercises that had been designed in advance specifically for 
this purpose.  Participants were asked to imagine the scenario, visualizing each step involved, 
and describe their thinking and processes.  The participants were then probed on issues relating 
to situation assessment, potential errors and biases, cues and patterns, and other challenges the 
situation might present.  The information obtained from these simulation interviews was added to 
the cognitive demands table for further analysis and synthesis with data from the in-person 
interviews. 
III.5.3 Collection of Scoring Data from Observed Event and Prior Contests 
After the awards contest judging event concluded, all awards were announced, and all 
interviews had been completed, numerical scoring data from the observed contest and nine prior 
contests were obtained from the award contest program administrator.  The dataset received 
assigned a unique anonymous number to each judge and a unique randomly assigned number to 
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each entry. Data for ten contests was provided, however, due to apparent errors in the random 
assignment of some item numbers, only scores from eight contests were suitable for analysis.  
Over the eight contests analyzed, 70 judges scored a total of 8,699 entries.  According to the 
program director, not every item was scored by every judge in each contest for various reasons 
including lack of sufficient time, insufficient familiarity with a particular contest category, and 
judges’ unwillingness to rate specific entries with which they were already familiar.  Thus, the 
number of scores analyzed across the eight contests totaled 63,809. 
III.6 Data Analysis 
This study follows Miles and Huberman’s (1994) three recommendations for qualitative 
case data analysis: (1) data reduction, (2) data display, and (3) conclusion drawing and 
verification (Miles & Huberman 1994: 10-12). The data analysis and collection process was 
interactive and cyclical, allowing the researcher to reflect, revise, and reconsider, gaining a 
deeper understanding of the information collected. 
III.6.1 Data Reduction 
Data reduction is a process that involves selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and 
transforming collected data into more usable forms (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Data reduction 
occurred continuously throughout this study from before the project began until the final report 
was completed.  To improve validity and assist in analysis, this research included the use of 
various methods for summarizing (contact summary sheets, document summaries, case analysis, 
and interim case summaries), different approaches to coding (at both descriptive and inferential 
levels), methods to assist in thinking about data (annotations, journaling, and memos), and 
methods for producing extended reports throughout the study. 
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III.6.2 Data Display 
Miles and Huberman (1994) also recommend the use of matrices, graphs, charts, and 
diagrams designed to assemble organized information into immediately accessible, compact 
forms. Creating a data display was an iterative process, occurring throughout and following data 
collection.  Additionally, displays were created to compress and order data to allow the 
researcher to draw justifiable conclusions.  Single-case displays were collected into a matrix, 
which were further condensed to permit side-by-side comparisons (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 
176).  Cross-case displays, composite models, and sequence analysis were particularly helpful in 
data analysis by allowing for ordering actions and behaviors and sorting by significant categories 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994: 172-187). 
III.6.3 Conclusion Drawing and Verification 
Data reduction and data display provided the base information for conclusion drawing and 
verification.  Review of the data collected involved identifying key themes and drawing 
conclusions by identifying cues, patterns, processes, justifications, and explanations from the 
obtained and observed data. Initial conclusions were kept loose and tentative until further support 
was gathered and solidified as the process concluded.  The conclusions were then verified after 
analysis to improve validity. 
III.6.4 Coding 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher or a professional 
transcriptionist.  Following the recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1994), data was coded 
using both descriptive and inferential codes to facilitate analysis and interpretation.  An initial 
coding scheme for the interview transcripts of expert judges was developed based on a review of 
literature of various definitions and components of creativity, the measurement and assessment 
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of creative output, dual process models of judgment and decision making, the various elements 
and indicators of expertise and expert cognition, the factors and differentiators of Cognitive 
Experiential-Self Theory and Cognitive Continuum Theory, indicators of heuristics and potential 
biases, and the aspects of Naturalistic Decision Making, including three different forms of the 
Recognition Primed Decision model.  From the literature review, 11 major codes and 32 minor 
or sub-codes were developed for use in the review and coding of interview transcripts.  The 
review and coding process inductively generated 3 additional major codes and 14 additional sub-
codes as several unique concepts, descriptors, and unanticipated aspects of the judging criteria 
and process arose from explanations provided by expert judges.  
Initial transcript coding involved review and analysis of four transcripts chosen by the 
researcher as representative of all interviews conducted.  The initial coding scheme and four 
selected interview transcripts were imported using NVivo 10 software and “nodes” were created 
using the initial coding scheme.  The transcripts were then coded using the initial criteria, and 
any potential new codes and sub-codes that emerged were coded accordingly on appropriate 
transcript portions.  Coding was also used to help to identify coherent themes, and initial codes 
were modified, expanded, collapsed, and refined as data collection and analysis progressed, as 
new themes and patterns emerged. 
III.6.5 Check Coding 
A check coding process was utilized in an effort to increase both the accuracy and 
trustworthiness of the analysis.  The four transcripts initially selected for check coding and the 
accompanying coding sheet were provided to two independent researchers who had no 
connection to the study.   The two check coders who were selected to review the transcripts were 
trained researchers identified and hired through a freelancer website.  Both of the coders have 
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doctorate degrees, one in experimental psychology and the other in public health, and both have 
published articles in their disciplines.  The two check coders separately coded the four transcripts 
using the preliminary codes and added new or different codes as they felt appropriate.  
Preliminary review indicated overall agreement among coders of between 64% and 85% for the 
four transcripts.  Discussion between the coders revealed that most of the differences related to 
assign multiple codes to the same data and choices between closely related codes.  As a result, 
some codes were collapsed into broader concepts while other codes were divided into more 
discrete elements.  After several discussions, all coders reached general agreement on the main 
and subsidiary codes and coding of the data.  All remaining transcripts were coded by the 
researcher using the agreed coding scheme and coding approach. 
III.6.6 Ethical considerations 
All participants consented to be interviewed for the study and to have their interviews 
audiotaped. A consent form, approved by the university Institutional Review Board, was 
provided to each participant before the interviews.  To preserve the confidentiality of the 
participants, the awards program and the data provided, all interview tapes, notes from 
observations and interviews, and collateral data collected were kept in a locked cabinet or in a 
password protected file on the researcher’s personal computer.  When the interviews were 
transcribed, code names were used to identify the participants in place of their real names and, 
where reported, code names are used. All judging scores received from the awards program were 
anonymous, with numbers assigned to individual judges and all entries identified by item 
numbers only.    
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III.7 Issues of Trustworthiness 
For qualitative research, issues of trustworthiness surround the credibility, dependability, 
confirmability, and transferability of the study results.  Credibility relates to whether the research 
findings are accurate and credible reflections of information provided by the participants or 
otherwise obtained (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Credibility also relates to whether the 
methodology chosen is logically related to the objectives of the study.  In this study, efforts were 
taken to improve the credibility of the research design, including obtaining data from multiple 
sources, soliciting feedback from industry members to narrow and refine the field of inquiry, 
actively searching for contrary findings and contradictory data, applying different research 
methods to obtain data, and reviewing the findings with colleagues to confirm the data collected. 
Dependability for qualitative research involves an assurance that the findings are consistent 
with the data.  Such dependability requires objective reviews of the data and development of 
procedures to reduce researcher bias and identifying data inconsistencies (Lincoln & Guba, 
2000).  In this study, several efforts were made to increase dependability of the findings, 
including the use of check coding by individuals with doctorate-level research experience who 
were not connected to the current study, improvement of the coding and refinement of the coding 
scheme based on input from independent coders, maintaining a journal of the research and 
decision-making processes, as well as using the data display and conclusion drawing and 
verification techniques recommended by Miles & Huberman (1994).  Transferability of the study 
results is concerned with how the findings of his study may be used in other contexts.  
Transferability is improved when the data are shared in a rich, detailed manner that allows the 
reader to fully understand the context and information to determine how study findings might be 
usefully applied in other settings.  To improve transferability of this study, verbatim quotes of 
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participants’ responses along with detailed explanations of the context of the judging process, 
observations and awards program are provided. 
III.8 Anticipated Limitations and Delimitations 
As with any research, this study was anticipated to involve several limitations inherent in 
the nature of the research approach and the methods employed.  First, since the study is 
necessarily limited to a small number (12) of recognized creative domain experts operating at a 
very high level of performance, it is difficult to generalize to a larger population of experts from 
other domains or to individuals without this recognized level of expertise.  However, the 12 
participants represented a broad spectrum of creative disciplines and each had significant 
experience in judging creativity both professionally and in awards contests, as well as decades of 
professional experience as a creative employee and manager.  The number of participants was 
deemed sufficient in light of the limited number of experts in the field, the depth of information 
each provided about their processes and understanding of the issues, their level of expertise in 
the field, and the fact that multiple participants provided similar information.  This similarity in 
participant responses indicated agreement on the main issues and relative complete coverage of 
the data obtained.  Second, as this qualitative study involved events and actions viewed 
retrospectively, and using information relayed to the researcher during individual interviews of 
participants, it may be subject to biases or gaps in memory and perception of the participants, 
lack of conscious understanding of the nature of the processes employed, and filtering or efforts 
to appear socially acceptable or helpful to the research effort.  Numerous techniques previously 
discussed were employed to reduce filtering and biases in memory, including semi-directed 
interviews, real-time think-aloud protocols and simulations.  Third, this study is limited by the 
single researcher’s ability to analyze and interpret the observed and collected data, as well as the 
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researcher’s own cognitive biases and perceptions from the researcher’s professional experience 
in the domain of study.  Several techniques described in this section were used to maintain 
objectivity, including reviewing the data and conclusions with third parties in both academia and 
creative industries, and the use of independent data coders. 
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IV FINDINGS 
IV.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria domain experts 
use in assessing the output creativity by individuals who regularly create products in real-world 
settings.  To facilitate this investigation, expert judges from an established international 
creativity awards program were observed in a field setting and participated in semi-structured 
interviews. Understanding how domain experts make judgments about professionals’ creatively 
in their products and ideas, in situations where judges face significant time pressure, uncertainty, 
and high stakes, provides useful insights into how creativity is assessed in real-world situations.  
These insights may also increase understanding of the challenges that creativity researchers face 
in assessing creative output in experimental studies, suggest refinements to assessment methods 
and practices to improve the overall reliability and validity of creativity research, and improve 
the discernment of creativity in organizational settings.     
This chapter provides the main from the interviews field observations, real-time exercises, 
collateral data, and the results from inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ scores both from the 
observed contest and prior creativity award contests.  Five major findings were gleaned from a 
detailed analysis of the research data: 
1.  All (100%) of the participants reported they did not specifically use the “novel and 
useful” definition of creativity that is prevalent in research, with most stating the definition was 
inadequate and incomplete for judging creativity.  Instead, participants reported they look for a 
combination of as many as six distinct elements as key indicators of creative output: 1) 
uniqueness, novelty or surprise; 2) inventiveness or advancement of the state of the art; 3) overall 
quality of execution; 4) conceptual impact or cleverness of idea; 5) level of artisanship necessary 
to achieve the conceptual goal(s); and 6) utility, usefulness or appropriateness to the task.   
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2.  A large majority (10 of 12 [83%]) of participants reported they use the same or very 
similar processes, criteria and standards to assess creative products and ideas in their workplaces 
as they do in creativity award contests. 
3.  The majority (9 of 12 [75%]) of participants reported that highly creative products and 
ideas produce an “immediate” positive or “gut” reaction, often accompanied by a strong 
emotional and/or physical response (sometimes termed “goose bumps”) and stated the most 
highly creative work is readily identifiable, even among very high-level professional creative 
work, indicating intuition is a significant element of the participant’s assessment of creativity.  
However, more than half of participants (7 of 12) reported also using some form of rational 
analysis to assess the level of creativity after their initial response, and to modify or confirm their 
initial intuitive assessments. 
4.  All of the participants (100%) stated they believed novices would find it very difficult 
to assess professional creative products and ideas, identified several types of mistakes the 
participants themselves had made as novices, and indicated they believed non-experts would be 
inclined to make similar types of errors (termed by some as “the novice trap”) in attempting to 
assess professional creativity.   
5. Most participants (7 of 12 [58%]) acknowledged using various heuristics or rules of 
thumb to judge entries, and stated they were aware of several types of biases that might affect 
their judgment; however, participants also believed they were able to reduce the effect of these 
biases through their substantial judging experience, deliberate mindfulness of the potential for 
biases, and the use of the Consensual Assessment Technique. 
The following sections discuss each of the findings in more detail and draw support from 
the pilot study data and interviews of creative managers, Applied Cognitive Task Analysis 
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interviews of the 12 participants, direct observations by the researcher during a three-day judging 
event, and in-person judging simulations and think-aloud exercises with five of the participants.  
In total, 18 hours of recorded interviews resulted in more than 340 pages of typed transcripts that 
were coded and analyzed.  Illustrative quotations from the interview transcripts are provided 
below to allow the reader a deeper view into the experiences and perspectives of the study 
participants in their own words; however, pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of the 
participants.  In addition, the researcher’s observations of the judging event and the responses of 
participants in the simulations and think-aloud protocols were recorded in contemporaneous 
notes, subsequently coded and analyzed, and are interwoven into the findings to provide a 
broader perspective of the cognitive and behavioral aspects of the activities observed.  
Information gleaned from program administrators was also included to provide further context of 
the field setting, the participants, and their behaviors.  Finally, a statistical summary and the 
results of inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ scores assessed on 63,800 items in eight 
awards’ program contests over five years are provided.  
IV.2 Findings from interviews, observations and exercises 
“The guy who invented the first wheel, he was an idiot.  The guy who invented the other 
three, he was a genius.” - Sid Caesar (1922-2014) 
Finding 1: All (100%) of the participants reported they did not specifically use the 
“novel and useful” definition of creativity that is prevalent in research, with most stating the 
definition was inadequate and incomplete for judging creativity.  Instead, participants reported 
they look for a combination of as many as six distinct elements as key indicators of creative 
output: 1) uniqueness, novelty or surprise; 2) inventiveness or advancement of the state of the 
art; 3) overall quality of execution; 4) conceptual impact or cleverness of idea; 5) level of 
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artisanship necessary to achieve the conceptual goal(s); and 6) utility, usefulness or 
appropriateness to the task.   
The primary finding of this research study is that participants did not believe the “novel 
and useful” definition of creativity relied upon by researchers was adequate, reflective, or 
practicable in assessing creativity in professional award contests or in workplace settings.  All of 
the participants felt strongly that defining creativity as being simply “novel and useful” or 
“unique and appropriate” failed to capture the essence, scale or totality of the concept of 
creativity as used in practice. 
The definition [novel and useful] is definitely narrow—it feels like textbook.  It’s not 
reality.  I mean, if I was looking at a bunch of collateral brochures, let’s say, what would 
be novel with all of those?  Well, it would be one that somehow is different from the rest, 
right?  Then you start looking for differences:  “Oh, I guess this one’s novel because it 
opens landscape versus traditional.”  You’d have to look for some reason to call it novel.  
And ‘useful’, well they all serve the same purpose, so I don’t know if you could say that 
one is more useful than the other in that context. (Christine) 
During interviews, most of the participants denied using any particular definition or criteria for 
judging creativity in contest situations.  Moreover, during think-aloud exercises as the judges 
scored actual entries in the contest, several participants became frustrated trying to explain their 
process or identify the criteria being used.  One participant described the difficulty in explaining 
his criteria or steps during one think-aloud exercise as “dumbing it down”:  
Jeremy:  “Ok, that one is really good.” 
 Researcher:  “Why?”   
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 Jeremy: “It just…everything works.  I’m describing this to you like I’m in school again, 
and I’m explaining it to my professor or a teacher why I think this design is worthy.  But I’m 
really dumbing it down…no offense…because it’s the only way I know how to say it.  There 
aren’t any words I can use to express what I’m feeling and thinking right now, the combination 
of all these things and why it matters.” 
 During simulated judging exercises using entries that had already been scored, several 
other participants also stated they could not describe the process of judging creativity or 
separately identify all of the criteria they used in the judging process.  One participant expressed 
the difficulty as having “no language” to describe what she was thinking: 
Well, there is no language to attribute what you do when judging…and there is no way to 
separate the various component parts that make up an ultimate impression or decision in 
your mind.  No one breaks it apart like that.  You might be able to say where it fails, or that 
it just doesn’t rise to the level, but you can’t explain [why something is creative] in words. 
(Angela) 
Other participants pointed to the significant time pressure involved in judging a large number of 
items, and the importance of the contest to the entrants as both contributing to an environment of 
high stress and insufficient time to do more than briefly review and quickly score each entry.  
While all participants felt the “novel and useful” definition of creativity used in research is 
inadequate and incomplete for their purposes in assessing creativity in practice, through the use 
of Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques (structured probe questions, knowledge audits, 
and creation of lists of cognitive demands, see Appendix 7.1) a number of descriptions were 
elicited from participants with regard to the most important characteristics judges look for when 
assessing particularly creative items in a contest setting. 
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In an effort to better understand the criteria that experts look for in creative entries, 
participants were asked as part of the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis interviews to describe 
examples of entries that had been scored very high or that had failed to score high for one or 
more particular reason.  While the participants’ descriptions of the specific elements they 
recalled about memorable entries where not all encompassing or complete, and did not 
necessarily generalize across different contest categories, the descriptions began to uncover some 
of the criteria, cues, and patterns experts appeared to use when assessing creativity.  As 
participants became more aware of the elements they could recall, they began to develop 
explanations for how they made their decisions.   
In general terms, several participants suggested the criteria for an award winning entry is 
simply whether the entry is more creative than anything else the judge has seen in that category, 
with the top-rated entries simply perceived as “better than” what that judge might have been able 
to create facing the same tasks, using their own skill and experience as the standard: 
Everybody is looking for fresh.  Everybody wants to be “wowed.”  If you want the single 
biggest criteria for a contest it’s:  “Astonish me.”  That’s what you want; you want to say 
to yourself, “God, I wish I had done that!  That was great!”  That doesn’t happen often, but 
it happens.  (Bill)  
“I know something is really creative when I think to myself, ‘I don’t even know if I could 
have ever come up with that.’”  (Leonard)   
The standard of “I wish I had done that” was also the description at the top of the “judging 
criteria” form given to participants at the judging event.  According to the director of the awards 
program, that quotation was incorporated into the form after she heard several judges use it in 
prior contests to describe the most creative entries. 
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When asked to recall examples of the most creative entries they had seen, most participants 
described two aspects of creative work that combine broad concepts of “idea” and “execution,” 
and stated that both should be present to a significant degree in order for an item to be considered 
highly creative: 
Good creativity is part great design and part quality execution.  A great idea with bad 
execution would get a 5 [out of ten], same with great execution but not a great idea.  Great 
idea and great execution is going to get a 9 or a 10.  (Angela) 
Other participants referred to a description of creativity that was similar to the “novel and useful” 
definition used in creativity research, but with the additional elements of functionality, ingenuity, 
overall concept, engagement and cleverness: 
You’re walking that fine line with the architecture you create that needs to be very 
inspired, but then it needs to be very functional.  And if you look at it the functionality is 
key, because if it’s not functional people won’t fall in love with it.  And then on top of that, 
I feel it’s the creativity because if you do something that is creative, but not functional, 
then it is art, and I’m not judging art. It’s how uniquely someone solves a problem.  Or 
how do you sell a very common method in an uncommon and sticky manner that just left 
all of us speechless or it sneaked up from behind, so we are just like, “wow, this is really 
different!”  (Fritz) 
To me a great creative work is never just one aspect, it’s the whole package…the criteria I 
use is ‘concept’…it’s clever, it’s smart, it’s using wit or humor or intelligence or creativity 
in both the look, but also in the words.  And then, depending on what it is, I start looking at 
the typography, the colors used, the photography, the illustration, how the words are placed 
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on the page, and then the balance and proportion and all of those more graphic design rules 
start to come into play. (Christine) 
To me, it’s the concept.  I try to look at it as the consumer or user of the product, would it 
engage me.  That’s difficult sometimes because I may not be the target audience; so I have 
to put myself in their position, try to make it up.  Is it engaging from an execution 
standpoint, is the layout clean, does it follow good rules of design, or does it diverge in a 
way that is interesting and appealing, does it make me want to pick it up and learn more? 
(Leonard) 
I think if it’s too confusing or hard to “get” then it probably isn’t very creative.  It can’t be 
so different and bizarre that it doesn’t make sense.  Especially in packaging or marketing, 
it has to get to the point quickly and in a clever way; it has to cause a response, otherwise it 
may be beautiful, but it’s worthless.  (Edward) 
Other participants appeared to identify three components of newness, beauty, and “interesting” 
functionality as the key factors.   
I am looking for three things: Is it unique?  Is it solving the problem in an interesting way?  
Is it visually appealing?  (Richard) 
One participant shared an example of an entry that had won top honors in a prior contest with 
these three components: 
An example of something I found truly creative the first time I saw it was Perlex, which is 
for a web page, and as you scroll down certain images appear to float up and they move 
and you get multiple layers happening.  That’s probably been five or six years out on the 
market now, but when I first saw that in a competition it was, “wow—amazing!  This is 
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totally new!” And it won because we hadn’t seen it before, it was beautiful, and it did 
something really interesting.  (Fritz) 
Several other participants indicated they were more focused on the “quality” of key elements in a 
creative product or idea: 
In our studio, we have three things we are looking for: quality of the idea, quality of the 
design, and then quality of the execution.  So all of those things are critical for us and 
everything that we judge before it goes to the client has to meet those standards.  And one 
of the things that creates a “wow” moment is when the quality of the idea knocks you out.  
And then, of course, common to all is quality of the execution.  If you have great ideas and 
brilliant design that’s badly executed, they’re out the door.  (Bill) 
I’m looking for great concept, great execution, and great subject matter.  I’m looking for 
consistency, messaging, layout and design, photography or illustration, does it all work, 
that’s all part of it.  If it’s done technically correct, maybe it’s perfect, but if falls flat on the 
messaging or it’s boring, it doesn’t communicate, then it shouldn’t win an award.  (David).   
Some participants concentrated more on the challenge presented to the designer, and how they 
applied ingenuity, concept, elegance, and inspiration, to the overall execution: 
For me, the main question is: how much of a creative challenge was it?  The harder the 
challenge, and the more the entry achieved that challenge in an inspiring, elegant and 
thoughtful way, the more points I’m going to give it.  And then it’s whether I’ve seen 
anything like it before, does it open a realm of possibilities or thinking that I’ve never had 
before.  Last is the execution, when I am blown away with what they were able to achieve 
technically.  (Jeremy) 
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It has to be different, thought provoking.  Everything’s been done before, but something 
that’s done in a different manner, where maybe the execution with the end product is 
something that is going to make me say, “Wow, I wish I had done that!”   Or, “wow, how 
did they do that?”  That’s going to get my highest score. (Martin) 
With regard to whether items in a contest are judged against a minimum standard, most 
participants indicated entries were assessed in comparison to current work in creative industries 
and needed to show a significant advancement in the “state of the art,” in addition to being 
measured against all other items in the category or contest: 
Definitely there is a minimum [level of creativity] required, in a sense; to get an award, it 
has to be creative compared to the rest of the industry, it can’t just be slightly more creative 
than the other items to win.  You have to compare the entries to what you’ve seen outside 
of the contest to see if it’s really different from other stuff out there.  If none of the entries 
are really creative, I won’t score any of them highly. (Christine) 
I may see several different entries that are interesting or unique for different reasons.  I 
usually know right away if something is really creative, so I will remember that.  But 
when I score the items, I don’t give one item an 8 and then compare the others from there.  
Each entry gets a score based on the overall execution compared to what I know from the 
industry. (Martin) 
We all get copies of the books that are published with all of the winners from the various 
awards programs out there, and we are constantly looking at what others are doing in the 
industry, so we have a pretty good idea of what the industry is doing.  (Bill) 
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Most of the participants agreed that while their judgments are, to a degree, based on their 
subjective opinions of what is visually appealing, they attempt to score the “execution” or 
technical achievement of contest entries using a more objective perspective of the level of 
artisanship execution, delivery of concept, and effort involved in the work: 
I think I make more of an objective decision first, because I know what it takes to do 
something, to put together a magazine cover or advertisement.  You have to be able to pick 
out a photo, pick the right colors and the font, and those are all disciplines where if at the 
end its not done well and not compelling, I won’t score it very high.  If it’s done well and 
is creative…it may not be my cup of tea…I don’t particularly like supra ultra modern but, 
if there’s a compelling magazine cover that leverages those types of tools and aesthetic and 
it’s done really well, then I would score it high. (Amy)A really good technical entry will 
kind of become the measuring stick and so all the other entries will have to beat that to 
win, but that’s why it’s a contest.  And if there are other entries that are as good or better, 
then we have to figure out which is the top.  But if all the other entries are technically 
really weak then it doesn’t matter.  (Edward) 
As discussed in Finding 4 below, during the Knowledge Audit stage of Applied Cognitive Task 
Analysis, some participants were able to more clearly describe and explain the criteria they use 
to identify creativity in professional work. 
Finding 2: A large majority (10 of 12 [83%]) of participants reported they use the same or 
very similar processes, criteria, and standards to assess creative products and ideas in their 
workplaces as they do in creativity award contests. 
My approach tends to be [what] I call ‘fly-by.’  Let’s say there’s 20 items in whatever 
category we’re viewing.  I’ll do a fly-by and just see if anything stands out to me.  And so 
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then maybe I narrow it down to five—the most attractive, or the most creative, and then I’ll 
come back and then take a closer look at each of those five.  And then whittle it down from 
there.  So, it’s an elimination process, I guess.  But that’s pretty much how I do it in our 
agency too, just on a smaller scale.  (Christine) 
For me, personally, judging is no different.  It’s like when I meet my team as creative 
director, and I see seven different ideas, and it’s going to take me three minutes to just go 
through them and say, “no, no, no, yes, and here’s why, and let’s move forward with this 
and why don’t you take it for a spin on that idea?”  (Fritz) 
Some of the differences between judging awards contests and assessing creativity in the 
workplace the participants revealed centered around the amount of time available to review each 
item, the availability of background information on the client or problem presented, and the 
ability to discuss the output during the creative process in the workplace which is not possible in 
a contest setting: 
The process is different because there is probably more communication back and forth in 
an agency setting.  If somebody in the office says: “which of these do you like?”  I’m 
probably going to be inquisitive about it, where in an awards show you don’t have that 
ability.  The other thing with the show is, you’re maybe in the first section, you’re judging, 
and you’re looking down the room and you’ve got 50 more sections you have to get 
through by 3 p.m. or something, and so you’re like: Ok, I have to set time limits for myself 
that I have to keep moving.  (Christine)  
Interviewer:  How is judging entries in creativity competitions different than how you 
decide whether something is creative in your agency? 
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Leonard:  I wouldn’t say it’s different at all.  I’m just critical.  The only difference is 
maybe I take more time, obviously, internally with my team to make sure that they are 
following the same rules and make changes. 
Sometimes the entry will have a short paragraph on the back or another page written by the 
designer or team that explains a little of the background, what they were trying to 
accomplish, maybe why they chose a certain approach.  I like to read those because I get a 
better understanding of the challenge that was presented and how the contestant looked at 
it.  That kind of information makes it more like my role at my agency where I’m usually 
critiquing the work of others with a limited amount of background on the client and project 
brief.  (Edward) 
The researcher also observed the process of some participants during the three-day judging 
event.  The 2014 judging event was conducted in a hotel ballroom in a major metropolitan city 
on the East Coast of the United States.  Eight judges had been selected for the event by the 
program director, and each traveled to the venue at their own expense.  The awards program paid 
for the judges’ accommodations and provided meals during the event; however, none of the 
judges were compensated for their participation.  During a round-table discussion after the event, 
many of the judges said they participated in judging events out of a sense of obligation to the 
industry, as a way of staying connected to the very best work in their profession, and to 
strengthen their professional credentials. 
At the beginning of the judging event, the judges gathered to receive instructions and scoring 
devices in large ballroom where entries were laid out on long tables separated by category.  Each 
judge was given an electronic tablet and a one-page explanation of how to use it in the judging 
process.  After the program director generally described the judging criteria on the forms, each 
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judge was shown how to input their scores on the tablet device, and the group was told they had 
three days to score all of the entries (in excess of 800 entries in more than 60 categories), and to 
separately mark on the tablet any entries they wished to nominate for Best in Show.  The judges 
received no other instructions or directions on how to judge the entries, how to go about 
reviewing the categories, or what was expected of them. 
 Once released to start reviewing items, judges moved slowly around the ballroom, 
appearing to drift aimlessly among the entries and tables.  About 15 minutes after moving among 
the tables, one judge sat down at a table and began perusing a group of entries held in a binder, 
but she did not appear to be scoring any of the items.  A few minutes later, another judge sat 
down at a different table and he too began thumbing through the items but did not appear to be 
entering any scores on his tablet.  Other judges appeared to look at only a few items at a table 
before moving on to another.  After about 25 minutes, the first of the eight judges appeared to 
start entering scores on his tablet device.  Within 45 minutes, all the judges were reviewing items 
and entering scores.  However, during the first hour of the judging event, not one of the judges 
was seen or heard speaking to any other judge.  One of the participants later explained why he 
took this approach: 
In general, I’m trying to [judge] alone…I’ve found for some [of the categories] you start 
seeing herds of people.  But I try to avoid that because you do get swayed, as much as you 
try not.  You’ll hear people saying: “Oh, this is amazing, did you see this!?” and I don’t 
want to hear it; it does play into your psyche…And that is the risk of doing it as a group.  
(Leonard)  
 Once the scoring process began in earnest, a pattern seemed to emerge among the judges.  
Judges moved around until they came to a category that was physically away from the other 
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judges and then either stand or sit at the table where the entries were placed.  Several judges 
were observed looking almost casually at some of the items in the category, handling and 
viewing each for only a few seconds before moving to the next.  After several or all of the items 
were viewed in this way (usually depending on the number of entries in the category), the judges 
would review the items again and started to enter scores on the tablet.  When all the scores were 
entered, the judges moved away from the table, and the process would repeat wherein judges 
moved around each other politely but maintained their distance.  One of the participants 
explained why he preferred this approach: 
I am a packaging and graphic designer, I prefer to see the physical version of the entries 
over seeing them online or just a photo.  That’s why I like this awards program, all of the 
entries are physically here and I can touch them and compare them.  And I can review 
entries at my pace without being influenced in any way by other judges. (Richard)  
 The first time any of the judges talked to each after the event began was outside the 
ballroom during a spontaneous break.  However, during the first day, the judges appeared to 
make only small talk during breaks and over lunch; there was no discussion of the contest 
entries.  In fact, the first time the researcher overheard any judge discussing an entry was in the 
afternoon on the second day of judging.  In this instance, one of the judges had just walked away 
from a category after scoring and was approached by another judge who asked, “Are you all 
done with that category?”  When the other judge replied yes, the two judges discussed one entry 
in that category both had already scored and agreed they thought it should be considered for Best 
in Show.  As the judging process continued that second day, more judges were overheard 
discussing specific entries or categories, usually in the context of a particular entry that might be 
considered for a top award.  This judging and scoring process, primarily conducted in isolation, 
 85 
with breaks to discuss entries that they had already scored, continued over the contest’s three 
days. 
 During breaks in judging, the researcher was able to discuss the contest with all of the 
judges, and five of the judges consented to participate in the study and be interviewed.  Four of 
the participants also agreed to take part in think-aloud exercises while judging contest entries in 
one of the categories or during simulated judging exercises using entries they had already scored.  
After the exercises concluded, these four participants were interviewed and provided more 
specifics about the process used in judging contest entries.  Several participants confirmed that it 
is important that they judge separately to reduce the possibility of being influenced, and that they 
try to assess the level of creativity in the contest before scoring any items: 
So I look over all of the entries in a particular category first, as I said, then I go back and do 
the scoring.  I want to get an idea of the overall quality and creativity, and if I see 
something really great, I will remember it, and then score it more highly when I come back 
to do the actual numbers.  (James) 
The contest gives us a rating sheet and, basically, a 1 or 2 has no creativity at all, a 9-10 is 
at the very top, it is the best of the category and maybe one of the best in the whole show.  
If something is good, but not quite as good as it could be, maybe the coloring wasn’t quite 
right or the concept was a little off or just another version of something else we’ve seen 
before, then it will still get a 5 or 6, but I can’t give it a top score.  (Martin) 
During applied cognitive task analysis dialogues with participants about the cognitive effort 
required to judge creativity, many identified the most challenging part to be separating and 
ranking the very best entries from others that are very good.  Most participants stated they felt 
different entries may be highly creative for different reasons and comparing them was almost 
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impossible, especially if for different categories or if they have different levels of complexity.  
Below a score of 7, all of the participants said the decision was rather straightforward, and that 
they tend to gravitate toward giving scores of around 3 to 5 at the low end to make a clear 
separation between those worthy of consideration and those below the “highly creative” 
threshold.   
In fact, not all of the judges used the entire 1 to 10 scale suggested by the contest 
administrators (see summary statistical analysis of judges’ scores in Table 1 of Section 4.3 
below).  One of the participants in this study stated he rarely gave an entry a score of 10, as he 
felt the top score should be reserved for only the very best of the best, sharing that he uses the 
following quote as his guide for score of 10: “’Perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing 
more to add, but when there is nothing left to take away.’  [Antoine de Saint-Exupery (1900 - 
1944)]  The longer you’ve been in the business, the fewer things get a 10 because you’ve seen a 
lot.”  (Edward).  Another participant, Amy, said she rarely gives scores below a 5 because she 
knows all entries were created by professionals so they must be at least “average.” 
While observing the event, the researcher noticed variation in the amount of time judges 
spent on viewing and scoring each item.  To test this variation, on the second day when the 
judges appeared to have become proficient at using the tablet for scoring, the researcher 
attempted to surreptitiously record the amount of time four different judges each spent looking at 
individual entries in various categories and noted how long it took those judges to enter their 
scores.  Depending on the category, and allowing for the inexact nature of timing individuals 
from a distance, all four judges appeared to spend less than two seconds reviewing each item that 
consisted of a single page in a binder or of a single item on a table.  A similar amount of time 
(two seconds) was generally spent recording scores, but in a few instances, judges were observed 
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viewing up to six entries in a row and then entering scores for all six items at the same time.  
Sometimes, judges spent considerably more time on single item, usually between five and eight 
seconds, and in some cases more than 10 seconds, looking at the entry more thoroughly and 
critically.  Interestingly, none of the judges were timed spending between two and five seconds 
to evaluate any of the entries.  When asked individually after the scoring was complete about the 
instances when they took more time, judges indicated those particular items appeared more 
creative and potentially worthy of a higher score, and the judges wanted to spend more time 
considering the entry to be sure, in particular looking at execution and detail.  One of the 
participants explained his thinking: 
Usually, you can tell really quickly if something is good or great, it stands out.  So then I’m 
just trying to decide whether it gets an 8 or 9 or whatever.  The other entries that aren’t 
very good, there’s no need to spend any time on those.  But some categories have more 
going into them, like big corporate reports or a video, you have to go through those and see 
all of it, so those categories do take longer.  (Richard) 
Only one participant (Jeremy) said he would sometimes go back to other items after he 
began judging and modify his previous scores based on the quality of subsequent entries viewed.  
Most of the other participants said they didn’t have time to go back and revise their scores, and 
all participants said they felt very confident that the scores they awarded were correct based on 
their experience and knowledge of the industry and in comparison with other items in the 
contest. 
I’m not going to lie, first impressions matter.  If something doesn’t get my attention right 
away with the quality of work and ideas presented, I’m probably not going to spend the 
time to dig through it to find something creative about it.  (Edward) 
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A few participants, however, indicated the standard they used might change depending on the 
level of creativity being shown at the contest.   
I feel that at the beginning of a show obviously the first pieces are much more about my 
professional viewpoint.  And then as I go let’s say half a day through an award show… I’m 
already going to be jaded by my background of that half day.  So if I see really bad work 
that half day, suddenly something I thought was a five might suddenly turn into a seven 
just because I’ve seen so much bad stuff [laughter] but in the end it’s all relative to the 
other entries.  (Fritz) 
If it’s really fantastic, even with crappy presentation, I’ll give it an award, if it’s that 
amazing and cutting edge.  So I’m not saying that I’m never going to give anything an 
award if it’s sloppily done, but me, personally, I have a hard time looking past that, 
because it’s a given.  If you’re going to take the time to enter something in a contest, then 
surely you can do a credible, decent job with it.  (David). 
Finding 3:  The majority (9 of 12 [75%]) of participants reported that highly creative 
products and ideas produce an “immediate” positive or “gut” reaction, often accompanied by a 
strong emotional and/or physical response (sometimes termed “goose bumps”), and stated that 
the most highly creative work is easily identifiable, even among professional creative work, 
indicating intuition is a significant element of an expert’s assessment of creativity.  However, 
more than half of participants (7 of 12) reported also using some form of rational analysis to 
assess the level of creativity and to modify or confirm their initial intuitive assessments. 
David:  “If it hits me in the gut, it’s a winner.” 
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It’s mainly really a gut instinct.  But gut instinct based on my experience, based on my 
knowledge, based on looking at creative work every day and being in between my own 
creative team and their creative instinct and egos.  (Fritz)   
During a think-aloud exercise while judging an actual contest category, one participant had a 
very sudden emotional and visible physical reaction as he turned the pages of a binder of entries 
and came upon one particularly creative entry and stopped: 
So, I just look at each item, kind of going through them like this and saying pretty quickly, 
“no…not great…that’s just ok…maybe a 5.” Uh…[2-3 seconds pass, the participant does 
not move while staring at the entry, he is visibly moved]…oh my.  I, uh…wow!  I mean, 
there…[he slaps the page of the binder]…look!  [He points at his forearm]  See, I have 
goose bumps!!”  (Martin) 
Most of the participants reported highly creative work often produces a strong visceral response.  
Amy said, “If something is really creative, I want to eat it.  I want to lay in it, I want to put that 
all over my body and feel happy all the time.”  Angela concurred, saying “If it’s given me delight 
in some way then I’m going to give it a higher rating.”  
 Most of the participants also said their response to an item’s creativity, or lack there of, 
was almost instantaneous, and that it was the magnitude of impact on the viewer that signaled the 
level of creativity: 
I have to see the effort involved…there has to be a spark of something non-traditional and 
an effort to express something, you know, compelling.  I can tell immediately…whether 
it’s good or bad, you know, that there was an approach that pushed it out of the ordinary, I 
think that is what creative means to me.  (Amy) 
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There are always those cases where there’s something that is just like “whoa, that’s 
amazing!” And for some reason it resonates with you.  If it’s purely a creativity criteria, I 
think usually at this point it’s something that happens pretty quickly, that one’s going to 
stand out immediately.  Let’s assume it’s something simple, it’s one page, I’m looking at 
each for probably no more than three seconds initially…which is, in the real world, it’s two 
point five seconds [laughs].  I know they’ve put a lot of effort into putting together their 
submissions in, so I don’t want to make a rash judgment, I want to give each entry it’s due 
time, but usually I know it when I see it.  (Christine)   
Does it work for the target audience?  Does it fit the purpose of the creative brief and even 
though you don’t get a creative feel for every single piece you look at, you have an idea if 
it is right for the client and consumer.  So you assume a lot of things but this and that, 
target audience, purpose, my experience and my knowledge are mixed up and then you 
give a very quick instant vote.  (Fritz) 
However, some participants (David, Leonard, and Martin) said the speed of their process and 
judgments might have had more to do with the limited amount of time available to judge a very 
large number of entries in a contest than with the ease of identifying creative work, and that they 
had to accept their initial impressions as valid because they were unable to spend as much time 
as they might like on each entry.  Others (Fritz, David, and Edward) mentioned they race through 
entries looking for only the very best and grade those that make an immediate impression as 
more creative because, “I don’t want to be looking at bad work all day” (David).   
While almost all of the participants agreed they often had an immediate response to highly 
creative work, most added they felt the immediate response needed to be tempered with a more 
analytical review before giving a final score: 
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If it’s really complex, it might slow things down, but for the most part, you’re making an 
instantaneous judgment that’s the combination of all of that experience, discipline, 
knowledge that you have, that creates that instant physical response, and the only word that 
comes out of your mouth is “wow.”  And then you start to take it apart.  (Bill) 
Sometimes when you’re looking at a piece of work on a table, I notice the executional 
qualities first.  Call it a five second look—those kind of things.  Then I start to look more 
closely.  The concept comes first and then you get to make your way to execution and then 
you hope the execution actually makes the idea better than worse.  Nothing depresses me 
more than a great idea ruined by poor execution. (James) 
There’s a kind of visceral side of judging and then there’s a cognitive side.  From a visceral 
side, you see something and the question is does it make you say, “Wow!” Or does it give 
you an emotional reaction, does it raise the hairs on the back of your neck? But then you 
have the logical reaction to it, does it work like it’s supposed to or what am I getting for 
my money? (Jeremy) 
Many participants spent the additional time and analysis to consider the artisanship and 
execution of the concept and creative idea, and they ultimately compared the creativity with 
other entries: 
If it wows me or if there’s a really brilliant idea there or something you know has a really 
unique way of showing me something that’s in it.  Or it surprises me, or delights me, or 
intrigues me, or it pulls me in.  That’s what just stops you and makes you take notice.  But 
then as a judge it’s your job to really take a look at the craft.  You have to dissect it.  I start 
with the idea behind the work, then I look at, “Okay, how well did they execute that idea?” 
(Angela) 
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You can tell pretty quickly…I break it down into the nanoseconds.  I think it is the visual 
quality first that I recognize, the visual design, the taste and finesse of the execution.  The 
first thing that stops me is, “has it been done well?”  And that’s the reverse process for 
work at the office.  It’s concept first and then execution at my agency, but here where 
everything has been fully executed, you notice execution first and then look to see what the 
idea was, but it still happens very quickly.  (James) 
Interviewer:  How quickly do you recognize when an entry is very creative? 
Leonard: Like one second.  But then I have to say, “Are my eyes deceiving me?”  And then 
I have to look at it more closely, and I have to see everything else in that category to be 
sure.  There may be something else that’s even better. 
Finding 4: All of the participants (100%) stated that they felt novices would find it very 
difficult to assess professional creative products and ideas, identifying several mistakes the 
participants themselves had made as novices, and that they believed non-experts would be 
inclined to make similar types of errors (termed by some “the novice trap”) in attempting to 
assess professional creativity.   
 Although not a particularly surprising finding considering their level of experience and 
backgrounds, all of the participants felt strongly that judging creativity for both awards and for 
professional work requires not only extensive experience in a creative industry assessing 
products and ideas, but also significant skill and direct experience in doing actual creative work.  
For example, Amy said, “You have to some years of experience to be able to appreciate the 
craftsmanship enough to be objective.” 
To judge creativity someone needs to be a trained designer and have creative work 
experience, otherwise it’s just subjective opinion with no basis in the industry.  They might 
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just be looking for what’s pretty or something they haven’t seen before but everyone in the 
trade already has.  They’re not looking for technical design elements, just what they like.  
(Leonard) 
There are lots of other contests out there where the judges are celebrities or executives in 
an industry with little or no real experience, and they seem to give awards to the things that 
personally excite them.  But unless they really know what’s going on in the industry and 
the level of effort required to pull off a truly creative idea, they just fall for the first thing 
that grabs their attention or looks cool in the moment.  We see it in our agency all the time: 
clients and junior designers will get all excited about the next “new thing,” and they can’t 
help but think it’s the best.  But that’s the novice’s trap, they can’t get out of that way of 
thinking until they have actually been working in the field a while and considered all the 
other great work that’s out there.  (Bill) 
As part of the second stage of the cognitive task analysis process, the Knowledge Audit (App. 
7.1), some participants were asked why certain parts of the task might pose a challenge to 
novices and were encouraged to imagine the kinds of mistakes a novice or non-expert might 
make when judging the creative work of others.  All of the participants who responded to these 
task analysis probes where able to draw on past experiences and conceive of multiple ways 
someone without the requisite level of experience might incorrectly judge a product or idea as 
creative, or fail to identify a highly creative entry.  Interestingly, during this phase of the CTA 
process, participants found their voice in explaining the key criteria they look for when assessing 
creativity.  Most of the participants’ examples of novice mistakes directly related to a lack of 
knowledge and inability to recognize several key elements of creativity: what has come before 
(lack of novelty); the subtle but powerful effect a well-developed idea (conceptual impact or 
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cleverness); the utility or appropriateness of the item to the task presented; the level of 
inventiveness or advance in the state of the art represented (inventive step); the level of 
experience and creative skills required to accomplish the concept as reflected in the finished 
product (artisanship); or the delivery and impact of an entry that elevates it above the others 
during assessment (execution).  Of particular note was the participants’ belief that creativity 
requires a confluence of many elements, some of which might be missed or ignored by a novice: 
I think someone without the right level of experience would miss the subtle aspects of 
something really creative, probably stopping at the point of execution, without digging 
deeper into the idea.  Judges who don’t have a lot of experience won’t understand the 
amount of effort and difficulty required to make something new and conceptually 
interesting, they might think what they are seeing was easy to do but someone with a lot of 
experience in a creative field would know how hard that would be to pull off.  (James). 
A majority of the participants explained how experience in a creative field alone is insufficient to 
attain the level of expertise necessary to effectively judge creative products and ideas—that 
assessing creativity requires extensive experience in evaluating and analyzing the work of others 
during the creative development process.  Several participants also questioned whether someone 
experienced in only one aspect of creative design could effectively judge the creativity of a 
completely different type of product or area of specialty, e.g., whether technical expertise in 
website design could be effectively transferred in judging creative photography.  The participants 
who raised these concerns said a true expert in a creative field must have a combination of 
extensive experience working as a creative and many years deliberately practicing, getting 
feedback, and learning how to develop and evaluate creativity in different forms to be an 
effective judge of creativity: 
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I think judges who don’t have much experience haven’t seen as much as a seasoned 
professional, and so they’re pretty impressionable.  They don’t have the knowledge maybe, 
and the skill sets on how a lot of things are done, and they get a little too excited just 
because, to a novice, everything is new and fresh and cool.  But just being in the business 
for 30 years isn’t enough; if they haven’t mastered the craft they shouldn’t be judges, 
because they don’t take it as seriously as a master. (David) 
For me, judgment is a trained muscle, and it comes from knowledge, experience and 
discipline.  It’s all of those things, it’s literally a trained muscle that allows me to recognize 
instantly whether what I have in front of me meets all the criteria, and that only occurs over 
time. (Bill) 
It’s not enough to know how to create something, you have to learn how to critique 
design…how to tear it down and know what’s missing, what can be changed and added, to 
make it better.  If it’s as good as it can be, then you can say it’s truly creative.  (Angela) 
It takes a lot longer, a lot more work for a junior person to see the difference between 
something that is pretty good and something that’s really good.  It is just years of 
disciplined thinking and practice…and getting feedback from others in order to get the 
perspective to know what’s great and what isn’t.  (Jeremy) 
Several participants also commented on how consistent past groups of expert judges had been at 
identifying the most creative work in prior contests where the participants had been on the 
judging panel, even when that panel had not judged as a group before and each originated from 
vastly different creative fields, countries, and cultures: 
If you get ten judges together and every one of them is an industry professional they [tend 
to be very consistent]; but yet they all have very different backgrounds as far as their own 
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creative insights or their own intuition or why they decide something is visually pleasing 
or not.  [Even though] it’s a personal decision, I feel if you have enough people coming 
together with the right background… that you will get a fairly fair judgment out of it.  
(Fritz) 
Most people who are at a level where they’re going to be picked to judge an awards show, 
I mean they’re—in theory—at the very top of their game, and so you’ve got a whole bunch 
of people who are the very best, very Type A.  But the outcome is 99 times out of a 100 
still going to be very consistent for the top awards.  (James) 
Everything is subjective, obviously, and if you get a room full of people together they can’t 
even figure out what to get on a pizza.  But if you have eight people who are strong 
personalities and great in their respective fields at what they do, if the work is that good 
and in this contest it is, the cream always rises.  (Leonard) 
If you can’t stop thinking about an entry or can’t wait to talk to other people about it, that’s 
one I would give the highest score to.  I think it’s tricky because the volume of entries is 
daunting, and you start to get tired…things start to meld together.  But there are usually 
four or five overall that are just clearly the best.  And at the end of the show, all the judges 
got together, and it was amazing how much we all agreed that those four or five items were 
among the best.  We had totally different backgrounds and different personal aesthetics, 
with people from different countries and different cultures on the panel, and yet we 
gravitated towards the same items without even knowing it.  (Amy) 
There’s an old expression that is: a judge’s opinion can change by what he ate for 
breakfast.  And so it is totally subjective, and I’ve often wondered if I went back a week 
later or a month later or a even a year later with the exact same work, if I would give it the 
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exact same marks.  And in most cases, if the work is that fantastic, a top award winner, I 
think the yes, I would. (David). 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4.3 below, the judges’ actual scores for this contest, and for 
seven prior contests, were analyzed for inter-rater reliability to test the judges’ beliefs about the 
consistency and reliability of group scoring.  While the judges’ scores for those eight different 
contests showed a high level of inter-rater reliability, their agreement did not reach the “very 
high” level some participants might have assumed.  The possible reasons for this are discussed in 
Section 5 below.  
Finding 5: Most participants (7 of 12 [58%]) acknowledged using various heuristics or 
rules of thumb to judge entries and were aware of several types of biases that might affect their 
judgment; however, participants also believed they were able to reduce the effect of most such 
biases through their substantial judging experience, deliberate mindfulness of the potential for 
biases, and the use of the Consensual Assessment Technique. 
I think the honest answer is: I don’t think you can prevent [biases from] affecting your 
choices.  I think we walk around with those in our head all the time.  I want to have an 
open mind…but it’s near impossible.  You have to be aware of those biases and work 
through that and try to be fair with what you’re looking at.  (Christine) 
As noted above, all judges appeared to deliberately work alone during the event, only 
discussing entries after they had been scored.   Many of the participants indicated this was part of 
their strategy to avoid being “swayed” by other judges’ reactions, which they felt might bias 
them to award a higher or lower score.  However, many participants also acknowledged that they 
tended to review several items in different categories before starting the actual scoring process, 
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in order to get a sense of the overall level of creativity in the contest, despite the possibility of 
pre-judging entries based on a small initial sample:  
At the beginning of the judging process, I’ll skip ahead to get a sense of what’s to come, 
but then once I’ve gone through a few categories, I do the rest of them in order.  I get a 
sense of the kind of submissions the show is getting, and then I start judging the entries. 
(James) 
I do a quick round-up of the room.  Just to see where I want to start and what type of work 
is there.  I’m not being critical at all at that point.  Obviously, certain things catch my eye, 
and I’m like, “Wow, that’s really cool, I can’t wait to get to that one. But I try to withhold 
judgment and see more of what’s there.”  (Leonard) 
All the participants expressed awareness of the potential for various biases to impact their 
assessment of creativity both in awards contests and in the workplace.  However, they agreed 
that being mindful of the potential for bias and working hard to assess creativity objectively, 
using their past experiences and expertise as guides, reduced the possibility of bias impacting 
their ability to identify the most creative products and ideas and score them accordingly.  
Importantly, all of the participants also pointed to the fact that they were judging entries 
individually, and that their scores would be combined with the scores of other experts as 
reassurance that any bias in individual judgments would be effectively rectified in the final 
contest score averages. 
Most participants also felt the types of biases and heuristics inherent in the judging process 
would be more significant, and perhaps insurmountable, challenges for non-experts, particularly 
in situations of significant time pressure, high stakes, and uncertainty such as an awards contest: 
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One of the things you see [with inexperienced judges] is everyone tends to find something 
they fall in love with early on and … everything else systematically is graded lower or 
higher against that one.  I was guilty of that at first where I would start on print ads or 
magazine covers and be like, that’s really cool, and it’s the first thing I saw that was good 
so everything else measured against that.  To prevent that from happening, I have to 
remember how it may have affected me in past situations, just be mindful of the impact 
those thoughts can have, and go through the steps that I know will help reduce that kind of 
thinking from affecting my decisions.  (Amy) 
These entries are from real people with real jobs and whether they win or lose this contest 
can have a major impact on their career.  I have to be very careful to not to get in a rush or 
let the work of other entries affect my judgment; each entry has to be considered on its 
own merit before it is compared to the others.  I keep that in mind as I go through each 
one, almost methodically, even if I can only spend ten seconds looking at something, so I 
don’t get caught up in being too critical or not critical enough.  (Jeremy) 
Lastly, participants reported that the use of multiple expert judges, who evaluated all items 
independently and based on their extensive judging and industry experience, helped to reduce the 
likelihood of impact of pure subjectivity and process biases.  Participants embraced and 
approved the Consensual Assessment Technique as an appropriate method to judge creativity 
and to establish high validity and reliability of results in both contests and professional practice. 
IV.3 Judges’ scoring and interrater agreement testing 
As described in the methodology chapter, scoring data was obtained from the creativity 
awards program that included all entries for the contest of this study and 9 other contests from 
2009-2014.  In each of those years, the program held separate contests for digital and interactive 
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media at one part of the year, and print media and packaging, etc., at another point, each with 
different entries and different judging panels, resulting in two sets of judges’ scores per year.  
The data was received in archival form, with the names of the judges made anonymous with 
random ID codes, and individual judge’s scores of 0 to 10 assigned to each entry.  Due to 
apparent errors in the random assignment of some entry numbers, however, only scores from 
eight contests, including the contest involved in this study, were suitable for analysis. For the 
eight contests included in the analysis, 70 judges scored a total of 8,699 entries.  Approval to use 
the archival data for research purposes was separately obtained from the university’s Institutional 
Review Board. 
The purpose of obtaining this scoring data was to test the inter-rater agreement of the 
judges over several years.  However, to protect judges’ confidentiality, data for all contests over 
a five-year period were provided in an anonymous format, and since the participants had acted as 
judges in different contests over that five-year period, it was not possible to specifically test the 
level of agreement of any single judge or group of judges with other judges in a particular 
contest or to compare all of the participants’ scores across contests.  Nonetheless, the data 
provides interesting insights into the level of agreement expert judges achieve in actual judging 
environments over several successive years, in contests where the participants acted as judges at 
different points, and allows the results from this field setting to be compared to the results of 
published experimental creativity research studies. 
In creativity research, Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) analysis is a primary method to 
measure inter-rater agreement among judges.  ICC may be performed under different models 
depending on the raters and the items rated.  The model of ICC analysis depends first on whether 
the judges form the population of all judges of interest or if they are taken as a random sample of 
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all possible judges.  Second, the model of ICC depends on whether all subjects or items rated 
form the target population or are based on a random sample. Lastly, the model of ICC depends 
on the whether the reliability is based on individual ratings or mean ratings of all judges (Shrout 
and Fleiss, 1979). These considerations give rise to three different forms of models on which 
ICC is based. 
One-way random effects model. This model is most appropriate when judges are taken as 
a random sample from a population of possible judges, who rate all subjects of interest. In this 
model, judges are treated as a random sample, and the focus of interest is a one-factor ANOVA 
test to determine whether there is a significant subject effect. This model applies even when the 
researcher cannot associate a particular subject with a particular rater because information is 
lacking about which judge assigned which score to a subject.  
Two-way random effects model. In this model, both judges and subjects are comprised of 
random samples from respective populations of judges and subjects. Judges rate all (N) subjects 
chosen at random from a population of subjects, and it is known how each judge rated each 
subject. In this model, the ICC is interpreted as the proportion of subject added to the judge 
variance that is associated with differences among the scores of the subjects. The ICC is 
interpreted as generalizable to all possible judges.  
Two-way mixed model. In this model, all judges of a population rate a random-sample of 
subjects from a well-defined population. This particular model is a mixed model as judges are 
treated as fixed effect (not as a random sample of all possible judges) and the targets treated as 
random effect in the model. In this model, the ICC coefficient is equivalent to the two-way 
random effects model, but the only difference is that ICC computed and tested is not 
generalizable beyond the given set of judges.  
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For each of the three models, the type of ICC computation method also requires a choice 
from two alternatives: (i) whether ICC is to be computed using absolute agreement or (ii) ICC is 
to be computed using a consistency approach.  Absolute agreement is a measure of whether 
judges assign the same absolute score. Absolute agreement is often used when systematic 
variability due to raters is relevant. In contrast, the consistency method of ICC computation 
measures if ratings are highly correlated, even if they are not identical in absolute terms. 
Consistency agreement is often used when systematic variability due to raters is irrelevant. These 
alternatives use different versions of the intraclass correlation coefficient—(i) Single measure 
reliability where individual ratings constitute the unit of analysis and (ii) Average measure 
reliability where the mean of all ratings is the unit of analysis. Average measure reliability is 
most appropriate when the research design involves averaging multiple ratings for each item and 
using an individual rating would involve too much uncertainty.  
For this research study, a two-way random effects Intraclass Correlation model using the 
consistency alternative (ICC(2)) was employed to assess the inter-rater agreement in all contests 
because both judges and items scored were random samples, and the judges’ scores are averaged 
across items to achieve a creativity score for the contest. The 0 to 10 ratings that judges used 
were assumed to be interval-level data, and the test statistic follows F distribution. A test of the 
significance of the ICC was also performed. The statistical hypothesis formulated to test the 
significance of the ICC coefficient is: 
Null hypothesis H0: ICC coefficient is not significant (= 0).  
Alternate hypothesis H1: ICC coefficient is significant (# 0).  
The test for this study is performed using a .05 level of significance, thus the null hypothesis can 
be rejected, and the coefficient is considered significant if the p-value of the test is less .05. 
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Tables 3 to 11 report descriptive statistics for contests 1 to 8 respectively.  The number 
(N) of items judged, as well as the minimum score, maximum score, mean, and standard 
deviation of scores are reported for each for each judge (identified separately by an anonymous 
number2) for each contest.  
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 1 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
2 2652 0 9 5.72 1.498 
3 2648 0 9 5.23 1.853 
4 2154 0 9 6.11 2.023 
5 2233 0 9 6.17 1.520 
6 205 1 8 5.18 1.355 
8 1828 0 9 7.10 1.828 
9 2034 0 10 4.10 2.503 
10 402 5 9 7.97 .869 
 
 
                                                 
2 Judge numbers were assigned in the data set by the awards program before receipt by the researcher and were not 
in strict numerical order. 
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 2 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
11 511 5 9 7.96 .884 
12 492 0 9 5.84 1.837 
13 511 0 9 4.98 2.380 
14 509 1 9 6.62 1.730 
15 504 1 9 6.50 1.897 
16 512 0 9 5.58 2.677 
23 651 0 9 4.73 2.036 
24 487 0 9 4.72 2.122 
25 501 0 9 5.16 2.616 
26 411 1 9 5.63 1.767 
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 3 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
28 511 1 9 4.54 2.080 
29 558 1 9 6.01 1.443 
31 527 1 10 4.99 2.006 
32 511 1 9 4.42 2.105 
33 538 2 9 5.57 1.610 
34 530 1 9 6.41 1.356 
39 636 1 10 5.95 1.526 
40 583 1 9 5.15 1.727 
41 649 1 9 4.90 2.199 
______________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 4 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
46 1336 1 9 5.21 1.766 
47 1321 1 10 4.43 2.215 
51 1269 1 10 5.06 2.363 
52 1326 1 10 5.57 1.662 
53 1331 2 10 6.32 1.550 
55 1332 1 10 4.97 2.254 
56 1305 1 10 5.18 1.848 
57 1334 3 10 7.62 1.415 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 5 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
70 978 1 9 5.56 1.296 
71 966 1 10 4.84 1.732 
72 982 1 10 3.62 2.258 
73 983 0 10 4.75 2.250 
74 937 3 10 6.15 1.243 
75 981 1 10 5.12 2.483 
76 977 1 10 5.80 2.222 
77 970 1 10 5.44 1.892 
78 976 1 10 6.31 1.530 
79 915 2 10 5.68 2.301 
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 6 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
76 465 1 9 6.44 1.571 
80 487 1 10 5.15 2.103 
81 487 1 10 4.93 1.782 
82 381 1 10 7.16 1.512 
83 487 1 10 7.15 1.973 
85 487 1 9 5.85 1.808 
86 487 2 10 7.07 1.972 
87 481 1 10 6.85 1.478 
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Table 10 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 7 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
29 913 1 10 5.89 2.671 
88 956 1 10 5.03 2.700 
90 964 1 10 5.61 2.886 
91 977 1 10 5.21 1.688 
92 951 0 10 4.60 1.540 
93 969 2 10 4.36 1.658 
94 927 1 10 4.91 1.857 
95 963 1 10 4.90 1.603 
96 955 1 10 5.82 1.413 
97 971 1 10 5.36 3.140 
 
  
 110 
Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 8 
Judge 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
105 859 1 10 6.61 1.687 
106 854 1 10 8.26 1.258 
107 863 1 10 6.02 2.474 
108 861 1 10 5.30 1.931 
109 835 1 10 5.39 1.516 
110 858 1 9 5.96 1.583 
112 864 1 10 4.60 1.951 
 
The inter-rater agreement analysis was performed using the IBM SPSS version 19.0 software 
application applying a two-way random effects model (ICC(2)) consistent with recommendations 
of Shrout & Fleiss (1979). Listwise deletion of missing values was employed as the default in 
SPSS to handle instances of missing data.  
The summary of the ICC analysis is presented in Table 12. In this table, summary of the 
computed ICC coefficient along with the test for its significance is reported for both single and 
average measure types of computation of ICC. In addition, 95% confidence intervals for the ICC 
coefficient along with the F statistic and the associated p value is reported.  
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Table 12 Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
  
Intraclass 
Correlation 
95% Confidence Interval 
F Test (True Value 
0) 
Contest  Lower 
Bound Upper Bound Value   P value 
Contest 1 Single Measures .256 .177 .333 4.036   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.674 .563 .750 4.036   
<.001 
Contest 2 Single Measures .360 .284 .430 6.371   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.797 .735 .841 6.371   
<.001 
Contest 3 Single Measures .294 .247 .341 3.390   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.676 .621 .721 3.390   
<.001 
Contest 4 Single Measures .260 .201 .318 5.418   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.759 .694 .808 5.418   
<.001 
Contest 5 Single Measures .271 .229 .313 5.559   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.788 .748 .820 5.559   
<.001 
Contest 6 Single Measures .277 .206 .350 5.333   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.754 .675 .811 5.333   
<.001 
Contest 7 Single Measures .188 .165 .214 3.462   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.699 .665 .731 3.462   
<.001 
Contest 8 Single Measures .250 .162 .336 4.880   <.001 
 Average 
Measures 
.700 .574 .780 4.880   
<.001 
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For each of the contests, the F test for the significance of the ICC coefficient reports p < .05, 
indicating a statistically significant positive inter-rater agreement among judges. Average 
Measures report the Intraclass Correlation for each contest, with the lowest ICC coefficient at 
0.674 for contest 1 and the highest ICC at 0.797 for contest 2.  Reliability coefficients of .65 to 
.80 are considered to indicate moderate to high agreement in creativity research studies 
(Amabile, 1996; Kaufman & Baer, 2012). The ICC coefficients reported translate to an effect 
size measure of at least 0.449 (η2 > 0.449). This means the effect size for inter-rater agreement 
measure is at least moderate, a further indication of a high (but not very high) degree of 
consistency and agreement among judges across items for each of the contests. 
  
 113 
V DISCUSSION 
V.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this multi-case field study was to investigate the criteria and processes used 
by expert judges in assessing the creativity of professional entries submitted to a creativity award 
contest.  The study assumes that understanding how domain experts make judgments about 
creativity of professional products at awards contests, in situations where judges face significant 
time pressure, uncertainty, and ill-defined goals, will provide useful insights into how creativity 
is assessed in real-world situations.  To conduct this investigation, the study employed 
naturalistic inquiry techniques to collect qualitative data through in-depth interviews, 
observations, think-aloud and simulation exercises, and used quantitative analysis to test scoring 
data.  Participants in this study were recognized subject-matter experts in creative industries with 
substantial experience judging creativity in both workplace and professional awards contests.  
Observation of real-time entry judging and simulation exercises occurred during an actual 
awards contest event.  Archival data of scores given in the contest observed and in eight prior 
creativity award contests over the previous five years were obtained after all awards were 
announced.  The data qualitative was collected, coded, and analyzed using the conceptual 
frameworks identified by a literature review of relevant topics and then reorganized using themes 
and concepts that emerged from the data that responded to the research questions.  
To explore how domain experts judge the creativity of entries in a professional awards 
program, this research investigated the following research questions: 
1.  What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the 
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of 
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?  
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2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the 
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’ 
professional workplace settings?  
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products 
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else 
when judging creativity contests? 
4.  What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make 
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity? 
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging 
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them? 
The following section discusses the findings and data collected in this research study and 
analyzes the findings as they relate to each specific research question. Contributions to theory 
and practice resulting from the research study are also discussed. 
V.2 Discussion 
V.2.1 Definition and Elements of Creativity 
 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that.  Justice Potter Stewart, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 
(1964), conc. op. [emphasis added]. 
 
The question of how to define, identify and measure creativity has plagued researchers for 
more than 50 years, almost as long ago as when Justice Potter wrote the famous passage above 
categorizing obscenity as: “I know it when I see it.”  The results of this research suggest that, at 
least for domain experts, the answer to whether something is creative is similarly explained: they 
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simply know it when they see it although, by strict definition, they could not have seen it before 
because it did not exist, i.e., it had not been created.  How domain experts know creativity when 
they “see it”—the criteria they apply and the processes they undertake to assess creativity—has 
no such ready answer. 
The primary question for this research of ‘how to define creativity’ arose in response to 
concerns raised in literature suggesting that inconsistent and potentially contradictory results in 
creativity research might be due to a misalignment between the two-item construct definition 
used to describe creativity, on the one hand, and the unitary operational definition of creativity 
often used to measure the dependent variable of creative output.  The results of this research 
study indicate that domain experts do not agree with either the two-item “novel and useful” 
construct or the unitary operational definition of creativity common in creativity research.  In 
fact, participants specifically rejected the “novel and useful” definition of creativity widely 
adopted in research as being too simplistic, incomplete and inadequate in practice, and strongly 
questions the viability of that definition for research purposes.   
In practice, the participants in this study reported using a minimum of three key factors to 
define, identify and measure professional creative output: 1) novelty; 2) inventiveness; and 3) 
task appropriateness.  The weight of the data collected indicates novelty, inventiveness and task 
appropriateness are formative, elemental factors that are minimally necessary to identify and 
sufficiently measure the construct of creative output.  Moreover, the participants identified three 
additional aspects they look for in the assessment and measurement of creativity, expecting to 
identify at least one of the following three criteria: 4) cleverness; 5) artisanship; and 6) 
execution.  Some participants viewed the additional criteria as comprising the balance of six 
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formative elements of the creativity construct, while others viewed the additional aspects as 
second-order or perhaps reflective measures of the first three more formative factors.  
Creativity domain experts also do not appear to use either intuition or rational analysis alone 
in reaching their judgments of creative output.  Instead, participants reported and were observed 
applying a two-step or an iterative process: 1) a relatively immediate holistic recognition and 
binary decision that an item is or is not highly creative; and 2) either a very brief confirmatory 
analysis, if an item was determined to be not highly creative, or a more extensive analysis of 
highly creative items.  In both cases, judges appeared to apply non-consciously the three-item 
criterion to all items assessed, and applied the multi-faceted six-factor measurement construct to 
assess the comparative level of creativity to more creative items, and award a final score. 
In the first immediate assessment step, participants made it clear that novelty alone does not 
make an item creative: the item must represent a significant creative departure from existing 
products or ideas.  This makes logical sense given that just because something is “new” or 
previously unseen does make it creative.  It may be the rater has not seen the exact item before 
but recognizes it as an easily anticipated or a logical extension of an existing product or idea, i.e., 
“obvious”.  For example, adding a third hole to two-hole punched paper for the first time might 
be new and even novel compared to the state of the art of paper products at the time, but that 
alone does not make it creative.  For an item to be considered creative, participants stated they 
required it to be novel and not an obvious extension of an existing product or idea; it must be 
unique, different, novel, and unexpected.  In other words, it must represent an inventive step—
enough of a departure from the current state of the art to surprise, astonish or challenge the 
expert judge’s expectations. Lastly, more than mere “utility”, experts reported a creative item 
must respond both appropriately and substantially to the creative task presented. 
 117 
Once judges identified an item as exhibiting some level of creativity using the first three 
criteria, participants reported the amount of time and effort involved in determining whether and 
to what extent the item is highly creative depends on the complexity of the item, the degree of 
departure from the “state of the art”, and the perceived difficulty in execution.  This requires 
assessment of the cleverness of the item’s idea or approach, the degree of artisanship exhibited 
by the finished product, and the elegance and impact of the execution.  Thus, whether considered 
as additional factors of the main construct or as second-order reflective measures, most 
participants indicated that some or all three additional factors needed to be present to identify 
and measure an item as highly creative.   
“Creativity” is more than just being different.  Anybody can play weird; that’s easy.  What’s 
hard is to be as simple as Bach.  Making the simple, awesomely simple, that’s creativity. 
  - Charles Mingus, Jazz composer, performer and pioneer (1922-1979). 
For those participants who viewed the three additional measures as second-order or 
reflective factors, the elements appeared to help identify or qualify the main factors.  For 
example, many participants indicated that cleverness could be viewed as either an extension or a 
more granular measure of novelty (where cleverness denotes a high degree of novelty) or 
inventiveness (as some degree of cleverness would be expected in an inventive step and, the 
more clever, the more inventive).  Conversely, many of the participants noted that cleverness can 
be and often is a separately assessed element.  For example, where two similar items are each 
novel and also to the same degree an inventive step forward in the state of the art, the degree of 
cleverness of each would allow an expert judge to distinguish between the two and rate one 
higher than the other.  Likewise, artisanship and execution might be considered extensions of the 
concept of appropriateness to the task in some instances, although during the simulations and 
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task analysis exercises all respondents reported something much more significant than mere task 
utility must be present to identify an item as creative—the item must be both appropriate to the 
task and also elegantly and meaningfully deliver on the concept.  As one participant put it: “If 
it’s done technically correct, maybe it’s perfect, but if falls flat on the messaging or it’s boring, it 
doesn’t communicate, then it shouldn’t win an award.” (David).  Thus, it remains an open 
question whether artisanship and execution are additional formative factors necessary for a 
finding of creativity, or reflective measures used to measure the extent of achievement of task 
appropriateness.3   
Interestingly, the six factors identified by the participants in this study closely resemble the 
elements of creativity suggested more than 50 years ago by Jackson & Messick (1965) in their 
four-item definition of creativity: 1) unusual when compared to other products; 2) appropriate to 
the context; 3) representing a shift in the constraints and boundaries of the situation; and 4) able 
to condense both simplicity and complexity.  A minority of researchers have similarly argued for 
a three-factor definition of creativity that incorporates the elements of surprise, non-obviousness 
or inventiveness similar to the three-part test used by the Patent Offices of the United States and 
the United Kingdom to assess patent applications (Barton, 2003; Boden 2004; Simonton 2013).  
                                                 
3 The following are other words participants used when attempting to describe each of the 
six key indicators, as generated by a word usage analysis drawn from interview transcripts and 
researcher observation notes:  
Novel: unique, different, diverse, unusual, distinctive. 
Inventive: surprising, unexpected, progressive, astonishing, unlikely, unforeseen, not 
obvious. 
Appropriate: useful, functional, utility, fit-for-purpose, meaningful. 
Clever: interesting, inspiring, appealing, compelling, conceptual, ideation, 
provocative, radical, exciting, extraordinary, daring, bold. 
Artisanship: quality, commonsensical, beautiful, elegant, simplified, excellence, artistic, 
superior. 
Execution: Delivery, achievement, challenge, success, realization, impactful. 
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The explanations provided by the participants in this study help to expand on those conceptual 
discussions by identifying and refining the factors suggested by researchers into the six factors 
identified as used in practice.  The results of this research strongly suggest the definition of 
creativity, and the criteria used to assess creative outputs, needs to be expanded in research to 
include at a minimum a third criterion of non-obviousness, surprise or an inventive step.  In 
addition, participants stated usefulness fails to capture the of utility sufficiently; appropriateness 
to the task allows for a more complete assessment, particularly in professional settings.  
Moreover, this research indicates that the other factors—cleverness, artisanship and execution—
are either formative elements or reflective measures of creativity in practice, and that additional 
research is needed to determine if these factors are also necessary to more completely define and 
measure creativity in research.  
V.2.2 Processes Used by Experts in the Field  
The participants in this study reported they use almost exactly the same processes, criteria 
and standards to judge creativity in contest environments that they use in the workplace.  One of 
the key differences between the two environments related to the time available to process an item 
and the evaluator’s ability to put context around the item.  Participants indicated the complexity 
of the items reviewed is one way the judgment process is significantly slowed down in a contest 
setting; more complex items require more time to evaluate and score.  However, most 
participants reported that taking additional time to review an item rarely, if ever, caused the 
initial assessment or score to improve.  In fact, most participants indicated additional time spent 
examining an item in a contest setting usually resulted in a lowering of the initial score.  One 
possible explanation is that more time reviewing an item allowed the judge to be more critical, 
using a more analytic reasoning process to overcome initial intuitive impressions.  There is no 
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evidence in this study, however, to indicate that analytic reasoning resulted in a more “correct” 
score, and it is likely judges avoided unnecessary analysis as a way to prevent bias from 
affecting their judgment.  Moreover, not having as much information about a contest item as one 
might have about an item in a workplace setting was not seen as detrimental to the validity or 
reliability of assessments in contests.  In fact, participants believed creativity is more easily 
identified when directly and contemporaneously assessed against multiple items—a situation that 
rarely occurs in practice. 
There is also no evidence from this study to suggest the judges used any formulaic or 
arithmetic approach to the evaluation of creative output, other than the ranking effect of choosing 
a score to give an item.  And there is no evidence to suggest expert judges require additional 
instruction or direction to use a specific criterion.  In many of the studies reviewed prior to this 
research, researchers instructed participants to use either a single item construct (i.e., creative) or 
a two or three factor construct including novelty and usefulness, to assess creative products or 
ideas.  However, this research clearly shows that experts do not expressly rely on novelty and 
usefulness alone, and do not appear to (and reported they did not) separately weight novelty, 
usefulness or any other criteria when evaluating creativity.  This suggests experts assess 
creativity using a multi-dimensional holistic model to reach a scaled ultimate unitary decision 
without conscious processing or scoring of individual factors.   
V.2.3 Applicability of the Consensual Assessment Technique 
This research also supports Amabile’s Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) as a valid 
method in the process of evaluating creative output in both practice and research.  Experts 
reported their assessment process followed the same general requirements outlined by Amabile 
for CAT evaluation (a group of domain experts, judging each item independently and without 
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specific instructions) and they were observed following those same processes in scoring items in 
the actual contest.  The only instructions given the judges during the observed contest were an 
outline of the scoring scale to be used and specifics on how to enter scores electronically.  CAT 
presumes domain experts have the requisite experience and understanding to recognize and 
assess creative output without pre-defined criteria or instructions, and if acting independently 
they will achieve a high level of agreement on the measure of creativity.  Although CAT has 
been defined as using a “unitary” operational construct to measure creativity, in practice it 
appears domain experts applying CAT non-consciously rely instead on a multi-factor construct.  
Whether an item is creative, or more creative than another, is likely the final measure of the 
output’s combined novelty, inventiveness, and appropriateness to the task, along with some 
measure of cleverness, artisanship and execution. 
In summary, the evidence developed by this research suggests experts reach an initial binary 
conclusion (creative or not) and then assign a score reflecting a relative comparison of the level 
of creativity against other items either in the assessed set or against the expert’s own experience 
and knowledge of the state of the art.  In practice, this research also highlights the importance of 
using experienced professionals to identify creative output to determine which ideas and 
products to pursue, something business organizations find difficult to accomplish consistently 
(Harvey & Kou, 2013). 
V.2.4 Cognitive Processing (CEST and CCT) 
Participants in this study acknowledged that creativity triggers an immediate emotional 
response and, in many cases almost simultaneously, an abbreviated form of analysis occurs as 
part of the evaluator’s assessment.  Thus, the evidence generated by this research tends to 
support both Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum Theory 
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(CCT) in the context of how expertise-based intuition and rational analysis operates in evaluating 
creative output in practice.  Both CEST and CCT recognize expertise-based intuition and rational 
analysis as components of evaluative cognition.  However, CEST posits rational analysis and 
intuition operate either in direct opposition or at different times during the evaluation process.  
CCT, on the other hand, theorizes that intuition and rational analysis exist on a continuum and 
operate simultaneously, in varying respective degrees, in response to task stimuli. Both theories 
are supported by the findings of this research but the study failed to provide sufficient definitive 
evidence to differentiate between them, as each model adequately explains the results obtained.   
As noted in the Findings chapter, participant judges appeared to use intuition for most of the 
initial assessments generated during the contest judging event.  Moreover, all participants either 
acknowledged “intuition” was a critical component of their judgment process or reported 
experiencing several of the indicators of intuitive decision making such as using their “gut” 
instinct or reaching a decision with little time to fully consider each item.  Participants also were 
observed moving very quickly through each entry, in most cases spending less than two seconds 
viewing each before entering a score.  Participants also identified several aspects of their process 
consistent with theories of intuition, including sudden awareness of an idea or choice without 
conscious awareness of the source, affect-laden decisions often coupled with strong emotional or 
physical reactions, and high confidence in their judgments (many saying they rarely if ever go 
back to reconsider their decision).  Other participants used the words “visceral reaction” to 
describe their judgments during the evaluation phase. 
However, many of the participants also said they were on occasion concerned their fast and 
easily achieved decisions may not be accurate and that additional time and “cognitive effort” 
were sometimes required to determine whether their first “impressions” were accurate.  
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Participants reported that occasionally the additional time spent on review would uncover issues 
causing them to award a lower final score than first intended.  None of the judges indicated that 
additional time spent on an entry resulted in a higher score.  These findings suggest a two-step 
serial process as predicted by CEST whereby judges use the default mode of processing for the 
majority of decisions that match a particular item with a pattern or experience from long-term 
memory.  However, when an entry is complex or initially considered particularly creative, a 
switch in processing can occur, causing the participant to apply the slower, more cognitively 
involved effort of rational thought.   
The findings also support the predictions of CCT that in many cases intuition and rational 
thinking occur simultaneously as “quasirationality” in response to the demands of complex 
decision tasks.  Entering scores for each item often took judges longer than the time required to 
review the item, and many items appeared to be scored “in bulk” for this reason.  However, in 
some cases, particularly when an item contained multiple parts or dimensions, judges spent 
additional time looking at the entry more holistically, in an apparent attempt to take in the overall 
concept or execution of the item.  In most of these cases, judges still moved very quickly and 
deliberately, reviewing each item, scoring them and moving on.  Judges reported that items 
receiving low scores (5 or less) were reviewed for the least amount of time, while items that 
received high scores (8 or above) were not only reviewed for a longer period of time (ten or more 
seconds), but often judges were seen contemplating the item from multiple perspectives.  Judges 
later explained the additional time was often spent “admiring” a particularly creative item they 
had already decided would receive a very high (9 or10) score. When asked to explain their 
overall scoring system and the criteria they were using in these specific instances, participants 
could not verbalize their reasoning saying they would have to “dumb it down” to an elementary 
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explanation. However, all participants agreed the process used in these cases did not involve 
conscious switching or toggling from one processing mode to another.  In fact, many judges 
reported their process involved both a holistic appreciation for the item, in tandem with a more 
critical appreciation for discrete elements of the execution and approach, and that their thought 
process involved “searching” for the right response to the item presented.  This suggests judges 
were not operating solely in one mode or the other, as predicted by CEST, but were moving 
along a continuum between rational analysis and emotional intuitive response to reach a decision 
that matched the stimulus, as theorized by CCT.   
Evidence from this research also suggests that the two theories may describe different 
aspects of the same overall process.  During observations, judges exhibited signs suggesting they 
may have been operating in a binary “off-on” approach, using intuition to quickly assess whether 
an item deserved further consideration.  When an item elicited an intuitive response, judges 
appeared to then shift into a more holistic review of the item, but not into a purely analytical 
review.  Participants reported that even when they identified an item as creative, the initial 
emotional response did not disappear as they continued to review the item in more detail, and 
that they did not recall critically analyzing an item unless intuitively they felt something wasn’t 
quite complete.  In many instances reported by the participants and observed during the judging 
and simulations, judges were unable to identify why a particular item was considered highly 
creative, but very often they could readily identify why an item might not receive a higher score.  
This suggests judges were using a continuum approach to processing along with a form of 
pattern matching.  Judges first compared the item against their memory and observed 
immediately if the item matched their past experience (i.e., was not new or different) requiring 
no movement along the continuum (due to having reached a successful decision outcome) and 
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they awarded a low or middle score.  If the item did not match the judge’s past experience or 
memory, a shift to a different processing approach was required to consider the item further (due 
to decision failure).  All of the participants indicated a more complex form of decision-making 
was involved in this “second look.”  However, none of the judges exhibited and none of the 
participants reported that they toggled into a purely analytic mode.   
This task-centered response and movement along a continuum until an acceptable choice is 
found supports CCT’s quasirationailty movement model, but does not exclude the CCT model. 
In fact, most participants indicated they had used both approaches, at different times or for 
different categories, suggesting both theories may adequately describe the process of creative 
evaluation and that the research methodology employed here was insufficient to identify the 
boundary conditions of either.  Likewise, it could be that both processes are available to experts 
and are used for different purposes or in different contexts to assess creativity. “If there are two 
models that both agree with observation…then one cannot say that one is more real than 
another.” (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010: 46). 
V.2.5 Recognition Primed Decision-Making and Expert Intuition 
Regardless of whether CEST or CCT, or both, are involved, the evidence strongly supports 
experts utilize one or more of the variants of the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model 
when assessing creative products and ideas.  Interestingly, the participants appeared to use the 
opposite of “pattern-matching” and “consistency with prior experience” that are the hallmarks of 
most variants of RPD.  For creative products, most participants reported they evaluated entries 
very quickly, using both intuition and an abbreviated analysis to determine that the expert had 
not seen the item, i.e., that the item was outside of the expert’s stored memory or recent 
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experience, before assessing the qualities of novelty and cleverness.  In short, the participants 
appeared to look for what did not fit a pattern or was inconsistent with expectation.   
Participants then appeared to use story-building to simulate and evaluate the creative steps 
that might have been taken to develop the item (to assess inventiveness, artisanship and 
execution), and lastly participants incorporated forward-chain reasoning to extend the simulation 
into future scenarios to evaluate the likelihood of success of the product or idea (to assess 
functionality, task appropriateness, and concept delivery).  Highly creative items would then 
require “progressive deepening” of simulation and comparison, and extended imagination, in 
order to complete forward chain reasoning.  By definition, “forward-chaining” requires assuming 
some aspects of an item as a given (the “if”) and extending those aspects into the future until an 
imagined solution is achieved (the “then”).  Forward chaining is not rational analysis where 
various “options” are considered against each other using logic to derive a superior solution.  In 
RPD and forward-chaining used by experts, only one “option” is simulated, using imagination in 
an attempt to recreate the solution presented.   
In this research study, all participants appeared to utilize some variant of RPD to identify 
and assess items they had intuitively determined were creative and worthy of further assessment.  
This evidence supports Klein’s model of RPD as being “a blend of intuition and analysis. The 
pattern matching is the intuitive part, and the mental simulation is the conscious, deliberate, and 
analytical part.”  (Klein, 2008: 458).  In a fashion, RPD helps to explain how both CEST and 
CCT may be involved in cognitive processing in uncertain, ambiguous, time-sensitive and non-
algorithmic tasks. As pointed out by other researchers, the process of “intuiting” is rapid (often 
instantaneous), spontaneous (without effort and unable to be controlled) and alogical (not 
necessarily contradicting the rules of logic but may not follow them either) (Dorfler & 
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Ackermann, 2012).   Intuition is ineffective in decision-making involving algorithmic tasks that 
can be decomposed and solved logically, sequentially, or mathematically but can be highly 
effective in non-algorithmic tasks (Dane, Rockmann & Pratt, 2012).  RPD is also less effective in 
situations presenting highly combinatorial or algorithmic problems, where justifications are 
required, or in cases where differing views of multiple stakeholders must be considered (Klein, 
1998).  In this study, the quantitative analysis of judges’ scores also supports the conclusion that 
domain experts with significant experience (from “high-fidelity” environments) utilizing expert 
intuition and consensual assessment techniques achieve more reliable and valid results in non-
algorithmic tasks than non-experts.  These results also might explain why organizations that 
assess creativity in group settings make less effective decisions—whenever justifications are 
required or multiple stakeholder views must be considered, expert intuition is likely to be 
curtailed or ineffective. 
V.2.6 Expert v. Novice  
All of the participants in this study expressed the opinion that novices would struggle to 
consistently identify and score highly creative work.  Participants identified several reasons for 
the challenges novices would face, including: a) an incomplete awareness of the “state of the art” 
(lack of domain familiarity); b) the absence of understanding the work effort involved in the 
varying levels of artisanship required to produce highly creative work (lack of creative 
experience); c) the relatively small amount of judging experience (lack of discernment skill),  
and d) the lack of experience with heuristics and biases (lack of debiasing skill) that would result 
in personal subjectivity and emotional responses going unanalyzed.  In essence, participants 
believed novices would unrealistically assume their abilities to assess creativity were greater than 
their experience would allow and succumb to untrained emotional responses.  Some participants 
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termed this gap of knowledge and experience the “novice trap” or referred to the novice’s 
“inability to know what they don’t know.”  In psychology, this cognitive bias is termed the 
Dunning-Kruger Effect and explains the difficulty inexperienced individuals have in recognizing 
their own lack of knowledge and the overconfidence in decision making that often results 
(Dunning, et al., 2003). 
Participants also described several ways the challenges would likely inhibit the ability of a 
novice judge to assess creativity effectively.  First and foremost, the participants identified the 
risk of “premature convergence” or accepting the most easily identified response and failing to 
see additional potential solutions.  Premature convergence is more likely in tasks with short-time 
frames and in complex environments, particularly where the decision-maker lacks experience in 
the task and has limited breadth of understanding of the field.  For novice judges, the time 
pressures and lack of experience creates the risk they would seek out only items that appear very 
different from the rest of the field and select those items as highly creative without further 
evaluation.  Participants also indicated that a lack of experience would cause novices to not 
recognize “rough creativity”, i.e., creative work that is not fully polished but which exhibits all 
of the traits of creativity except execution and artisanship.  One example of this challenge in 
practice would be highly creative formative work that needs further development and which is so 
divergent a novice would assume it would be impossible to achieve.  Experts, on the other hand, 
would be able to identify the potentiality of such rough creativity and understand how it might be 
implemented in the future. 
The participants not only identified the necessity of using domain experts to ensure the 
validity and reliability of creativity assessment, the experts’ descriptions of the processes and 
criteria used to identify highly creative work in contest settings also reveals some of the reasons 
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behind this necessity.  Faced with the significant time pressures, uncertainty and ambiguity of a 
high-stakes creativity contest, experts must rely on various heuristics in order to accomplish the 
tasks timely.  However, the use of heuristics also creates the potential for the impact of numerous 
biases to alter the results.  The methods used by experts as expressed by the participants in this 
study not only serve to accomplish a great deal in a short period of time, but as explained in the 
next section, also help to reduce the frequency and the impact of bias on the decisions made. 
Non-experts lack the experience necessary to appropriately utilize heuristics and to identify and 
avoid biases that would result.  
V.2.7 Using Heuristics and Avoiding Biases 
Participants in this study acknowledged using heuristics to judge creativity in high-pressure, 
low-time environments, and all acknowledged numerous potential biases that could adversely 
affect their judgment and decision-making.  Participants identified a number of biases novices 
would encounter in judging creativity that they would struggle to recognize and deal with 
effectively, including: availability, typicality, anchoring, and confirmation bias.  Novices without 
experience in the relevant domain, lacking awareness of the processes and criteria necessary for 
valid assessment, and inexperienced in the process of judging and preventing biases from 
affecting their decisions, are ill equipped to provide reliable judgments in the face of these 
challenges.  However, the participants reported several techniques they relied upon to reduce the 
likelihood and impact of biases.   
Several participants identified “mindfulness” as a significant method used to avoid the 
impact of biases or predisposition on decisions, by having full consciousness of the situation, the 
importance of the work to the contestants, and the value of the contribution to the overall 
profession of creativity.  As one participant explained: 
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“These contests are really important to the participants, and I have to do my very best to 
make good decisions and not let my own subjective opinions or the feelings of others affect 
my judgment.  I approach these [contests] with a high degree of awareness of the ultimate 
goal is: identifying the most creative and worthwhile work.” [Edward] 
Other participants indicated they felt that prior contest judging and professional work experience 
had improved their ability to avoid certain biases from creeping into their decisions. For many, 
the same experience gained in the “high-fidelity” environment of a contest, coupled with the 
immediate feedback of judging professional work, in which they developed expertise in the 
domain also trained them to recognize bias and debias their judgments.  Indeed, training and 
expertise gained from practical experience, along with having empathy for the individuals the 
decision will impact, have been shown to improve “debiasing” in decision-making (Dhami, 
2013). 
Participants also pointed out the importance of staying abreast of other creativity awards 
contest outcomes and the creative work published in their respective industries as well as other 
fields as a means of avoiding subjectivity and other potential biases.  Many participants 
specifically reported that critically assessing the creative work of others outside of the 
participant’s own professional work and contests in which they acted as judges was a way of 
keeping an open mind and avoiding “group-think.”   
While participants acknowledged that time pressures often required the use of heuristics to 
complete assessment of creativity in practice that could lead to bias in judgment, most felt 
“mindfulness” of the potential biases, awareness of their personal subjectivities, and use of some 
form of analysis to confirm or discount initial reactions, all helped experienced judges avoid or 
reduce the likelihood of incorrect biases in their judgments.  Kahneman acknowledged that 
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intuition can produce valid and accurate judgments and decisions but only in situations where 
domain expertise overcomes inherent biases caused by heuristics (Kahneman, 2011).  This study 
supports the concept that domain expertise can overcome inherent biases where that expertise is 
obtained and maintained in “high-fidelity environments,” and where the judgments and decisions 
surround tasks that are non-algorithmic. 
V.2.8 Inter-rater Agreement of Judges Scores 
As noted in the Findings section, inter-rater correlation of judging scores across eight 
contests over multiple years were calculated at a low of 0.674 and a high of .797.  ICC scores of 
reliability between .65 and .80 are considered to reflect a moderate to high degree of agreement 
in creativity research.  However, considering the level of domain expertise and relative 
homogeny of items assessed in the creativity contest, the judges’ interrater correlations could be 
criticized for not being even higher. As pointed out in the literature review, fewer numbers of 
experts have been shown to achieve a high level of inter-rater agreement compared to the 
number of novices necessary to achieve a similar rating (Kaufman, et al., 2008).  However, 
assessing creativity by its nature is a human-based non-algorithmic process with no clear 
objective determinant, and therefore anything nearing total agreement among multiple judges is 
unachievable.  In fact, had the correlation of the judges’ scores been higher than .80, the research 
results would be suspect for being too highly correlated.  All of the work assessed was at a very 
high professional level—presumably the contest entries had been pre-selected as highly creative 
by the entrants, all of whom were creative professionals.  Despite this, judges’ scores on 
individual entries ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 10.  Given that experienced professionals 
created the work judged in a field setting, it would be unlikely, and highly suspect, if the judges’ 
scores achieved a very high level of agreement.  To achieve very high correlations one would 
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expect only one or a few items in each category to be scored as highly creative with the 
remaining items scoring well below the top items along a normal distribution, allowing for 
complete discrimination across the top, middle and bottom ranges.  In situations where 
professional work is being judged, however, less variation would be expected among the items 
scored with clustering near the very top of the range, making high inter-rater agreement much 
more difficult to achieve.  Accordingly, score correlations above .70 for highly creative products 
across a small number of raters would not be expected unless the assessments were in fact highly 
reliable.   
V.3 Contributions to Theory And Practice 
This field study contributes to the development of creativity research and the understanding 
of process models of judgment and decision-making in several ways.  First, through the 
observation and in-depth inquiry of the processes and criteria that expert judge participants used 
in assessing creative entries, this research develops evidence highlighting the critical role experts 
must play in the measurement of creative output in research.  The experts observed in this 
research revealed unique and special processes and approaches to the evaluation of creative 
products that appear to be very fast and highly effective, without the need for special instruction 
or significant support.  Moreover, the participants’ judgments of the entries appeared to be highly 
valid as shown by the tight consensus on the choices of winning entries and highly reliable as 
shown by the results of inter-rater reliability testing on the participants’ actual scoring and the 
scores given by judges in prior contests.   
Second, participants identified several deficiencies in the operational and construct 
definitions of creativity often used in creativity research.  Participants provided evidence 
suggesting that a holistic unitary measure of creativity, applying multiple facets that may be 
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different depending on the item assessed, is more effective for experts in assessing creative 
products in practice.  Because of their years of experience evaluating creative products and ideas, 
experts appear to be able to identify the key components of creativity for a particular item or, 
perhaps more correctly, identify when key elements are missing or poorly executed.  While it is 
tempting to seize upon the key elements and components identified by the participants as 
indicative of creativity in order to create a list for potential use by non-experts, it is important to 
remember that this study involved only a small number of participant judges in the think-aloud 
and simulation exercises that generated those key elements identified.  And each of the 
participants made clear that judging a different group of items would likely involve different 
combinations of elements and components, such that not all should be considered necessary or 
important for every creative product or idea.  Moreover, none of the experts felt non-experts 
would be able to apply specific criteria.  It was only by means of the expert participants’ 
experience and deliberate practice that they had learned what to look for in which situations, and 
what allows experts to “know it when they see it.” 
Third, this research potentially highlights some of the context and reasons behind 
quantitative research showing the stark differences in performance between experts and non-
experts when judging creativity.  Studies have shown that non-experts’ assessments of creativity 
in small groups cannot be considered reliable or valid, and that it can take as many as a 100 non-
experts to achieve an inter-rater reliability equal to just a few experts.  This research provides 
additional evidence of the challenges inherent in using non-experts by identifying some of the 
reasons non-experts would struggle to evaluate creativity and achieve reliable results.   
The participants’ behavior and processes also contribute to understanding the cognitive 
processing of experts during decision making in general, and of Cognitive-Experiential Self-
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Theory and Cognitive Continuum Theory in particular.  CEST and CCT both recognize the 
existence and effective use of intuition by experts, but the mechanisms by which this occurs are 
not well understood.  The results of this study provide insights into expert decision-making 
behavior and their perceptions about evaluating creative products in a field setting.   
This field study also contributes to practice by identifying ways to improve the assessment 
of creativity in organizations.  Managers of organizations struggle to differentiate creativity, 
innovation or problem solving, often incorrectly viewing the three separate constructs as 
inextricably connected (Banks, et al., 2002).  Organizational groups also tend to identify 
relatively average ideas produced by their members as more creative than other more novel ideas 
created by other individuals (Rietzschel, et al., 2006).  The findings of this study highlight the 
importance of employing domain experts to evaluate creative products and ideas and reveal that 
assessment of creativity is not a team sport.  As required by the Consensual Assessment 
Technique, and recommended by the participants in this study, assessment of creativity should 
be done by individuals acting independently and without specific instructions.  Using groups to 
assess creativity may be problematic to the extent it introduces potential bias from other 
participants, including confirmatory bias and group-think, as well as political effects as members 
“choose consciously or subconsciously to ignore ideas, advocate for their own ideas, show 
enthusiasm for others’ ideas, and provide interpersonal rewards for good ideas” (Rietzschel et al., 
2006: 347). 
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
VI.1 Conclusions 
This research provides rich insight into how small groups of domain experts identify and 
evaluate the creative output of professionals in the real world setting of an awards contest.  The 
results of the research contradict some of the limited models and measurement constructs of 
creativity used in research, and challenge the validity and reliability of research studies that 
relied on non-experts to assess creative output.  The results support the value of expert intuition 
in making rapid, valid and reliable assessments of creativity, and the limited role rational 
analysis plays in quantifying creativity of professional output and in reducing judgment error 
from decision biases.  While the results of the research cannot be generalized to a wider 
population, the observations, analysis and reports from the participants provide strong evidence 
in support of a broader operational definition and multiple factor measures of creativity in 
products and ideas for both research and practice.  Lastly, this research suggests numerous 
opportunities for further research to refine our understanding of the nature of creativity and 
identify how to better measure creative output.   
VI.2 Recommendations for further research 
Quantitative data in this study indicates that many of the expert judges of the creativity 
contests reviewed did not award scores using the entire scale proposed by the contest 
administrators.  A review of the minimum and maximum scores given by judges in the contests 
of this study indicated that, while most judges used the proposed 1-10 scale, some judges used a 
scale ranging from 2 to 10, others used a scale of 5 to 9, and several judges used a scale of 0 to 9 
but gave no entries a top scores of 10.  Future research using detailed statistical analyses might 
provide insights into whether rater effects affected the results of the scores or the contest.  Rater 
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effect analysis might also reveal whether expert judge scoring is less reliable in the “mid-range” 
of creativity where the bias of subjectivity and personal variations in the weighting of various 
factors of the creativity concept might have a greater impact.  Another line of research might 
involve test-retest reliability of expert judges over a long period.  Would an item be considered 
as creative in the years following its initial assessment?  If so, what role if any does the criterion 
of novelty play in the decision? As one of the criteria used by most judges is whether an entry is 
“different,” “new”, or “surprising”, it is difficult to anticipate the consistency of judges’ scores 
over time when that characteristic is no longer apparent.  However, an experiment using similar 
or the same items from a prior contest that subsequently asks judges to score them as to the level 
of creativity at the time the item was first scored may yield insights into whether judges are 
consistent in the comparison of items after the passage of time. 
Brain imaging studies using fMRI have shown a correlation between the areas of the brain 
engaged for different types of social and mechanical tasks (see Jack, et al, 2014) and suggest that 
when the positive task system is engaged the default system is deactivated.  A similar study 
using both simple and complex items previously judged by experts as highly creative and less 
creative might reveal insights into whether different information processing systems operate in 
parallel or serial fashion when making aesthetic judgments. 
Future research might also investigate whether expert and non-expert judges produce more 
or less valid and reliable results when evaluating creativity in a group as opposed to 
independently.  The results of this research confirmed that awards judging in practice follows the 
requirements set out in Amabile’s Consensual Assessment Technique that evaluators must make 
their judgments independently and without consultation.  One assumption of CAT appears to be 
that judges acting together would negatively influence each other’s judgment.  However, several 
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participants in this study reported that judgments for “Best in Class” winners were made in open 
group discussions and the judges expressed that the ultimate choices made in that setting were 
highly valid.  Additional research could test these assumptions among both non-experts and 
experts, to see if non-expert judgments can be improved when evaluating creativity 
collaboratively, and to assess whether expert judgment is less reliable when made in a group 
setting as suggested by research into organizational creativity assessments.  Research on the 
latter question would have significant implications on the assessment of creativity in practice, 
potentially leading to better models of decision making in organizations.   
Similarly, a factor analysis comparing judges scores by separately applying each of the six 
key elements of creativity reported in this study might reveal significant variation in what judges 
rely on for their conclusions while still awarding very similar overall scores.  For example, one 
judge might give an entry high marks for novelty and execution, and thus a high overall score 
where those items are heavily weighted, in comparison to another judge who might heavily 
weight inventiveness and artisanship and score an item as high in creativity for quite different 
reasons. 
VI.3 Final Thoughts 
Obviously, it would be simpler and cheaper if researchers could employ non-experts or 
untrained evaluators to score creativity using an objective multi-dimension scale and achieve 
relatively high validity and reliability.  However, this research and other studies indicate non-
experts are ineffective judges of creativity and that objective scales are not used by domain 
experts.  Conversely, requiring the use of domain expert judges for every research study might 
be overkill, particularly for simple evaluations of basic creativity.  For example, Amabile, who 
developed the Consensual Assessment Technique, successfully used psychology students to 
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evaluate collages created by elementary school students in her research of task motivation.  Such 
an approach might be perfectly appropriate in some contexts; nonetheless, this study shows that 
researchers need to use greater care when designing and evaluating creativity research studies.  
Employing domain experts with experience in judging creativity and applying the appropriate 
criteria is critical to assure reliability and validity in studies of creative outcome. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Applied Cognitive Task Analysis  
This research utilized a modified form of cognitive task analysis called “applied cognitive 
task analysis” to conduct semi-structured probe question interviews of expert judges.  Cognitive 
task analysis (CTA) is a set of methods designed to describe the various cognitive skills and 
mental demands required to accomplish challenging and complex decisions and judgments 
(Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006).  While there are many different types of cognitive analysis 
methods and approaches within CTA, each aimed at achieving a unique aspect of cognitive 
research, most are resource intensive, difficult to use, and often require specialized training or 
experience in cognitive psychology (Hoffman & Woods, 2000).  As a result, many CTA methods 
tend to be of limited use to management scholars and researchers (Militello & Hutton, 1998). 
Applied cognitive task analysis (ACTA) is a streamlined version of cognitive task 
analysis developed for use by researchers not trained in cognitive psychology (Militello & 
Hutton 1998; Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006).  ACTA provides a refined set of cognitive task 
analysis techniques specifically designed to identify the key cognitive elements required to 
perform mentally challenging or complex tasks (McAndrew & Gore 2013).  Because ACTA 
focuses on the key cognitive elements underlying difficult judgments and decisions, critical cues 
and patterns and problem-solving strategies, it is particularly well suited to studying expert 
decision making.  ACTA has been used successfully in studies involving weather forecasting 
(Hoffman et al., 2006), clinical nursing (Militellto & Lim 1995), currency trading (McAndrew & 
Gore, 2013), military command and control (Drury & Darling, 2008), recruitment (Gore & Riley, 
2004) and financial markets (McAndrew & Gore, 2007).   
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As a streamlined method, ACTA presents a likely trade-off between usability and 
resources, on the one hand, and power and comprehensiveness, on the other (Militello & Hutton, 
1998; Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006).  As a result, ACTA techniques should not be expected 
to produce information as comprehensive and specific as other more in-depth and systematic 
forms of cognitive task analysis.  However, ACTA methods have been shown to consistently 
produce reliable, high-quality information about cognitive processes in various contexts, as well 
as being more accessible to researchers without intensive training in cognitive psychology 
(Militello & Hutton, 1998; McAndrew & Gore, 2013). 
The ACTA Process: 
The process of applied cognitive task analysis involves four complementary steps that are 
designed to systematically build on one another to elicit high quality, task specific knowledge 
(McAndrew & Gore, 2013).  ACTA utilizes structured interviews, observation, and simulation to 
elicit knowledge from subject matter experts (SMEs), and knowledge representation techniques, 
e.g., cognitive mapping, to provide structure for organizing and comparing cognitive 
information.  The first step of ACTA involves the interviewer and the SME co-producing a task 
diagram providing a broad overview of the task.  In this initial step of the interview, the SME is 
asked to decompose the task into subtasks with questions such as, “Think about what you do 
when you (task of interest).  Can you break this task down into less than six but not less than 
three steps?” (Militello & Hutton, 1998).  The SME is then asked which of the identified 
subtasks require difficult cognitive effort.  This step provides a “surface level” view of the task 
and identifies specific areas of the task, or subtasks, requiring complex cognitive skills to be 
explored in greater detail in subsequent steps.    
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Step two of the process is the “knowledge audit,” where the SME reviews and explicates 
the aspects of expertise required for effective execution of the critical cognitive subtasks 
identified in step one.  The knowledge audit draws directly on research on expert-novice 
differences and critical decision method studies of expert decision-making to uncover the 
demands of cognitively challenging tasks (Militello & Hutton, 1998).  During the audit, the 
interviewer uses generic and specific probes to elicit greater detail about the subtasks and 
cognitive effort necessary to complete them effectively, including critical cues and strategies for 
decision making.  Concrete examples and specific information about past experiences and 
comparisons between how experts and novices might perform the task are captured with the goal 
of streamlining and improving data collection and analysis (Militello & Hutton, 1998; 
McAndrew & Gore, 2013).  The output of the knowledge audit is an inventory of the task-
specific expertise with examples of situations in which expertise is employed, cues and strategies 
that are used to make decisions and an explanation of why the decision poses a challenge to 
novices (Militello & Hutton, 1998). 
The third step, the simulation interview, builds on the information obtained in the first 
two steps to contextualize the task, and allows the interviewer to better understand the SME’s 
cognitive processes.  In the simulation interview, the SME is presented with a challenging brief 
scenario that has been created in advance for the purposes of the interview.  The interviewer 
presents the challenge and asks the SME to imagine going through the scenario, visualizing the 
steps involved.  The interviewer then probes the SME on issues relating to situation assessment, 
potential errors and biases, cues and patterns and other challenges the situation might present 
(Militello & Hutton 1998).  The information solicited is captured and recorded in a simulation 
interview table for subsequent comparison and analysis across interviews.   
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After the interviews are complete, the final step is creation of a “cognitive demands 
table” of the information elicited in all the interviews, to merge and synthesize the data.  The 
cognitive demands table provides a format for the researcher to identify those areas requiring 
complex cognitive skills and the pertinent problem-solving and decision-making activities 
involved in the task (Militello & Hutton, 1998).  
 
Appendix B: Review of Selected Creativity Studies 
Author(s) Year Title Publication Subject types 
 
Rating by 
Inter-rater  
reliability        
Akinola 
& 
Mendes 
2008 
The Dark 
Side of 
Creativity: 
Biological 
Vulnerabili
ty and 
Negative 
Emotions 
Lead to 
Greater 
Artistic 
Creativity 
Personality & 
Social 
Psychology 
Bulletin 
Young adults 
ages 18-25, 
general pop., 
N= 90;  65 
females 
4 
“professiona
l artists” and 
4 studio art 
grad 
students 
.65 to .88 
Amabile 1982 
Children's 
artistic 
creativity: 
Detrimenta
l effects of 
competitio
n in a field 
setting 
Personality & 
Social 
Psychology 
Bulletin 
Schoolgirls, 
N=22 ages 7-
11 
“artist-
judges” 
“high” 
Amabile, 
et al 
1986 
Social 
influences 
on 
creativity: 
The effects 
of 
Journal of 
Personality and 
Social 
Psychology 
Study 1: 
N=115 boys 
and girls, 
ages 5-10; 
Study 2: 
N=80, 
students, ages 
8-11; Study 
Study 1: 3 
elementary 
school 
teachers; 
Study 2: 
“artist-
judges” nfs; 
Study 1: 
.91; 
Study 2: 
.80; 
Study 3: 
.75 
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contracted-
for reward 
3: N=60 
undergrad 
women psych 
students 
Study 3: 14 
“artists” nsf 
Baer 1998 
Gender 
differences 
in the 
effects of 
extrinsic 
motivation 
on 
creativity. 
The Journal of 
creative 
behavior 
N= 70 middle 
school 
students, 35 
male and 35 
female 
4 “art 
educators” 
0.8 
Butler 1987 
Task-
involving 
and ego-
involving 
properties 
of 
evaluation 
Journal of 
education 
psychology 
N=100, top 
performing 
5th and 6th 
grade 
students 
Count of # 
of original 
responses by 
2 “judges” 
.91-.93 
Conti et 
al. 
2001 
The impact 
of 
competitio
n on 
intrinsic 
motivation 
and 
creativity 
Personality and 
Individual 
Differences 
N=50, 
children ages 
6-10 
5 judges 
with 
“experience 
in children’s 
art” 
0.82 
Eisenber
ger & 
Armeli 
1997 
Can Salient 
Reward 
Increase 
Creative 
Performanc
e Without 
Reducing 
Intrinsic 
Creative 
Interest?  
Journal of 
Personality and 
Social 
Psychology 
Study 1: 
N=296 5th 
and 6th grade 
students; 
Study 2: 
N=120 5th 
and 6th grade 
students 
2 judges: 
two judges 
“assigned 
each 
drawing a 
score equal 
to the total 
number of 
times the 
same topic 
appeared in 
the 
population 
of drawings” 
Study 1: 
0.99; 
Study 2: 
.98 
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Eisenber
ger et al. 
1998 
Can the 
promise of 
reward 
increase 
creativity?  
Journal of 
Personality and 
Social 
Psychology 
Study 1: 
N=216 5th 
grade 
students; 
Study 2: 220 
5th and 6th 
grade 
2 judges, 
same as 
above; in 
Study 2, 2nd 
judge only 
rated 60 
items 
Study 1: 
.97; 
Study 2: 
.99 (60 
only) 
Eisenber
ger et al. 
1999 
Promised 
reward and 
creativity: 
Effects of 
prior 
experience 
Journal of 
Experimental 
Social 
Psychology 
N=238 5th 
and 6th 
graders 
2 judges, 
same as 
above 
0.99 
Eisenber
ger & 
Rhoades 
2001 
Incrementa
l effects of 
reward on 
creativity 
Journal of 
Personality and 
Social 
Psychology 
Study 1: N= 
72 5th and 
6th graders; 
Study 2: N= 
97 5th 
graders ; 
Study 3: N+ ; 
Study 4: N=  
Studies 1 & 
2: 3 
“judges,” 
based on 
novelty 
combined 
with quality; 
Study 3: 3 
undergrad 
research 
assistants; 
Study 4 N/A 
Study 1 
& 2: 0.88; 
Study 3: 
.82; 
Study 4 
N/A 
Eisenber
ger & 
Aselage 
2009 
Incrementa
l effects of 
reward on 
experience
d 
performanc
e pressure: 
positive 
outcomes 
for intrinsic 
interest and 
creativity  
Journal of 
Organizational 
Behavior 
Study 3: 
N=405 intro 
psych 
students 
2 
undergradua
te research 
assistants 
“The 
intraclass 
correlatio
n 
coefficien
t for the 
judges’ 
creativity 
ratings 
was .64.” 
Friedman 2009 
Reinvestig
ating the 
effects of 
promised 
reward on 
creativity 
Creativity 
Research 
Journal  
Study 1: 
N=81 
undergrad 
intro psych 
students; 
Study 2: 
N=108 
Study 1: 22 
undergrad 
coders; 
Study 2: 14 
coders 
Study 1: 
.84; 
Study 2: 
.96 
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undergrad 
intro psych 
students 
Gerrard, 
et al. 
1996 
Promoting 
children's 
creativity: 
Effects of 
competitio
n, self-
esteem, 
and 
immunizati
on. 
Creativity 
Research 
Journal  
N=103 3rd 
grade 
children 
2 art 
professors 
and 1 grad 
art student 
rated on 
“creativity” 
and 
“quality”; 21 
teachers of 
gifted 
children also 
rated on 
“creativity” 
.69-.72 
for art 
judges; 
for 
teachers 
.89-.92 
Glover & 
Zimmer 
1982 
Procedures 
to 
influence 
levels of 
questions 
asked by 
students. 
The Journal of 
General 
Psychology 
N=24 5th 
graders 
2 ed psych 
students 
rated the 
quality of 
questions 
5th grade 
students 
asked during 
class before 
and after 
treatment 
Not 
given. 
Hennesse
y 
1989 
The effect 
of extrinsic 
constraints 
on 
children's 
creativity 
while using 
a computer 
Creativity 
Research 
Journal  
N=66 
children, age 
7 - 13 
Unknown  
Hennesse
y et al. 
1989 
Immunizin
g children 
against the 
negative 
effects of 
reward 
Contemporary 
educational 
psychology  
Study 1: 
N=113 3rd-
5th graders, 
age 7-11; 
Study 2: 
N=58 3rd 
graders 
Study 1; 3 
elementary 
school 
teachers 
rated 
children's 
stories on 
“creativity”; 
Study 2: 12 
Study 1: 
.80; 
Study 2: 
.70 
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elementary 
school 
teachers 
“familiar 
with the 
work of 3rd 
graders” 
rated 
collages 
Hennesse
y & 
Zbikows
ki 
1993 
Immunizin
g children 
against the 
negative 
effects of 
reward: A 
further 
examinatio
n of 
intrinsic 
motivation 
training 
techniques 
Creativity 
Research 
Journal  
N=41 8-10 
year olds 
Rated 
creative 
stories.  
Abstract 
only, no 
other info 
 
Kachelm
eier, et al. 
2008 
Measuring 
and 
Motivating 
Quantity, 
Creativity, 
or Both 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
N=78 
undergrad 
business 
students 
11 doctoral 
students 
CA .86 
Moran & 
Liou 
1982 
Effects of 
reward on 
creativity 
in college 
students of 
two levels 
of ability. 
Perceptual and 
motor skills 
N=80 college 
students 
2 “judges” .85-.98 
Selart et 
al. 
2008 
Effects of 
Reward on 
Self-
regulation, 
Intrinsic 
Motivation 
and 
Creativity 
Scandinavian 
Journal of 
Educational 
Research 
N=42 psych 
undergrads 
3 grad psych 
students 
0.62 
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Aime, et 
al. 
2014 
The riddle 
of 
hierarchy: 
Power 
transitions 
in cross-
functional 
teams 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
N=131, 
divided into 
teams of 4-5, 
business 
school 
students, avg 
age 21 
3 upper level 
PhD. 
students 
with prior 
work 
experience.  
Scale 1 -10. 
(ICC(1, 
k) = .63, 
ICC(2, k) 
= .65, F  
= 2.88, 
p< .001 , 
rwg = 
.82). 
Chua 2013 
The costs 
of ambient 
cultural 
disharmon
y: Indirect 
intercultura
l conflicts 
in social 
environme
nt 
undermine 
creativity 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
Study 1: 
N=188, avg 
age 34, from 
Mturk; Study 
2: N=264 
college 
students 
Study 1: 2 
coders 
experienced 
in fashion 
design; ideas 
task;  scale 
1-7; Study 2: 
2 
entrepreneur
s; business 
ideas task; 
scale 1-7 
Study 1: 
ICC .78-
.88, 
agreemen
t .68-.81; 
Study 2: 
ICC .89-
.90, 
agreemen
t .82 
Mattern, 
et al 
2013 
Matching 
Creativity 
Perceptions 
and 
Capabilitie
s: 
Exploring 
the Impact 
of 
Feedback 
Messages. 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Education 
N=849 
college 
students 
4 researchers 
rated 
Alternative 
Uses Task 
responses 
for 
originality, 
flexibility 
and 
elaboration. 
Cohen's 
Kappa: 
.92, .98 
and .99 
Schuhma
cher and 
Kuester 
2012 
Identificati
on of Lead 
User 
Characteris
tics 
Driving the 
Quality of 
Service 
Innovation 
Ideas 
Creativity and 
Innovation 
Management 
N=120 Mturk 
users, avg 
age 33 years 
2 soccer 
club 
webpage 
user/manage
rs, judged 
novelty, 
feasibility 
and 
relevance 
each on 7 
point scale  
Cohen's 
Kappa: 
.87 
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Grant & 
Berry 
2011 
The 
Necessity 
of Others is 
the Mother 
of 
Invention: 
Intrinsic 
and 
Prosocial 
Motivation
s, 
Perspective 
Taking, 
and 
Creativity 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
N=100 
undergrads 
Students 
with work 
experience 
in music 
business (3-
4 years) 
rated ideas 
for 
generating 
revenue on 
creativity, 1-
7 scale 
ICC2: 
.69, 
agreemen
t: .63 
Santanen, 
et al. 
2004 
Causal 
Relationshi
ps in 
Creative 
Problem 
Solving: 
Comparing 
Facilitation 
In... 
Journal of 
Management 
Information 
Systems 
N=244 MIS 
undergrad 
students in 61 
four person 
teams 
6 disaster 
relief experts 
rated 
solutions to 
water crisis 
scenario; 4 
university 
officials 
rated 
solutions for 
School of 
Business 
problem.  15 
years avg 
experience 
.834 for 
water 
crisis; .91 
for 
business 
problem. 
Ray & 
Romano 
2013 
Creative 
Problem 
Solving in 
GSS 
Groups: Do 
Creative 
Styles 
Matter? 
Group Decision 
and Negotiation 
N=250 
business 
school 
students, avg 
age 28 
Unstated 
number of 
judges 
(faculty with 
background 
in creativity 
and student 
judges) rated 
group ideas 
on Coffee 
Shop 
problem on 
novelty, 
cost-
effectiveness 
Unk 
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and 
feasibility 
Shalley 1995 
Effects of 
coaction, 
expected 
evaluation, 
and goal 
setting on 
creativity 
and 
productivit
y 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
N=84 
undergrads, 
avg age 22 
3 doctoral 
students 
with some 
HR work 
experience 
and MBA or 
MA judged 
creativity of 
responses to 
an HR 
manager in-
basket 
complex-
heuristic 
exercise, 
scale 1-7 
Cronbach'
s alpha: 
.77 
Perry-
Smith & 
Shalley 
2014 
A Social 
Compositio
n View of 
Team 
Creativity: 
The Role 
of Member 
Nationality
-
Heterogene
ous Ties 
Outside of 
the Team 
Organization 
science 
N=82 long-
term MBA 
teams of four 
to six 
individuals 
2 doctoral 
students and 
2 professors 
independentl
y rated 
creativity of 
team’s final 
projects 
Interrater 
reliability
: rwg2 
with a 
mean 
rwg2 .82 
and a 
median 
rwg2 .88. 
Litchfield
, et al. 
2011 
Directing 
idea 
generation 
using 
brainstormi
ng with 
specific 
novelty 
goals 
Motivation & 
Emotion 
N=147 
college 
freshman 
2 college 
students 
rated 
novelty, 
creativity, 
effectiveness 
and 
practicality, 
scale 1-5 
average 
rwg for 
novelty 
(.78), 
creativity 
(.79), 
effectiven
ess (.77), 
and 
practicalit
y (.71)  
(James et 
 150 
al. 1984, 
1993) 
Binnewie
s, et al. 
2008 
Age and 
creativity 
at work: 
The 
interplay 
between 
job 
resources, 
age and 
idea 
creativity 
Journal of 
Managerial 
Psychology 
N=119 
nurses who 
reported 
“creative 
ideas” in a 
broader 
survey, avg 
age 34 
3 registered  
nurses  with 
10 to 30 
years 
teaching 
experience, 
rated on 
novelty, 
usefulness 
and overall 
creativity, 1-
10 scale 
ICC of 
.89 
Wynder 2007 
The 
Interaction 
Between 
Domain-
Relevant 
Knowledge 
and 
Control 
System 
Design on 
Creativity 
Australian 
Journal of 
Management 
N=63 college 
students avg 
age 20, 
provided 
ideas for a 
business 
problem 
3 graduate 
business 
students 
with some 
work 
experience 
Interrater 
reliability 
of .59-
.65; 
Cronbach
’s alpha 
of .79. 
Matthing, 
et al. 
2006 
Developing 
successful 
technology
-based 
services: 
the issue of 
identifying 
and 
involving 
innovative 
users 
The Journal of 
Services 
Marketing 
N=52 
university 
students and 
others on 
campus, 
provided new 
mobile phone 
service ideas 
4 panels, 3 
judges each 
from R&D, 
Tech and 
Marketing 
dept of 
phone 
company, 
plus a panel 
of 6 
consumers, 
rated 
“originality” 
of ideas on 
1-10 scale 
Pearson's 
r, .69-.79, 
p<.01 
Williams 2004 
Personality
, attitude, 
and leader 
influences 
European 
Journal of 
N=208 
nonacademic 
employees of 
a university, 
4 judges 
with 
graduate 
degrees in 
ICC: 
novelty 
.71, 
usefulnes
 151 
on 
divergent 
thinking 
and 
creativity 
in 
organizatio
ns 
Innovation 
Management 
asked to 
provide 
“suggestions 
for 
improvement
” 
management
, experience 
working at 
universities 
and as 
management 
consultants, 
rated novelty 
and 
usefulness 
on 1-11 
scale 
s .59, 
combined 
as 
creativity 
.78 
Marakas 
& Elam 
1997 
Creativity 
enhanceme
nt in 
problem 
solving: 
Through 
software or 
process? 
Management 
Science 
N=40 
systems 
professionals 
from a local 
information 
center and 
senior 
undergrad 
and grad MIS 
students, 
asked to 
respond to 
open-ended 
questions 
3 judges, 
members of 
faculty at 
business 
school 
0.77 
Sosak, et 
al. 
1997 
Effects of 
leadership 
style and 
anonymity 
on group 
potency 
and 
effectivene
ss in a 
group 
decision 
support 
system 
environme
nt 
Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
N=159 
undergrad 
students, 
asked to 
generate 
recommendat
ions for an 
economic 
development 
program 
2 “experts” 
rated on 
imaginativen
ess, 
innovativene
ss and value 
addition. 
Cronbach
’s alpha: 
.90, .95, 
.97. 
Runco, et 
al. 
1994 
Judgments 
of the 
creativity 
The Journal of 
Psychology 
N=47 visual 
art college 
students, 
3 
professional 
artist / art 
not 
reported 
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of artwork 
from 
students 
and 
professiona
l artists 
created a 3D 
art project 
instructor 
judges, 1-7 
scale, and 
students 
judged each 
other’s work 
Mottweil
er and 
Taylor 
2014 
Elaborated 
Role Play 
and 
Creativity 
in 
Preschool 
Age 
Children 
Psychology of 
Aesthetics, 
Creativity and 
the Arts 
N=75 
children, 
aged 4 to 5, 
asked to 
complete a 
story stem 
and N=56 
same age 
asked to draw 
a picture 
Two authors 
and research 
assistant 
rated 
creativity on 
scale of 1-5 
Cronbach
’s alpha 
.95 for 
stories, 
and .88 
for the 
drawings 
Pretz & 
Collum 
2014 
Self-
Perceptions 
of 
Creativity 
Do Not 
Always 
Reflect 
Actual 
Creative 
Performanc
e 
Psychology of 
Aesthetics, 
Creativity and 
the Arts 
N=90 4th 
year college 
undergrads.  
3 creativity 
tasks: ideas 
for $1 million 
donation, 
photo 
caption, and 
essay on 
“dream” 
project 
Ideas rated 
by 6 psych 
research 
assistants; 
“captions 
and essay 
also rated.”   
“Interrate
rs 
reliabiliti
es were” 
.862, 
.825, .892 
and .731. 
Baer, et 
al. 
2010 
Win or lose 
the battle 
for creative 
creativity: 
The power 
and perils 
of 
intergroup 
competitio
n 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
N=280 
undergrads, 
in 70 4 
person 
groups, 
performed 2 
idea 
generation 
tasks on 
improving 
student life 
Ideas rated 
by 3 
research 
assistants on 
creativity, 
scale 1-5 
“the 
median 
interrater 
agreemen
t 
coefficien
t (rwg); 
and two 
intraclass 
correlatio
n 
coefficien
ts: 
rwg2=.80
; 
ICC=.37, 
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ICC2=.64
” 
Silvia 2008 
Discernme
nt and 
Creativity: 
How Well 
Can People 
Identify 
Their Most 
Creative 
Ideas?  
Psychology of 
Aesthetics, 
Creativity and 
the Arts 
N=226 
college psych 
students, 
created 4 
divergent 
ideas, then 
chose the 2 
most creative 
Ideas rated 
by 
undergrad 
research 
assistants on 
originality, 
scale 1-5 
Not 
reported.  
Comparis
on was 
correlatio
n between 
participan
ts’ top 2 
choices 
with 
judges 
ratings 
       
    
Total “expert” judges = 4 / 
41 
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